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Abstract
Quantum information theory investigates the information content of quantum
systems, hence generalizes classical information theory. The classical bits are
generalized into quantum bits (two-level systems). Unlike classical bits, each
quantum bit can be in a superposition of its two basis states, and several quan-
tum bits can be entangled to each other. Unlike classical bits, quantum bits
cannot be duplicated, and furthermore, the state of a quantum bit cannot be
identified, unless more (classical) information is available. This property of
quantum information was used to suggest new type of cryptography, quantum
cryptography, which uses quantum bits to encode classical bits, before providing
them to possible adversaries.
Quantum cryptography suggests various possibilities which are beyond the
abilities of classical cryptography. In particular, it suggests schemes for an
information-theoretic secure key distribution, and an alternative to the exist-
ing “public/secret key distribution” which cannot be information secure, and
are not proven to be computationally secure. The main advantage of quantum
schemes over any classical scheme is the fact that quantum information cannot
be passively intercepted, hence eavesdropping attempts induce noise. Unfor-
tunately, in the presence of noisy channels and devices, none of the existing
schemes for quantum key distribution is proven secure: the eavesdropper can
obtain some small amount of information while inducing an acceptable noise;
furthermore, the legitimate users must correct their data using some error cor-
rection code, and the eavesdropper can obtain this information as well. Classical
privacy amplification techniques were suggested to yield a secure final key, but
there is no complete proof of security yet. As is common in cryptography, a
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promising suggestion might be found worthless later on; Future technology, such
as the ability to maintain quantum states for a long time, could be destructive
(or even fatal) to all such schemes.
This thesis investigates the importance of quantum memory in quantum
cryptography, concentrating on quantum key distribution schemes.
In the hands of an eavesdropper – a quantum memory is a powerful tool,
putting in question the security of quantum cryptography; Classical privacy am-
plification techniques, used to prove security against less powerful eavesdrop-
pers, might not be effective when the eavesdropper can keep quantum states
for a long time. In this work we suggest a possible direction for approaching
this problem. We define strong attacks of this type, and show security against
them, suggesting that quantum cryptography is secure. We start with a com-
plete analysis regarding the information about a parity bit (since parity bits are
used for privacy amplification). We use the results regarding the information on
parity bits to prove security against very strong eavesdropping attacks, which
uses quantum memories and all classical data (including error correction codes)
to attack the final key directly.
In the hands of the legitimate users, a quantum memory is also a useful tool.
We suggest a new type of quantum key distribution scheme where quantum
memories are used instead of quantum channels. This scheme is especially
adequate for networks of many users. The use of quantum memory also allows
reducing the error rate to improve large scale quantum cryptography, and to
enable the legitimate users to work with reasonable error rate.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Quantum
Cryptography and Quantum
Memory
Classical information theory, originated by Shannon [93], quantifies the intuitive
concept of information as it appears in a statement like ‘this page contains a lot
of information’. It serves as an invaluable tool in communication theory, data
processing (e.g., compression), computation theory, cryptography and many
other areas in electrical engineering and computer science.
Information is deeply related to physical objects; As such, classical infor-
mation theory can deal only with cases where the carriers of information are
classical object (even if underneath there is a deeper quantum reality). In the
quantum world it is natural to extend this theory to the more general “quan-
tum information” theory [105, 64, 65, 34, 69, 54, 86, 92], which considers the
information content of a quantum system. We are mainly interested in cases
where information is encoded into quantum states, and later on decoded back
to classical information. The quantum information is transformed to classical
information when a test occurs in a laboratory, due to the projection postulate
of conventional quantum mechanics. A quantum state (in general, a density
matrix) ρ, has a practical meaning: it allows us to predict probabilities regard-
ing various physical tests. Its expectation value regarding a specific state φ,
〈φ|ρ|φ〉, can be measured in the laboratory (at least, in principle). In this sense,
it is a subjective property of a system: non-pure states are defined as statistical
mixtures of pure states1, hence one considers a state to be non pure due to hav-
ing partial knowledge on the preparation procedure. If a system is entangled
with other systems which are not available to us, then we can only consider
measurements on our system, and our prediction ability is more limited; we
have to “trace out” the degrees of freedom of the other systems, in order to be
1 Most books use this definition. Unlike most books Landau and Lifshitz [68] use a different
definition which assigns objective meaning to the density matrix. In this work we consider
only the subjective meaning of the density matrix (namely, prediction abilities which can be
verified in the laboratory).
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able to predict the probabilities of outcomes of various tests performed in our
laboratory. The state of our system depends on classical information which we
might obtain from people who hold the other systems, since such information
could influence our possible predictions.
There are various aspects of quantum information, such as entropy of quan-
tum systems [105, 64], the coding theorem for quantum information [92, 63],
optimal identification of quantum states [34, 69, 89, 25, 49], quantum noise
in transmission channels [29], communication using quantum states and many
others. This work deals with quantum communication and cryptography.
In communication theory, information is transmitted from one person to
another through a channel. Information theory tells us how well a state (say, a
string of bits) can be reproduced after it passed through a noisy channel. Thus,
it quantifies the reliability of the received state. In classical communication,
the information is carried by distinguishable signals, each of which represents a
distinct letter of some alphabet (usually binary). Each signal can be duplicated
and can also be identified unambiguously unless some noise is added. When a
small amount of noise exists, the state could still be identified with excellent
probability of success if enough redundancy is added to the transmitted data.
In quantum communication, the information is carried by signals which are not
necessarily distinguishable [34, 69, 25]. In general, we can omit the specification
of the carriers and consider only their quantum states (unless we deal with
implementations). For our purposes, it usually suffices to choose an abstract
two-level system (with a basis |0〉 and |1〉) to replace the classical bit. A general
state of a two-level system α|0〉+ β|1〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, is called a “qubit”
(quantum bit) [92]; any larger system consists of many qubits. If one uses
non-orthogonal states to represent classical signals ‘0’ and ‘1’, such that the
overlap of the two states is not zero, the encoded data cannot be duplicated nor
identified unambiguously.
In cryptography, information must always remain secret from some people.
In this scientific area, human intentions play an important role, and we must
always assume that people wish to learn this secret data. For instance, a sender,
Alice, wishes to send some data to a receiver, Bob, in a way that an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, cannot learn that data. In this case, information theory may tell us
the maximal amount of information available to Eve, depending on her abilities.
Thus, it quantifies the security of the secret data. An eavesdropper listening
to classical communication can (in principle) remain unexposed, since the data
can always be duplicated. Quantum communication allows for more. Using
non-orthogonal quantum states to transmit classical bits, the signals cannot be
duplicated [107], and any gain of information about them necessarily induces
noise. Thus, (unlike classical channels) quantum channels cannot be passively
intercepted, when non-orthogonal quantum states are transmitted! This fact
was used to suggest a new type of cryptography — quantum cryptography —
where the use of non-orthogonal states might permit performing new tasks,
which are beyond the ability of classical cryptography.
One of the main goals of cryptography, the secure transmission of messages,
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can be achieved using a secret key known only to the sender, Alice, and the
receiver, Bob. The problem is how to distribute the key. Achieving a secure key
distribution is among the most important goals of cryptography, and the cur-
rent ways this is done are either very expensive or not proven secure. The main
achievement of quantum cryptography is the design of schemes for secure key
distribution. They are using non-orthogonal quantum states, hence, any eaves-
dropping attempt induces noise and can be noticed by the legitimate users2.
The goal of any quantum key distribution protocol is to generate a common key
while not leaking any significant information to an unrestricted adversary; If the
amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper is much smaller than a single
bit, the key is said to be information-theoretic secure. The classical “public
key distribution” and many other protocols in classical cryptography are not
designed to withstand adversaries who have unlimited computation abilities;
i.e., they can be at most computationally secure. This advantage of quantum
cryptography would not be crucial if indeed classical cryptography was compu-
tationally secure. However, the existing schemes for classical key distribution
rely upon unproven computational assumptions (such as the difficulty of factor-
ing large numbers).
In addition to key distribution, it is important to mention a very similar task
– namely “key expansion”. In a key expansion protocol some short amount of
information (say, m bits) is shared in advance between Alice and Bob, and it is
used to derive long common keys (say, of total length n much larger than m). If
such an expansion leaks only an exponentially small amount of information to
an eavesdropper (say, 2−m bit) the final key is still information-theoretic secure.
Quantum key distribution demands, in addition to the quantum channel, also
an “unjammable” classical channel in which the transmitted data can possibly
be monitored passively, but not modified. This requirement [5] can be derived
in principle using schemes for broadcasting the classical messages. Alterna-
tively, it can be fulfilled if the legitimate users can identify each other through
the classical channel. In cryptographic terms, it means that they share some
information in advance, thus the so called “quantum key distribution” should
be better called “quantum key expansion”. Having clarified this point, we shall
keep using the “wrong” term as is common.
Quantum cryptography was invented in 1969 byWiesner [106] in his paper on
“conjugate coding” (unpublished by that time). Ten years later, a collaboration
between Bennett and Brassard (based on Wiesner’s idea) was the actual starting
point of quantum cryptography [7], and lead to “quantum key distribution” in
1984 [6]. Their basic idea is to use non-orthogonal quantum states for key
distribution since such states cannot be cloned by a potential eavesdropper.
They used four possible states, therefore, we refer to their scheme as the four-
state scheme. In 1991 Ekert [44] proposed (following a suggestion of Deutsch) to
use quantum nonlocality for cryptographic purposes, and the connection of his
scheme to the original quantum key distribution scheme was demonstrated by
2 For a more accurate analysis of this delicate point see [52, 88, 53].
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Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [11]. We refer to their version of Ekert scheme as
the EPR scheme. Another important scheme was later proposed by Bennett [4],
showing that quantum key distribution can be performed even if one uses only
two non-orthogonal states. We refer to this scheme as the two-state scheme. Any
of these schemes can be used to design a quantum key distribution protocol,
where a quantum channel and an unjammable classical channels are used to
transmit a secret key. If Alice and Bob identify errors (by the discussion over
the classical channel) they quit the protocol. Thus, Eve can force them to quit
the protocol, but she cannot cheat them into thinking she is not listening, and
still get information about their key.
The first prototype for quantum key distribution was built in 1989 [5]. It
provided a proof of feasibility by performing a distribution over a distance of 30
centimeters. Since then, much more practical prototypes were built for a dis-
tance of 30 kilometers [74] in a coil, a distance of 24 kilometers in underground
optical fiber [55], and 23 kilometers in underwater optical fiber [84]. The imple-
mentations are using either photon polarization (as originally proposed in [6])
or phase and interferometry (as in [4]). Unfortunately, they are mainly using
weak pulses of coherent light instead of Fock states of single photons, and this
creates various problems of security, due to the use of a Hilbert space which is
different from the Hilbert space used in the theoretical schemes. This problem
is considered in [58, 110]. It is yet unclear whether future practical quantum key
distribution will be based upon weak coherent pulses or upon single photons.
The basic theoretical schemes already raise the main fundamental questions
regarding quantum key distribution, thus we shall not consider here the more
complicated practical schemes which use weak coherent pulses.
Most of the fundamental questions in quantum key distribution (and more
generally, in quantum cryptography) are due to activities which are permitted
by the rules of quantum mechanics, but are not technologically feasible. The
ability to maintain quantum states unchanged for long times was ignored till
recently, but today it strongly influences any suggestion (or analysis) in quan-
tum cryptography. In this work we investigate the role of quantum memory in
quantum cryptography, and mainly in quantum key distribution.
The most important question in quantum cryptography is to determine how
secure it really is. Any practical implementation must take into account that
some errors are inevitable due to errors in creation, transmission and detection
of quantum states. The legitimate users must be able to withstand some errors,
and furthermore, must correct them to yield a final (shorter) common key. Thus,
Eve can gain some information from both the quantum states (if she induce less
errors than permitted) and the error-correction data (transmitted through a
classical channel). Eve’s total information depends on the permitted error rate,
on her attack and on the error-correction code used by Alice and Bob. Clearly,
it is not negligible. To overcome this problem, and enable the derivation of a
final key which is both reliable, and secure, privacy amplification schemes were
designed [5, 13, 9]. Their goal is to reduce Eve’s information to be as small as
desired, for the price of shortening the final key even further. To do so, collective
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properties of substrings of bits (e.g., the parity of a substring) are used as the
final key.
In early papers on quantum cryptography, the security of quantum key dis-
tribution was studied under the assumption that the eavesdropper is performing
standard (von Neumann) measurements on the photons on their way from Alice
to Bob. Such analysis can be found, for instance, in [57, 5], where in [57] the
issue of Eve’s information gain versus the disturbance to Bob’s state was dis-
cussed, and in [5] Eve’s information on the final string was also considered. It is
rather clear [5, 13] (although, not explicitly proven) that privacy amplification
is effective against any attack of that type, implying the security of quantum
key distribution against such attacks.
Unfortunately, quantum mechanics permits much more sophisticated eaves-
dropping strategies, against which there are no security proofs3.
Quantum gates are currently under investigation by both theorists [36, 41,
2, 31] and experimentalists [33, 103, 82]. Eve can use quantum gates to per-
form translucent attacks [45], which are not “opaque” (intercept/resent) as the
standard measurements are. In translucent attacks Eve interacts with Alice’s
particle as follows: she attaches an auxiliary particle (a probe) to each transmit-
ted particle by performing some unitary transformation on them together. After
the interaction, Alice’s particle is sent from Eve to Bob, in a way that Eve does
not know its exact state. If the interaction is weak, it results in a very small
disturbance to the state of the transmitted particle. Information gain versus
disturbance in such attacks is improved compared to “opaque” attacks [45] and
was investigated further [51, 48]. When attacking the four-state scheme of [6],
the measurement on the probes can be delayed till receiving the data regarding
the basis used by Alice. The main advantage of translucent attack over opaque
attack is that it can be performed on all the transmitted particles. In this case
it provides very little information on each particle, but it might provide much
more information on a collective property used as the final key! Fortunately, it
is clear [9] that privacy amplification is still effective against such a single par-
ticle attack, and a partial proof was also provided [79]. A demonstration of the
effectiveness of privacy amplification against such attacks is given in Chapter 2;
this is done for an explicit but typical example.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of privacy amplification against single-particle
attacks is not sufficient. Eve can do much more than such an attack if she is
capable of keeping the particles in quantum memories. In this case she can
perform joint attacks which are directed towards the final key, and the effec-
tiveness of privacy amplification against them is in question. Such attacks were
considered in some papers [5, 10], and were analyzed only in case of error-free
channels [109] (the analysis was done for quantum oblivious transfer, but the
proof applies to quantum key distribution [75] as well). In Chapter 2 we explain
the security problem in details, and we present a restricted class of joint attacks
which we call collective attacks, in which each transmitted particle is attached
3 But see Section 2.5.
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to a separate probe. All probes are measured together after Eve gets all classical
data, and the attacks are directed against the final key. Such joint attacks are
much simpler than the most general joint attacks, however, they are still general
enough to present the power of joint attacks. Furthermore, we could not find
any joint attack which is stronger than the collective attacks. Thus, we suggest
a new approach to the security problem:
• to prove the security against collective attacks.
• to prove that collective attacks are the strongest joint attacks.
While we have done a lot of progress regarding the first issue, we didn’t do
much progress regarding the second. We only explain the randomization argu-
ment which provides the intuition that collective attacks are the strongest joint
attacks.
The main achievement of this work is to provide various proofs of the security
of the final key (the parity bit) against a very powerful eavesdropper who has
both quantum gates and quantum memories. In Chapter 3 we find the optimal
information regarding the parity bit, obtained by any type of measurement,
and we show that the best measurement is indeed a joint measurement in an
entangled basis [15]. In Chapter 4 we consider various realistic attacks on the
parity bit which use both quantum and classical (error correction) information
and we prove security against them. Our results provide strong evidence that
quantum key distribution is secure. We consider various collective attacks which
leave the eavesdropper with probes in pure states [20] and mixed states [21],
and we prove security against them.
In parallel to our work, Mayers [76] and a group in England [38] came up
with other approaches to the joint attack, and several works studied the single-
particle attacks [71, 51, 72]. The techniques presented in these papers may well
prove useful in advancing the issue of the security of quantum key distribution.
In addition to studying the use of a quantum memory to the benefit of
the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography, we also study other applications of
quantum memory, to the benefit of the legitimate users. In Chapter 5 we in-
troduce a new scheme for quantum key distribution which is implemented with
quantum memory and does not require quantum channels! It is a time-reversed
EPR scheme and correlations between particles are introduced by projecting
their states onto entangled states. Our scheme is especially suited for building
a quantum cryptographic network of many users. A quantum memory plays
an important role in the security problem also when the legitimate users are
permitted to use it (ignoring the practicability of the scheme). In Chapter 6 we
discuss new possibilities related to quantum memories: first, they become more
available due to suggestions for quantum error correction [95], and fault-tolerant
error correction [96]. Second, new applications of quantum memories, namely
the possibility to purify singlets [12], can be used to design quantum privacy
amplification [38]. We connect the two issues together: we suggest quantum
privacy amplification based upon quantum error correction, and discuss their
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implications for quantum cryptography. This discussion corrects wrong impres-
sions that the security problem has already been solved by quantum privacy
amplification [38]. Our new quantum privacy amplification suggests the surpris-
ing possibility of using “quantum repeaters” for improving secure transmission
of non-orthogonal quantum states over a long distance.
The practical interest in quantum cryptography is clear. Furthermore, quan-
tum cryptography raises very interesting physical questions:
1. How is information split between two observers (Bob and Eve)?
2. Is secure transmission of data possible under the laws of Physics?
3. How do (reduced) density matrices (thus, predictions regarding the prob-
abilities of various outcomes in any possible test) change due to additional
classical information?
The intensive research on quantum information, quantum cryptography and
quantum computing already yielded (or helped improve) various surprising ad-
vances in quantum mechanics such as teleportation, generalized measurements,
fast quantum computation, purification of singlets, and preservation of qubits.
The protocols considered here and the attacks against them are discussed in
mathematical terms, and are required to be consistent only with the mathemat-
ical foundations of quantum mechanics. We prefer to simplify the discussion as
much as possible, thus we present simplified models (such as two-level systems,
and pairs of two level systems), and not the more realistic models which are im-
plemented in laboratories (such as weak coherent states). The only exception is
the case of quantum memory. Due to its special role in this work, we give a brief
overview of possible implementations. We shall frequently use the terms existing
vs. future technologies, where we actually mean feasible in the near future vs.
infeasible in the near (foreseeable) future. We follow the common literature of
both theorists and experimentalists in order to decide how to classify each op-
eration, without investigating further into the feasibility question. For instance,
creating or measuring a singlet state (or any state of two two-level systems),
and applying any single unitary transformations onto two two-level systems, are
considered as existing although performing them in practice is still a problem.
On the other hand, combining several such transformations on more than two
two-level systems, and keeping quantum states for long times are considered as
future technology.
The distinction between existing and future technologies has a special role
in quantum cryptography: the legitimate users are normally permitted to use
existing technology only, while the opponents are permitted to use any operation
consistent with the rules of quantum mechanics. Thus, a proof of security
must hold against a “quantum” opponent and a practical protocol is performed
by existing technology. In cases we permit the legitimate users to use future
technology we explicitly say it, and we explain the motivation for it.
In our work, we shall use alternately Dirac’s bracket notation, vector nota-
tion and spin notation |0〉 =
(
1
0
)
= | ↑〉, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
= | ↓〉, cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 =
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(
cos θ
sin θ
)
= cos θ| ↑〉 + sin θ| ↓〉, etc. In case of spin in x direction we also denote
| →〉 = (1/√2)(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉) = 1√
2
(
1
1
)
, etc.
The rest of this introduction is organized as follows: The basics of clas-
sical information are described in Section 1.1. Quantum information theory,
and mainly the use of quantum states for transmitting classical bits, are de-
scribed in Section 1.2. The principles of classical cryptography are described
in Section 1.3. We review the basic quantum key distribution schemes in Sec-
tion 1.4, where we also explicitly present a key distribution protocol with all
its details, and a detailed explanation of basic eavesdropping attacks and the
security against them. We introduce quantum memory in Section 1.5, in which
we also discuss basic uses of quantum memories in quantum cryptography, and
suggest implementations for a quantum memory. Recent progress in quantum
computing [35, 94] are deeply related to this work, although indirectly. A brief
introduction to the exciting new developments in quantum computing is given
in Section 1.6.
1.1 Classical Information
Classical information theory [93, 1] quantifies the idea of information. If one
tells us that the temperature on June 25 went up to about 30 degrees (Celsius)
in Haifa, we would not gain much new information due to our a priori knowledge
about the weather in that season. But if he tells us that it was snowing that day
he surely provides us a lot of new information. To quantify this, some definitions
are required. The self information of an event u is I(u) = log(1/P (u)), where
P (u) is the probability of the event, and where we always use log2 so the basic
unit is a bit. A rare event (e.g., snowing in June) has a large amount of self
information. A multiplication of probabilities yields summation of information.
The entropy of an ensemble A of events (letters) a1, . . . , an where each letter ai
appears with probability P (ai) is the expected value of the self information
H(A) = E[ log2(1/P (A))] = −
n∑
i=1
P (ai) log(P (ai)) (1.1)
and can be thought of as a measure of our lack of information on the unknown
event in A. For instance, for a binary alphabet, H = −∑2i=1 12 log 12 = 1 if
the letters appear with equal probability, and H = 0 if one letter appears with
certainty. The entropy of a binary alphabet with probabilities p and (1− p) is
denoted by H(p)
H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) . (1.2)
Two ensembles of letters A and B might have dependent probability distri-
butions. The trivial example is when A is the input alphabet for some infor-
mation channel and B is the output. The source is assumed to be memoryless
and stationary. An average distortion between input vector and output vector
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is a measure for the channel quality. Usually an additive distortion measure is
used d(u, v) =
∑m
i=1 d(ui, vi) where d(ui, vi) is a one letter distance. It is called
the Hamming distance if d(ui, vi) = 0 for ui = vi and d(ui, vi) = 1 for ui 6= vi.
For instance, the Hamming distance between the strings 000 and 111 is three.
This measure can also be used as a measure of distinguishability of two input
vectors (code words). In channel coding we increase the number of bits which
encode each code word so that the additive Hamming distance between any two
legitimate code words is increased. Hence, they can be distinguished even when
the channel is noisy. Such techniques (known as error-correction techniques)
enable receiving a reliable output when the channel is noisy.
The relation between input and output of a transmission channel is described
in terms of information [93, 1], and the Hamming distance can be a measure
for the distortion of a string transmitted through the channel. The conditional
probability of B = bi given that A = aj is P (B = bi|A = aj) [we write P (bi|aj)
for convenience]. The joint probability for both aj and bi is P (bi, aj). In case of
independent probability distributions it is equal to P (bi)P (aj), and in general
it is given by the Bayes probability law
P (bi|aj)P (aj) = P (bi, aj) = P (aj|bi)P (bi) . (1.3)
The Bayes probability law presents the symmetry of input and output. The
conditional entropy is defined by
H(B|A) = −∑
j
∑
i
P (aj, bi) logP (bi|aj) (1.4)
where the sum is over the size of the input and the output alphabets. When A
and B are independent, H(B|A) = H(B), meaning that we gain no information
on B by being told what A is. Otherwise H(B|A) < H(B) meaning that
our lack of knowledge about B is decreased when A is given. The gain in
information when A is given is called the mutual information and is among the
most important notions in information theory. The mutual information I(A;B)
is symmetric in A and B.
I(A;B) = H(B)−H(B|A) = H(A)−H(A|B)
=
∑
i
∑
j
P (aj, bi) log
P (aj , bi)
P (aj)P (bi)
(1.5)
In a perfect channel the output signals are completely determined by the
input signals. The channel introduces no errors. A Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC) with input A and output B is a channel with binary alphabet where the
signals are transported with symmetric distortion (i.e., equal error probabilities
Pe). The optimal mutual information in this case is achieved when the input
probabilities are also equal (hence also the output probabilities). It is
I(A;B) = H(B)−H(B|A) = 1−H(Pe)
= 1 + Pe logPe + (1− Pe) log(1− Pe)
=
1
2
[
2Pe log(2Pe) + 2(1− Pe) log(2(1− Pe))
]
, (1.6)
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sometimes denoted as I2(Pe).
For a given channel, the optimal mutual information (over all possible input
probabilities) is called the channel capacity. The channel capacity C is a measure
of the minimal distortion caused by the channel. For a binary channel C ≤ 1.
The ‘Channel Coding Theorem’ states that it is possible to derive an error-free
code using a non-perfect channel [93, 1]: for any positive ǫ, we can choose an
integer m and N vectors, N < 2mC, of length m (to be used as code words), such
that all code words can be distinguished with error probability smaller than ǫ.
Another important channel is the Binary Erasure Channel (BEC) which is
actually not a binary channel since its output contains, in addition to ‘0’ and ‘1’
also the letter ‘?’ which stands for an inconclusive result. This channel intro-
duces no error but the output of either inputs is inconclusive with probability
P? . Channel capacity is derived with equal input probabilities and is calculated
using eq.(1.3), (1.4) and (1.5) to be
I = H(A)−H(A|B) = 1 +∑
j
P (bj)
∑
i
P (ai|bj) logP (ai|bj)
= 1− P? . (1.7)
Note that the error probability Pe and the probability P? (of an inconclusive
result) have a different weight in their contribution to the mutual information.
1.2 Quantum Information
Contrary to a classical state, a quantum state cannot be identified unless addi-
tional information is provided. Suppose that a spin measuring device is aligned
in the z direction, so that it can identify the spin of an electron unambiguously
if it is prepared along the z direction. An electron with some arbitrary (pure)
spin state, say
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (1.8)
(with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1), will yield a result ‘0’ (electron went up in a measuring
device) or ‘1’ (electron went down in that measuring device), unpredictably.
The only clue that the state was as stated is that the probability for each result
can be calculated. These probabilities are |α|2 for the result ‘0’ and |β|2 for the
result ‘1’. Only if the physical state is taken from a set of orthogonal states in
a known basis can it be identified in one measurement as in the classical case.
The n letters of a quantum communication channel can be any different (not
necessarily orthogonal nor pure) quantum states ρ1 . . . ρn on an N -dimensional
Hilbert space HN . The mutual information of such a channel is a function not
only of the input probabilities, but also of the choice of measurement performed
by the receiver. Even in case of two orthogonal states, the receiver may select a
bad choice of measurement direction which will tell him nothing. Therefore, one
of the main questions is how to maximize the mutual information. For given
signals and given input probabilities of the source, that is, for a given density
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matrix
ρ =
n∑
i=1
piρi , (1.9)
what is the optimal measurement, and what is the mutual information in this
case (called accessible mutual information)? In classical information theory, the
only parameter controlled by the legitimate users is the input probabilities: op-
timizing the mutual information over all possible input probabilities yield the
“channel capacity”. In quantum information theory, the users control both the
input probabilities and the measurement, and optimizing both to maximize the
mutual information yields the channel capacity. We usually deal with given
(and equal) input probabilities, and care only about the accessible mutual in-
formation and not about the channel capacity.
The issue of finding the accessible information is frequently considered in
the literature. One way to attack this problem is to find upper [64] and lower
[62] bounds on this information where the entropy of a quantum system,
S = Tr (ρ log ρ)−∑
i
Tr (ρi log ρi) (1.10)
serves as the upper bound. Another way is to investigate and solve some special
cases (subclasses) [69, 34, 25] or concrete examples [34, 65]. Levitin [69] dis-
cussed two density matrices with equal determinants in 2-dimensional Hilbert
space, and Braunstein and Caves [25] considered density matrices which are
close to each other. Various cases of pure states are also solved; Kholevo [65]
and Davies [34] presented examples (with n > N) where the optimal mutual in-
formation is derived with a non-standard measurement (i.e. non von Neumann
measurements) since non-standard measurements [61] can result in more than
N results. On the other hand, it seems [69] (but has not been proven) that if
the Hilbert space spanned by n pure states is n-dimensional, the measurement
which optimizes mutual information is a standard (projection) measurement.
With some additional conditions, it probably holds for density matrices as well.
Let us consider the simple case of two non-orthogonal pure states in H2. A
generalization of this to HN is trivial since two pure states always span some
2-dimensional subspace of HN . Suppose that the sender of the information,
Alice, emits particles in one of the two non-orthogonal states |u〉 and |v〉, which
represent bits 0 and 1, respectively (the state of each particle is known to Alice).
The states are sent with equal probabilities. Since these two states are not
orthogonal, the receiver, Bob, cannot identify with certainty the state of a given
photon. By a suitable choice of basis, the two non-orthogonal states |u〉 and |v〉
can be written as
|u〉 =
(
cosα
sinα
)
and |v〉 =
(
cosα
− sinα
)
, (1.11)
where 0 < α < 45◦. The angle between the two states is 2α. Note that the
overlap between the two states is
C = 〈u|v〉 = cos2 α− sin2 α = cos 2α . (1.12)
15
A standard measurement in an orthogonal basis symmetric to the two states op-
timizes [69] the mutual information; it is analogous to a BSC. This measurement
introduces an error
Pe = sin
2(
π
4
− α) = 1− sin 2α
2
, (1.13)
hence,
I
BSC
= 1−H(Pe) = I2(Pe) . (1.14)
Although a standard measurement is optimal in this case a non standard
measurement [60] may be better for certain purposes. The receiver can build a
device which gives a definite answer in a fraction of the cases, and an inconclusive
answer otherwise. A measurement of this type (with a perfect channel) creates
an analogy to the BEC. It lets the receiver derive the optimal deterministic
results. It is useful if the receiver is permitted to use a subset of selected bits
and throw undesired result. In such a case, a measurement which optimizes the
mutual information regarding the selected bits is preferable to the one which
optimizes the average mutual information regarding all bits. A simple way to
perform a deterministic measurement is to perform a standard measurement in
the basis of one of the vectors. We define two vectors,
|u′〉 =
(− sinα
cosα
)
and |v′〉 =
(
sinα
cosα
)
, (1.15)
which are orthogonal to |u〉 and |v〉 respectively. Suppose Bob measured in the
|u〉 |u′〉 basis: if the result is |u′〉 which is orthogonal to |u〉, it must have been the
other state |v〉 prior to the measurement; if the result is |u〉, it is inconclusive,
since it could be either of the two possibilities prior to the measurement.
The above can also be described in terms of non standard measurements, a
description which is sometimes more appropriate for such analysis. The gener-
alization of the standard projection measurement is called a positive operator
valued measure (POVM) [61, 54, 87, 86]. A POVM is a set of positive operators
A1 . . . Ak which sum up to the unit matrix 1l. Each operator corresponds to
a possible outcome of the measurement. The probability that this generalized
quantum measurement yields the µ’th element of the POVM, if the system was
prepared in a pure state ψ, is 〈ψ|Aµ|ψ〉. More generally, for a preparation rep-
resented by a density matrix ρ, this probability is Tr (ρAµ). Contrary to the
two positive operators which define a standard (projection) measurement, the
operators which build up the POVM do not have to fulfill the condition that
AiAj = 0 for i 6= j, nor that AiAi = Ai.
To derive the optimal POVM in our case, we use the vectors |u′〉, |v′〉 and a
third vector
|w〉 =
(
1
0
)
, (1.16)
equidistant from |u〉 and |v〉. It is easy to verify that the three positive operators
Av = |u′〉〈u′|/(1 + C), Au = |v′〉〈v′|/(1 + C), Aw = 2C |w〉〈w|/(1 + C),
(1.17)
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(where C = cos 2α) sum up to the unit matrix 1l, and that Au and Av are
maximal (increasing them further will violate the conditions for a POVM). A
quantum test yielding Av rules out the initial state u which is orthogonal to it.
The same is true for Au while Aw yields an inconclusive result. The probability
of an inconclusive result is
〈u|Aw|u〉 = 〈v|Aw|v〉 = C, (1.18)
hence,
I
BEC
= 1− C . (1.19)
It is always possible [87] to extend the Hilbert space of states, H, in which
this POVM is defined, in such a way that there exists, in the extended space, K,
a set of orthogonal projection operators, Pµ , summing up to the unit operator,
and such that each one of the Aµ in Eq. (1.19) is the projection of one of these
Pµ from K to H. This is Neumark’s theorem [86]. The physical interpretation
of this theorem is that the extended space K corresponds to a combination of
the system to be measured with another system, called ancilla, prepared in a
known state [60, 87].
Another POVM, less efficient but simpler to realize than the above one, is
the one we described earlier (a standard measurement in one of the basis). This
POVM is made of the positive operators:
Av = (|u′〉〈u′|)/2, Au = (|v′〉〈v′|)/2, Aw = (|u〉〈u|+ |v〉〈v|)/2 . (1.20)
In this case, the ancilla merely registers which basis was used.
The optimal mutual information for the two non-orthogonal pure states is
derived by a standard projection measurement. The optimal basis is an orthog-
onal basis symmetric to the two states[69, 70]. An unproven claim of Levitin
is that the optimal measurement is a standard measurement also for the case
of two density matrices in H2. Levitin finds the accessible information for the
simple case of two density matrices with equal determinant and input proba-
bilities, where, again, the optimal basis is symmetric. Exact solutions for more
complicated cases are not known.
1.3 Classical Cryptography
The art of cryptography is almost as old as wars are. First, the transmission
of a secret message was done by trusted messengers. Then, people started to
use substitution codes which ‘prevented’ the enemy from reading the messages
even if he has got them. In this cryptographic method each letter is replaced by
another letter using some secret permutation, whose choice is chosen from all
the 26! possible permutations. The permutation must be known to the receiver,
thus the sender and the receiver must share some secret data (a key) in advance.
However, statistical properties of the language can be used to crack such codes.
More recently (16th century), a new technique was replacing the substitution
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codes. In this technique, the data (which for our purposes is always represented
by a string of bits) is divided into strings of equal length k, and each string
is combined (say, by a bitwise XOR operation) with a random key of length
k known to the sender and the receiver. The combined data is sent through
the communication channel. The usage of a random key reduces the statistical
characteristics, since a letter is not always replaced by the same letter. The one
time pad version of the key encoding (also called Vernam cipher), where the
random key K is as long as the message M , was invented at the beginning of
this century. In this encoding the i’th bit of the message is XORed with the
i’th bit of the key to yield the i’th bit of the encoded message C, Ci = Mi⊕Ki
(so that Ci is zero if Ki =Mi and one otherwise). For example,
M 001110 101011 100101 001001 110111
K 100010 111010 010100 001101 011010
C 101100 010001 110001 000100 101101
. (1.21)
This cipher cannot be broken at all since the key randomizes the message com-
pletely. It is easy to see that knowing the transferred message C =M⊕K gives
no information about M to an eavesdropper. This is formally proven using
information theory; The eavesdropper’s information is not increased since the
probability of guessing the message M is independent of C: P (M |C) = P (M).
The safety of the transmission depends on the safety of the key, which has
to be uniformly random, secret and shared only by the legitimate users. More-
over, safety can be guaranteed only if the key is used only once. The problem
is therefore how to distribute the random key between users in a secure way.
Classically, the only possibility is either through personal meetings, or through
trusted couriers. Therefore, one time pads are very expensive, and are imprac-
tical for many applications.
Most practical cryptographic systems nowadays rely on different principles,
i.e., computational security. This means that the system can be broken in prin-
ciple, but that the computation time required to do so is too long to pose a real
threat. Unfortunately, none of the existing schemes is proven to be computation-
ally secure, and they rely on various computational assumptions. On one hand,
they can be adjusted to yield any desired level of security once these assump-
tions will be proven. On the other hand, the existing schemes might be broken
in the future due to technological progress (faster computers), mathematical
advances (faster algorithms or future theoretical progress in computation the-
ory), or new type of computers (such as quantum computers) which are not
equivalent to the standard computers.
The existing public key distribution schemes are based on the very reason-
able (but unproven) complexity assumption that there are problems which can
be solved in non-deterministic polynomial time but cannot be solved in poly-
nomial time (see explanation in Section 1.6), combined with additional less
solid assumptions, such as that factoring large numbers is difficult. While the
first assumption is very reasonable, the additional assumption is not. Indeed,
some public key cryptosystems have already been broken in the past. The most
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popular public key cryptosystems nowadays are based on the assumptions that
the discrete logarithm and factorization problems are difficult. These assump-
tions might be found wrong in the future. Furthermore, recent developments in
quantum computation enable to use quantum computing devices to crack (at
least in principle) all public key cryptosystems which are based on the discrete
logarithm and factorization problems (and maybe many others) in polynomial
time.
The principle of public key cryptography was invented by Merkle [80] and
Diffie and Hellman [40]. Later on, this principle had lead to the RSA crytposys-
tem [91] which is the basis for the most important public key schemes. The idea
of public key cryptography is that the receiver chooses a pair of mutually inverse
transformation E and D, one used for encryption and one for decryption. The
sender does not need to know the receiver’s secret key. Instead, the receiver
publishes the encryption method E so that any user can use it (by calculat-
ing C = E(M) ) to send the receiver any message. The decryption algorithm
D remains secret, so that only the receiver can compute it and read the mes-
sage M = D(C). As we mentioned previously, public key cryptography is not
information-theoretic secure, but, based on some computational assumptions, it
is designed to be computationally secure. It is based on the presumed existence
of ‘one way functions’, E, which are easy to calculate while it is very difficult
to calculate their inverse. This would still be fine if we could prove that a huge
computing power is indeed required. Unfortunately, this is only assumed, and
none of the suggested transformations is proven to yield a reasonable and useful
one way function. To be useful for public key cryptography a one way function
must have a “trapdoor” which is used by the legitimate users, and sometimes,
the same trapdoor helps the adversary in reversing the function.
Modern cryptography deals with many other protocols, aside from the se-
cure transmission of messages, such as authentication, identification, electronic
signatures, contract-signing, zero-knowledge proofs, and more. Some basic pro-
tocols (from which more complicated protocols are built) are coin-tossing, bit
commitment and oblivious transfer. Public key cryptography provides beauti-
ful solutions to many such tasks, but usually these implementations suffer from
security problems similar to those we previously explained.
1.4 Quantum Cryptography
A different technique for key distribution, which might provide an information-
theoretic secure key distribution is quantum cryptography. The legitimate users
of a quantum key distribution scheme use non-orthogonal quantum states as the
information carriers. They cannot prevent Eve from listening to their informa-
tion exchange, but due to the “no-cloning” principle they will notice if she does,
and in such a case, they will not use the non-secret information. The no-cloning
principle assures us that any eavesdropping attempt induces noise. This noise
can be detected by Alice and Bob during the second stage of the transmission,
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which includes discussion over a classical channel.
Let us present the no-cloning principle in more details. The “no-cloning
theorem” tells us that a single quanta cannot be cloned [107, 39]: Assuming
that (any) quantum state can be cloned contradicts the unitarity of quantum
mechanics. Let u and v be two non-orthogonal (and non-identical) quantum
states, let A be the initial state of an auxiliary system used for the cloning
process, and let U be a general unitary transformation. A cloning process
which duplicates both states is [86]:
|A〉|u〉 −→ U(|A〉|u〉) = |Bu〉|u〉|u〉
|A〉|v〉 −→ U(|A〉|v〉) = |Bv〉|v〉|v〉 (1.22)
with all states normalized. This process is impossible since unitarity implies
〈u|v〉〈Bu|Bv〉 = 1 (note that the states B live in a smaller dimensional Hilbert
space than A). Moreover, even a less ambitious cloning process
|A〉|u〉 −→ U(|A〉|u〉) = |Au〉|u〉
|A〉|v〉 −→ U(|A〉|v〉) = |Av〉|v〉 , (1.23)
(with |Av〉 6= |Au〉) is impossible; In this process one attempts to gain an imprint
of the received state (|u〉 or |v〉), without disturbing the original. Unitarity
implies 〈Au|Av〉 = 1, meaning that no information at all can be gain on the
states while keeping them unchanged [11]. There is no duplicating attempt here
and we adopt Peres’ suggestion to name this “an imprint process”. Thus the
second version of “no cloning” is referred to as the “no clean imprint” theorem:
one cannot get an imprint of a quantum state without dirtying the origin.
In quantum cryptography Alice and Bob use a quantum channel to transmit
the non-orthogonal quantum states. Any attempt by Eve to learn anything
about these states induces noise. The information transmitted in a quantum
channel may be modified, hence Alice and Bob use also, in addition to the
quantum channel, an unjammable classical channel which is not secured against
eavesdropping. The quantum channel is used for the distribution of the secret
key, while the classical channel is used in particular to verify that there are no
errors (hence no eavesdropping), and later on, to send the encoded message. In
principle, this is sufficient to ensure the safety of the transmission: Alice and
Bob exchange a larger string than required for the key and use the extra part
to test for eavesdropping. If they find no errors the channel is secure hence also
the transmitted key. This can be verified to any degree of safety by checking
a larger fraction of the bits. If they do find errors they know that Eve was
listening.
Unfortunately, perfect quantum channels do not exist and Alice and Bob
may find errors even if no eavesdropper is listening. As a result, a much more
complicated protocol is required, and the eavesdropping analysis also becomes
much more complicated. At first it seemed that quantum key distribution can
still be secure in this case, but it was recently understood that security in noisy
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channels (and devices) is not guaranteed, if Eve is equipped with a quantum
memory! When we use the terms “secure” or “secret” in the rest of the work
we refer to being information-theoretic secure (unless stated otherwise).
Key distribution is only one of the implementations of quantum cryptog-
raphy. Many other tasks (and their implementations) have been considered in
the literature, based on the four-state scheme. We shall also discuss two tasks
which have been the subject of very interesting works in quantum cryptography:
oblivious transfer and bit commitment.
1.4.1 The Four-State Scheme and a Protocol for Quan-
tum Key Distribution
The first quantum key distribution scheme is the Bennett–Brassard (BB84)
scheme [6] which we call the four-state scheme. We describe it using the ter-
minology of spin 1/2 particles, but it can use any two-level system. A classical
two-level system, such as a bistable device, can only be found in one of the two
possible states, hence it encodes one bit. In contrast, a quantum two-level sys-
tem can be prepared in any coherent superposition of the two basis states, which
creates a much richer structure. Such a system is now known as a “qubit” [92]
(i.e. quantum bit). For each qubit, Alice chooses at random whether to prepare
her state along the z or the x axis, i.e., in one of the two eigenstates of either
Sˆz or Sˆx. This state, denoted by: | ↑〉, | ↓〉, |←〉 or |→〉 is then sent to Bob. It
is agreed that the two states |↑〉 and |←〉 stand for bit value ‘0’, and the other
two states, | ↓〉 and | →〉 stand for ‘1’. Bob chooses, also at random, whether
to measure Sˆz or Sˆx. When his measurement is along the same axis as Alice’s
preparation (e.g., they both use Sˆz), the measured value should be the same as
hers, whereas when they use conjugate axes, there is no correlation between his
result and Alice’s original choice. In addition to the quantum channel, the legit-
imate users also use a classical channel as previously explained. By discussing
over this channel Alice and Bob agree to discard all the instances where they did
not use the same axes. The result should be two strings of perfectly correlated
bits. These two strings shall be identical in case no natural noise occurs and
no eavesdropper interferes. We shall call this resulting string the raw data. As
the choice of axis used by Alice is unknown to Eve, any interaction by her will
unavoidably modify the transmission and introduce some errors.
In practice however, the transmission will never be perfect and there will
be some errors, even in the absence of an eavesdropper. Alice and Bob use the
classical channel to compare some portion of their data and calculate the error
rate. They decide about some permitted error rate, Pe, which they accept, and
determine this error rate according to the properties of the channel and their
devices. Eve could take advantage of that, and attack some of the bits to gain
some information, as long as the error rate she induces, pe, plus the natural
errors, do not exceed the permitted error rate. For all further discussions we
assume that Eve is powerful enough to replace the channel by a perfect channel
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so she can induce as many errors as accepted by the legitimate users pe ≈ Pe (or
more precisely – a little less): Eve can detect the particles very close to Alice’s
cite (where not many channel errors are yet induced) and release her particles
very close to Bob’s cite.
Assume Alice and Bob used the same basis. When Eve eavesdrops on a
fraction η of the transmissions, performing a standard measurement in one of
the bases (as Bob does), the error rate created is pe = η/4: when Eve uses
the correct basis, she does not introduce any error, while she creates a 50%
error rate when she uses the wrong basis. Eve knows the permitted error rate
(agreed using the classical channel), thus she chooses η = 4Pe. The average
mutual information she obtains is η/2: she has total information when she
used the correct basis, and none when she used the wrong one. Note that the
scheme is completely symmetric, so that Eve shares the same information with
Alice and with Bob. Therefore, we can write the mutual information shared
by Alice and Eve and shared by Eve and Bob as a function of the error rate:
IAE(Pe) = IEB(Pe) = 2Pe. More complicate attacks are discussed in Chapter 2.
As long as Pe is not too high, Alice and Bob might be able to use classical
information processing techniques, such as error correction and privacy ampli-
fication [5, 13, 9], to obtain a reliable and secure final key. It is called reliable
if they succeed to reduce the error rate to zero, and it is called secure if they
succeed to reduce the information obtained by Eve to zero as well (by “zero”
we mean close to zero as they wish). Both techniques are based on the use of
parity bits of long strings where the parity of a string is zero if it contains an
even number of 1’s and the parity is one if the string contains an odd number
of 1’s. For a two-bit string, this is exactly the XOR of the two bits.
The simplest error-correction code is the repetition code from one bit to
three bits: 0 is encoded as 000 and 1 as 111. It is not efficient (since the amount
of transmissions is increased by a factor of three) and it can correct only one
error in the three bits; and if two errors occur the “corrected” final bit is wrong.
This code uses two additional bits to correct a possible error in one bit. A
more efficient code [73] is the Hamming code H3 which uses three parity bits to
correct one error in four bits: Alice add to her four bits three parity bits so 16
different words are written using 7 bits. Since this example is explicitly used in
Chapter 4, let us present it in more details. The words are easily calculated by
taking the fifth bit to be the parity of bits 1, 2, and 3; the sixth bit to be the
parity of bits 1, 2, and 4; and the seventh bit to be the parity of bits 2, 3, and
4. For instance:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1
. . .
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. (1.24)
Let us call these seven-bit words wi where i goes from 1 to 16. It can be easily
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checked (an also proven) that any two words differ by at least three bits, thus
any single error can be corrected. (We say that any two words are at a Hamming
distance of at least three). When Alice sends a word wi and Bob receives it with
a single error he can correct it and re-derive wi. In practice Alice will send Bob
seven random bits. If the seven-bit word is in the above set, she (later on) sends
000. If it is 0000 001 or any word which is the bitwise XOR of wi with 0000 001
Alice sends (later on) the string 001. If it is any word which is the bitwise XOR
of wi with 0000 010 Alice sends the string 010, etc. Note that Alice actually
sends the parity bits of (1, 2, 3, 5); (1, 2, 4, 6); (2, 3, 4, 7). In this case we say that
Alice sends the parities of the parity substrings (1110100; 1101010; 0111001).
Doing so she also tells the parities of all their linear combinations, such as
1110100 ⊕ 1101010 = 0011110. This Hamming code has generalizations to
codes Hr of length 2
r − 1 and r parity bits, and generalizations to BCH codes
which correct more than one error [73].
Assume that Eve had no knowledge on their string apart of the error-
correction data. After performing that type of error correction Alice and Bob
remain with a corrected word of the same length (e.g., of length of seven bits in
the above example), and Eve knows that it is taken from a smaller set of words
(16 words, in this example). Alternatively, they can distill a shorter common
string (of length four, in the above example), which is completely unknown to
Eve (simply by keeping only the four first bits in the above example).
In reality, Eve has both the error-correction data, and some data she gained
by eavesdropping on the transmitted particles. Alice and Bob perform a privacy
amplification technique to reduce Eve’s information to be as small as they wish.
The simplest privacy amplification uses the parity bit of a string as the secret
bit. The analysis of Eve’s information could be very complicated. Let us start
from the simplest case. In case the eavesdropper does not know one (or more)
bit(s) of the string, she does not have any information on the parity bit. In other
simple cases Eve has either full information or zero information on each bit, and
we can calculate the probability P (n) that Eve knows all the bits thus we can
calculate her average mutual information I = 1[P (n)] + 0[1 − P (n)] = P (n).
If P (n) is exponentially small with n we say that the final bit is exponentially
secure4. In general, the situation is more complicated, and Eve’s information on
each bit is neither zero nor one. When Eve has some probabilistic information
on the bits, her information on the parity bit is not a simple function as in
the example above. Analysis of the privacy amplification in such cases were
done in [9, 79] using the concept of collision entropy. Alternatively, one could
calculate the probability that Eve guesses the parity bit correctly. When privacy
amplification is done after error correction, its analysis is even more complicated
since Eve has both the information on the bits and the error-correction data.
Furthermore, we might wish to obtain more than one final bit, so that the parity
4 When Eve has a total information which is much smaller than one bit, the key is already
information-theoretic secure. An exponential security where I ≈ 2−n is much better than
security with I ≈ 1/n.
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of the whole string is not a good choice, and the final key is usually constructed
from parities of several substrings of length of about half the string.
Fortunately, for particular symmetric cases, where Eve has the same error
probability for each bit, the analysis of privacy amplification is still possible.
Let us return to the key distribution scheme: All these operations, error
estimation, error correction and privacy amplification, waste many bits (say, l).
In order to remain with a final key of L bits Alice should send L′ > 2(L + l)
qubits (where the factor 2 is due to the two bases). In more details, Alice
and Bob start with L′ qubits, compare basis, and use some bits (of the raw
data) to estimate Pe. As a result, n bits remain, from which about Pen are
erroneous. Alice and Bob randomize the order of the bits and correct the errors
using an appropriate error-correction code [73]. This process generates parity
bits which Alice sends to Bob (using the classical channel), who uses them to
obtain an n′-bit string (n′ could be smaller than n) identical to Alice’s, up to
some very small error probability. By that time Eve has both the information
she gained in her measurements, and the additional information of the error-
correction data. Alice and Bob amplify the security of the final key by using
privacy amplification: by choosing some parity bits of substrings to be the final
key. Both the information available to Eve on the final key, and the probability
pf of having error in the final string must be close to zero as much as desired by
Alice and Bob. Various eavesdropping techniques, and the efficiency of privacy
amplification against them, are discussed in details in the next chapters.
Another fact which could be useful to Eve is that some of the transmitted
particles do not reach Bob. The easiest way to deal with them is to consider
them as errors (but this might affect the practicality of the scheme).
By the time we started this work, it was assumed that the privacy ampli-
fication of [13] and its extension in [9], indeed provide the ultimate security.
Only after intensive discussions with Charles Bennett, Bruno Huttner, Dominic
Mayers and Asher Peres, (initiated in Torino, 1994, at the ISI conference), it
became clear to us that privacy amplification might not work against a “quan-
tum” eavesdropper equipped with a quantum memory, and the possibility to do
any unitary transformation on the qubits. The security problem is explained
in Chapter 2, together with our suggestion for a way to approach the security
problem. We develop it further in Chapters 3 and 4, providing strong evidence
that quantum key distribution is secure, even against a “quantum eavesdrop-
per” equipped with any possible devices, and restricted only by the rules of
quantum mechanics.
Let us review other schemes for quantum key distribution, and concentrate
only on the parts which are different from the above scheme.
1.4.2 The EPR Scheme
The second basic quantum key distribution scheme is based on EPR [43] corre-
lations. It was suggested by Deutsch [35], formalized by Ekert [44] and modified
by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [11]. We describe here the modified version
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which we call the EPR scheme. In this scheme Alice creates pairs of spin 1/2
particles in the singlet state, and sends one particle from each pair to Bob.
When the two particles are measured separately the results obtained for them
are correlated. For example, if they are measured along the same axis, the re-
sults are opposite, regardless of the axis. Alice and Bob use the same sets of
axes as for the four-state scheme, say Sˆz and Sˆx, and keep the results only when
they used the same axis. It is noteworthy that, in the EPR scheme, the pairs
could be created by any other party, including Eve herself.
Let us discuss this point in more details. The singlet state may be written
in infinitely many ways. We write it as:
Ψ(−) =
√
1
2
(|↑A↓B〉 − |↓A↑B〉)
=
√
1
2
(|←A→B〉 − |→A←B〉) , (1.25)
where the equality follows from |→〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉) and |←〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉−|↓〉) ,
and where the subscripts ‘A’ and ‘B’ stand for Alice and for Bob. When Alice
and Bob use the same axis, either z or x, we use the first or the second equation
respectively, to see that their measurements always yield opposite results. The
singlet state is the only state with this property. Therefore, as Alice and Bob
may measure either of these two options, any deviation from the protocol by
Eve (i.e., any attempt to create another state), will induce errors. So Eve must
create the required singlet state, from which she cannot extract any information
about Alice’s and Bob’s measurement (see [44, 11] for more details).
1.4.3 The Two-State Scheme
The last elementary scheme is the two-state scheme [4]. In this scheme, Alice
chooses one of two non-orthogonal states,
φ0 =
(
cos θ
sin θ
)
or φ1 =
(
cos θ
− sin θ
)
(1.26)
and sends it to Bob to encode 0 and 1 respectively. As these states are not
orthogonal, there is no way for Bob to decode them deterministically.
Bob must not use the optimal projection measurements (in the symmetric
basis) because then the protocol is unsafe: Eve also measures in that basis and
sends Bob photons (according to her results) in the orthogonal symmetric basis;
hence her string and his string are the same. Bob expects a certain amount of
errors which is exactly the amount of errors in Eve’s string, Therefore Eve
introduces no additional errors to what Bob would expect.
Bob must obtain deterministic information on Alice’s state in order to no-
tice the presence of Eve. We have already seen how to analyze this system in
Section 1.2, and we saw that partial deterministic information is obtained by
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means of a POVM. When the best possible POVM (1.17) is used, Bob’s mutual
information is equal to 1 − P? = 1 − cos 2θ where cos 2θ is the overlap of the
two states. When Bob uses the optimal POVM, Eve cannot avoid introducing
errors. The safety of the protocol against eavesdropping is ensured by the fact
that Eve cannot always get deterministic results either. Therefore, in many
instances where she intercepts the transmission she will have to guess Alice’s
choice. If the channel is very lossy, Eve could take advantage of it and learn all
information: she performs the optimal deterministic attack, and throws away
the bits whenever she got an inconclusive result. Thus, in order to use this
scheme we must restrict also the losses in addition to the restriction on the
error rate, or alternatively use a reference signal [4]. To simplify further dis-
cussion of this scheme we redefine Pe to include the losses, thus it is better for
Eve to send something (which might not be counted as error) than to keep the
particle.
In our further discussions we consider a scheme in which Bob does not per-
form the optimal POVM. Instead, Bob performs a less optimal test which also
provides him with a conclusive or inconclusive result. This test was described
in Section 1.2 by a less efficient POVM (1.20), but it can also be described us-
ing ordinary measurements: Bob performs one of two possible tests with equal
probability. In half the cases he tests whether a specific particle is in a state φ0
or a state orthogonal to it φ0
′ =
(
sin θ
− cos θ
)
; A result φ0 is treated as inconclusive
(since it could also be φ1 sent by Alice), but a result φ0
′ is always identified as
φ1. In the other half he tests whether a specific particle is in a state φ1 or a
state orthogonal to it φ1
′ =
(
sin θ
cos θ
)
; A result φ1 is treated as inconclusive (since
it could also be φ0 sent by Alice), but a result φ1
′ is always identified as φ0.
All the conclusive results are the raw data. Note that Bob can get a correct
conclusive result only if he chooses a basis which does not contain Alice’s state
(in contrast to the situation in the four-state scheme).
1.4.4 Weak Coherent Pulses
As single photons are difficult to produce experimentally, a “slight” modifica-
tion of the four-state scheme, using weak pulses of coherent light instead of
single photons, was the first one to be implemented in practice [5, 100, 83].
Such schemes are sensitive to losses in the channel and to the existence of two
photons in a pulse. In an earlier work [58], not included in this thesis, we
focused on quantum cryptographic schemes implemented with weak pulses of
coherent light. We compared the safety of the four-state scheme and the two-
state scheme, and presented a new system, which is a symbiosis of both, and for
which the safety can be significantly increased. In that work we also provided a
thorough analysis of a lossy transmission line. A recent work of Yuen [110] sug-
gests that most of the practical schemes implemented in laboratories based on
weak coherent pulses are not “slight” modifications since they use a completely
different Hilbert space. Yuen actually shows that these implemented schemes
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are insecure due to that fact.
In this thesis we do not deal with weak coherent pulses. Whenever we discuss
the four-state or the two-state schemes we refer to the schemes as previously
described, which are using two level systems.
1.4.5 Quantum Bit Commitment and Oblivious Transfer
Let us consider two other possible applications of quantum cryptography, Bit
Commitment (BC) and Oblivious Transfer (OT). These are defined as follows:
BC: Assume Alice has a bit b in mind. She would like to be committed to this
bit towards Bob, in a way that she cannot change it, but yet, Bob will have
no information on that bit. In a bit commitment scheme Alice provides
Bob some evidence through a procedure commit(b) which tells him that
she is committed while following these two requirements. At a later time
Alice can reveal b to Bob through another procedure unveil(b), which
provides Bob, in addition to the value of the bit, with some information
from which he can make sure she did not change the bit she was committed
to.(
2
1
)
OT [106, 47]: Alice has two bits in mind. She sends them to Bob in a way
that he receives only one and knows nothing on the other bit. Alice does
not know and can have no control on whether Bob gets the first or the
second bit.
OT [90]: Assume Alice has a bit b in mind. She would like to transmit this
bit to Bob so that he receives this bit with probability 50%. Bob knows
whether he received the bit or not, but Alice must be oblivious to this.
Neither of them can control the probability of reception.
In the BC protocol, a cheating Alice would like to change her commitment
at the unveil stage, and a cheating Bob would like to learn the bit from her
commitment. In the
(
2
1
)
OT a cheating Alice would like to control or to know
which bit Bob received, and a cheating Bob would like to learn more than one
bit. In the OT protocols a cheating Alice would like to control the probability
that Bob receive the bit in OT or to learn whether Bob got the bit or not, and
a cheating Bob would like to learn the bit with probability better than 50%.
The two versions of OT are equivalent[32]: OT is derived from
(
2
1
)
OT by
considering only one bit of the two. A protocol for
(
2
1
)
OT is derived from OT
as follows: Alice and Bob perform OT several times. Bob arranges the bits in
two strings — a string of bits he knows and a string of bits he doesn’t; He tells
Alice the groups but not which group is known to him. Then, the parity bits of
each string are used for
(
2
1
)
OT.
BC can be derived easily from
(
2
1
)
OT: Suppose Alice sends a string of 2n
bits to Bob such that each pair of bits b2i, b2i+1 are transmitted to Bob via
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(
2
1
)
OT scheme. Alice wants to commit to a bit b, so she chooses the pairs of
bits to fulfill b = b2i ⊕ b2i+1. Bob knows nothing on the value of b. Procedure
unveil(b) includes the value of b and the value of all the 2n bits. If Alice wants
to change the value of b she needs to change one bit in each pair. Unless Bob
has accidentally received (in commit(b) ) only the bits she does not change, she
will be caught. Her chance to cheat successfully is 2−n, so that this procedure
provides exponential security. It is generally believed that OT cannot be derived
from BC.
The best protocols which are available today for quantum oblivious transfer
and quantum bit commitment are severely influenced by the possibility to use
quantum memories. On one hand, we do not wish to explain these complicated
protocols in details since they are not relevant for our work. On the other hand,
their sensitivity to the existence of quantum memory is remarkable, and we
wish to show it. As a compromise, we present two toy-models which exhibit the
same sensitivity to quantum memories.
The four-state protocol for key distribution can be modified to produce a
naive
(
2
1
)
OT protocol [32]: Alice sends particles as in the four-state scheme and
Bob measures them in one of the two bases. If he measures in the same basis
Alice has used he gets a bit, hence he receives each bit with probability 50%.
Alice then tells him the basis she used for each photon, so he knows which bits
he has received as required. Bob organizes the bits in two sets, one set for those
he identified and one for those he didn’t. He tells Alice the members of each
set but not which is the identified set. Alice sends him error-correction data for
the two sets so that he can correct one of the strings only, but not the other.
Finally Alice uses the parity bit of one of the strings to transmit him her secret
bit.
A naive bit commitment scheme based on using the four-state scheme can
also be easily implemented by choosing the basis as representing the secret bit.
Alice sends to Bob the bit ‘0’ using either | →〉 or | ←〉, and ‘1’ using | ↑〉 or
| ↓〉. In this case, of course, Alice does not tell Bob anything at the commit(b)
stage. In the unveil stage she tells him both the bit and the state she used.
Bob cannot learn the bit since both possible values are described by the same
density matrix
(1/2)(| →〉〈→ |+ | ←〉〈← |) = (1/2)(| ↑〉〈↑ |+ | ↓〉〈↓ |) . (1.27)
Alice can cheat with probability of 1/2; for instance she sends ↑ to commit to
‘1’, and in order to change her commitment she later on claims that she has
sent ←. Thus the protocol demands that she commit to the same bit n times,
so the probability of successful cheating is reduced to 2−n.
Both these protocols are insecure, since the parties can cheat using quantum
memories as we explain below.
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1.5 Quantum Memory
In this section we present the quantum memory5: its definition, basic use, and
its possible implementations.
1.5.1 Defining a Quantum Memory
A classical bit or a classical string of bits can be kept in a memory, where
their value is preserved for a long time. The main physical feature required for
keeping a bit is the huge redundancy used for the two possible bit values.
When it comes to the quantum world things become less obvious, but still
we can provide an appropriate definition:
• A quantum memory is a device where a quantum state can be kept for a
long time and be fetched when desired with excellent fidelity.
Clearly, both “a long time” and “excellent fidelity” are determined by the de-
sired task for which the state is kept.
A quantum state develops in time according to some unitary operation, and
is exposed to interactions with the environment. If redundancy is added in a
simple way as in the classical case above, we might lose all the advantages of
using quantum states. Thus, it is not easy to keep a quantum state unchanged
for a long time. The same problem appears when we want to transmit a state
over a long distance. However, with existing technology, one can talk about
transmissions of quantum states (e.g., sending photons’ polarization states to
a distance of more than 10 kilometers), while it does not make much sense to
discuss memories where a state can be kept for 10−3 seconds (which is much
shorter than a phone talk). Consider a quantum bit (a two level system) in a
state
ψ =
(
α
β
)
; (1.28)
If it changes according to some unitary transformation to a state
ψ1 =
(
α1
β1
)
(1.29)
we may still be able to use it if we know the transformation, but if it decoheres
due to interactions with other systems, in a way which we cannot reverse in time,
the state is lost. As in the case of transmission over a long distance — one can
choose some acceptable error rate Pe, and agree to work with the experimental
system as long as the estimated error rate pe does not exceed Pe. To estimate
the error rate, one first does all effort to re-obtain the desired state (e.g., take the
unitary transformation into consideration), and then one compares the expected
state ψ1 with the obtained state ρ and defines the error rate as the percentage
of failure. In theory, if we consider some irreversible change to the state (due
5 Parts of this section are original.
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to environment, or an eavesdropper, or any other reason), and we can calculate
the obtained state, the error rate is
pe = 1− 〈ψ1|ρ|ψ1〉 . (1.30)
The definition of a quantum memory contains more that just the ability to
preserve a quantum state for a long time. Other necessary conditions are the
input / output abilities: One must be able to produce a known quantum state;
One must be able to input an unknown state into the memory; One must be
able to measure the state in some well defined basis, or furthermore, to take
it out of the memory (without measuring it) in order to perform any unitary
transformation on it (alone, or together with other particles).
1.5.2 Basic Uses of a Quantum Memory
We shall describe here only simple uses known by the time we have started this
work. The rest of this work concentrates on other uses of quantum memory,
which are much more advanced. While doing this work more fascinating uses
of quantum memory were suggested by others, and we will shortly review them
in the relevant chapters (mainly in Chapter 6).
• Doubling the efficiency of the four-state scheme for QKD: Bob keeps the
particles in a memory, and measures them after Alice tells him the bases.
• Improving the EPR scheme: instead of measuring the states of their par-
ticles, writing the results on a paper and hiding the paper, Alice and Bob
keeps them in a quantum memory. This way they are assured that no one
else had access to the paper, and therefore, no one else has the key. They
perform a measurement only when they want to use the key [44].
• Teleporting [8] a state using singlet pairs prepared in advance.
• Suggesting new schemes for quantum key distribution which relies upon
the existence of short time quantum memory [16, 52].
• Cheating the naive
(
2
1
)
OT scheme presented in the previous section. Bob
delays his measurements till after he receives the classical information
regarding the basis used by Alice; In this case he gets full information.
To overcome this problem, the
(
2
1
)
OT protocol was modified [10] to con-
tain a step where Bob commits to the measurement he performed, thus
he cannot avoid performing the measurement. However, this “solution”
creates a tremendous complication to the protocol, and even worse – it
adds an undesired dependence on the existence of secure bit commitment
scheme!
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• Cheating the naive bit commitment scheme. Alice use photons taken from
EPR singlet pairs, keeps one particle of a pair in a memory, and sends
the other to Bob; she chooses the basis just right before she performs
unveil(b); She may thus change her commitment as she wishes to [23].
A better (and much more sophisticated) bit commitment was later sug-
gested [24], but most amazingly – it was recently broken by Mayers [78]
due to similar (but deeply hidden) flaws! Mayers’ attack is based on a
theorem regarding the classification of quantum ensembles [56]. In terms
relevant to quantum cryptography this theorem states that two “differ-
ent” quantum systems (in Bob’s hands) which are described by the same
density matrix [e.g. as in eq. (1.27)] can always be created from one entan-
gled state shared by Alice and Bob, by measurements performed at Alice’s
site. Thus, Alice can postpone the decision of whether a state comes from
the first or the second system, and change her commitment at the unveil
stage. The consequence to bit commitment is that, either the two density
matrices are different and Bob can partially learn the commitment, or
they are similar and Alice can change her commitment.
• Breaking the classical logical chain of achieving a secure protocol by using
secure building blocks. Thus, any protocol which is based on secure build-
ing blocks must be also checked as a whole. As a result, the importance
of the building blocks (such as OT and BC) is reduced.
There is a very surprising consequence of breaking the logical chains: Due
to the facts that (1) BC can be built upon OT and (2) secure BC probably
does not exist [78] one could induce (by reduction) that secure OT cannot
exist. However, secure OT might still exist, despite the fact that the BC
protocol built upon it is insecure.
1.5.3 Implementations
By the time we began this work, the possibility of implementing a quantum
memory was hardly considered. The following discussion is taken from our
work [19], and was done with the help of David DiVincenzo.
We demand the possibility to program, store and manipulate quantum bits.
Any 2-dimensional Hilbert space system can be considered and this opens a
variety of possible implementations. Fortunately, apart from a different timing
requirement, the same requirements appeared recently in quantum computing,
and are being thoroughly investigated by both theorists [36, 41, 2, 31], and
experimentalists [33, 103, 82]. The difference in the timing requirements is that
the quantum bits in most applications of a quantum memory are subjected only
once (or very few times) to a unitary operation of calculation, while the quantum
bits in quantum computation are subjected to a huge number of computations;
On the other hands, the common tasks where quantum memory is used take
long times. As a result, the problem of decoherence is different. For quantum
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memories we don’t need to consider the switching time versus the decoherence
time, but we must require a decoherence time on the time scales of minutes,
days, and even years, depending on the applications.
It may be possible to implement a working prototype of such a memory
within a few years. Such a prototype should enable to keep quantum states
for a few minutes (or even hours), and to perform two-bit operations on them.
At the moment, the best candidates for combining these two operations are
ion traps. In ion traps the quantum bits can be kept in internal degrees of
freedom (say, spin) of the ions, and in phononic degrees of freedom of few ions
together. It is already possible to keep quantum states in the spin of the ions
for more than 10 minutes [22] and in principle it is possible to keep them for
years. These ion traps are thus good candidates for implementing quantum
memories. Moreover, they are also among the best candidates for quantum
manipulations, since there are ways to use the phononic degrees of freedom to
perform two-bit operations [31], such as the very important controlled-NOT
gate. Barenco et al. [2] realized that a single quantum controlled-NOT logical
gate would be sufficient to perform the Bell measurement, a measurement which
appears in almost all applications of quantum memories. Thus, using ion traps
it is possible to (partially) perform the Bell measurement, and this was shown
both in theory [31] and in an experiment [82]. Combining together the two
experiments6 to have both long lived quantum states and the possibility to
manipulate them will create a useful quantum memory.
The way to establish a real working quantum memory which suits for all pur-
poses is still long. The main obstacle is that it is currently impossible to transfer
a quantum state from one ion trap to another. A fully operating quantum mem-
ory must allow us to put quantum states in a register (that is, a separate ion
trap), and pull it out to another register when we want to perform operations
on it, together with other qubits (possibly held in other registers). Recently, the
possibility of doing this arose from the idea of combining ion-traps (where the
ions are well controlled) and QED-cavity together, and to use the same internal
degrees of freedom for both [42, 85]. We shall call this combination cavitrap for
convenience. In QED cavity [33] the internal degrees of freedom are coupled to
photons and not to phonons. Recently, another group [103] has shown that it
is possible to use polarization states of photons instead of using the |0〉 and |1〉
Fock states. If such photon states are used in a cavitrap, it may be possible
to use them to transmit a quantum state from one cavitrap to another [42]. In
some sense, this will be an implementation of the nuclear spins based “quantum
gearbox” suggested by DiVincenzo [41].
All this discussion would be considered nothing but a fantasy just few years
ago. However, similar (and more complicated) ideas are required for using
quantum gates in both quantum computing and quantum information, and a lot
of effort is invested in both the theory and application of quantum gates. Also,
quantum memory is considered more and more seriously, for various purposes,
6 Which were done by the same group in NIST.
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and the fantasy becomes closer to reality every year.
1.6 Quantum Computation
A classical computer can solve certain problems in a time which is polynomial
with the size of the input. Such problems are called easy, and other problems,
which are solved only in exponential time are called difficult. Public key cryp-
tography uses one way functions with trapdoors, i.e., functions which are easy
to compute while their inverses are difficult to compute unless some secret key
is known. Easy problems are not useful for public key cryptography. An impor-
tant class of problems (which are useful for public key cryptography) is those
solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time, for which a given solution can
be verified in polynomial time. It is well accepted that the most difficult prob-
lems in this class are difficult to solve, although this assumption is not proven.
Unfortunately, the popular cryptosystems are not based upon this assumption
alone, but on much less solid assumptions. For instance, on the assumption
that factoring large numbers and computing discrete logarithms are difficult.
More than 20 years ago Feynman raised an important question: Can quan-
tum devices, based on quantum principles, simulate physics faster than classical
computers? Deutsch [35] proposed a Turing-like model for quantum computa-
tion in 1985, called a quantum Turing machine. He constructed a universal
quantum computer which can simulate any given quantum machine (but with a
possible exponential slowdown). The quantum Turing machine is different from
classical Turing machine in that, in addition to standard abilities, it can also
get into superpositions of states. Bernstein and Vazirani [17] constructed an
efficient universal quantum computer which can simulate a large class of quan-
tum Turing machines with only polynomial slowdown. Yao [108] developed a
complexity model of quantum circuits showing that any function computable in
polynomial time by a quantum Turing machine has a polynomial size quantum
circuit. Quantum circuits and networks were defined by Deutsch [36] on the
basis of reversible classical logic [3]. Yao [108] also developed a theory of quan-
tum complexity which may be useful to address the question whether quantum
devices can perform computations faster than classical Boolean devices.
There were early attempts of solving problems on quantum computers more
efficiently than it is possible on classical computers [18, 37, 97], focusing on
problems which are not known to be solved in polynomial time on a classical
computer. These works were the groundwork for the recent breakthrough of
Shor [94]. Shor succeeded to solve in polynomial time the problems of dis-
crete logarithm and factorization on a quantum computer! As we previously
said, these two problems are extremely important since most existing classical
cryptosystems rely on the assumption that they are not easy (not polynomial).
The interest in quantum cryptography also raised a lot due to the interest
in this breakthrough. In addition, many experimentalists are now trying to
make quantum gates in their labs, and many implementations for quantum
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cryptography which looked as fantasy three years ago, are now very close to
practice.
The question of building practical quantum computers is not only a techno-
logical problem, since decoherence and other environmental interceptions could
limit the computing abilities very much. However, it seems that quantum error-
correction codes [95, 98] and their extension to fault-tolerant quantum error
correction [96] can overcome the decoherence problem. This issue is still under
thorough investigation. We discuss quantum error correction in Chapter 6 but
we concentrate on its relevance to quantum memories and quantum cryptogra-
phy.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 describes the security problem in details and our approach to it.
Chapter 3 discusses the information on the parity bit in various cases, and
proves that it reduces exponentially with the length of the string in the case
relevant to eavesdropping analysis. Chapter 4 extends the analysis regarding
the information on a parity bit to deal with error correction, and applies the
analysis to show the security of quantum key distribution schemes against var-
ious attacks. Chapter 5 describes a new scheme for quantum key distribution
which is based on the use of a quantum memory. This scheme is especially
adequate for building networks of many users. Chapter 6 discusses quantum
error correction, quantum privacy amplification and suggests a new quantum
privacy amplification based upon quantum error correction. It also develops the
surprising possibility of having “quantum repeaters”. Chapter 7 provides our
conclusions in brief.
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Chapter 2
On the Security of Quantum
Key Distribution Against a
‘Quantum’ Eavesdropper
The security of quantum key distribution in noisy channels and environment
is still an open question1 despite the use of privacy amplification; no bound
has yet been found on the amount of information obtained by an adversary
equipped with any technology consistent with the rules of quantum mechanics
(to be called a quantum eavesdropper). In particular, neither of the suggested
schemes is proven secure against sophisticated joint attacks, which use quantum
memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. Note that in
order to make quantum key distribution a practical tool one must present a
scheme which uses existing technology, and is proven secure against an adversary
equipped with any technology.
The main achievement of this thesis is to develop a new approach to attack
this problem. In this chapter we explain the security problem in more details and
we present our approach to it. We separate the complicated security problem
into several simpler steps. We define a class of strong attacks which we call
collective attacks, and we conjecture that the problem of security against any
attack can be replaced by the simpler problem of security against collective
attacks. In the next two chapters we discuss security against collective attacks,
providing some important security results.
Our approach tries to prove the efficiency of privacy amplification against a
quantum eavesdropper, by analyzing the density matrices available to her, and
bounding the information which can be extracted from them.
The security of quantum cryptography is a very complicated and tricky
problem. Several security claims done in the past were found later on to contain
loopholes. Recently, in parallel to our work, two other attempts were made to
solve the security issue [76, 38], based on different interesting approaches. The
first one [76] considers the efficiency of privacy amplification as we do (but
1 But see Section 2.5.
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without analyzing Eve’s density matrices); we discuss it in the last section of
this chapter. The other one [38] assumes non realistic perfect devices2 with
perfect accuracy, hence provides only a limited security proof. Furthermore, it
suggests a quantum privacy amplification hence is not applicable with existing
technology. We discuss it in Chapter 6, where we suggest another quantum
privacy amplification scheme.
2.1 Privacy Amplification and Security Against
Existing Technology
We have seen that, in a realistic protocol, Eve might gain some information
on the raw data: she obtains some information on the transmitted data, as
long as she induces less errors than permitted3; furthermore, she obtains also
the error-correction data, since it is transmitted via a classical channel which
is accessible to her. Thus, the key common to Alice and Bob is insecure at
this stage. Actually, even in an error-free channels, and even when no errors
are found at the error-estimation stage, the error correction is still required; for
instance, Eve could eavesdrop only on two qubits hence be unnoticed with large
probability.
To overcome these problems, privacy amplification techniques [13, 9] were
suggested. The simplest one uses the parity bit of the full string as the secret
bit, so that the final key contains L = 1 bits. Such techniques are designed to
reduce Eve’s information on the final key to be exponentially small with the
length of the initial string. Currently, they are shown to work only against very
restricted attacks.
Eve can measure some of the particles and gain a lot of information on them,
but this induces a lot of error. Hence, if she performs such an attack, she must
restrict herself to attack only small portion of the particles, and thus, her in-
formation on the parity of many bits is reduced to zero. Let us explain this
in more details: When Eve measures only a small portion of the particles, the
probability that no other bit will be used for creating the final key is exponen-
tially small. If, to avoid inducing too much noise, she measures less particles
than used for the final string her information on the parity of this string is
zero. Alternatively, she can measure all the particles. For instance, when she
attacks the four-state scheme and measures all particles, each particle in one
of the bases, she gains full information if she guessed the basis correctly for all
bits which shall be used for the final key. However, the probability of success
is exponentially small with the length of the final key. Furthermore, the prob-
ability that she induces less than the permitted error rate when she attacks all
2This is not clear from [38]. The assumption appears on page 2819, col. 1, line 18, and it
is never removed.
3 We assume that the permitted error rate is reasonably small, but not extremely small
(say, around 1%).
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particles is exponentially small as well. Analysis of such attacks were done, for
instance, in [57] for the four-state scheme, and in [45] for the two-state scheme.
Eve can do much better than measure some of the particles — she can
obtain information on each bit without inducing too much noise. Of course, in
this case, she must induce only a small amount of noise on each bit. Eve can
achieve this task by performing an incomplete measurement: She lets another
particle interact with the particle sent by Alice, and performs a measurement
on that additional particle. Such translucent attacks were defined in [45]. They
are done using quantum gates and the additional particle is called a probe. The
analysis in [45] considered the mutual information available to the eavesdropper
on a single transmitted particle, and did not deal with the processes of error
correction and privacy amplification. Fortunately, it is rather clear [9] that
privacy amplification will reduce Eve’s information exponentially to zero also in
this case, hence, such an individual translucent attack is ineffective.
Let us show in detail that privacy amplification can reduce Eve’s information
on the final key (the parity bit of the string) to be exponentially small, when
a particular translucent attack is used. Let us consider the “translucent attack
without entanglement” of [45], which is applied onto the two-state scheme, and
which leaves Eve with probes in a pure state. It uses a two-dimensional probe in
an initial state
(
1
0
)
, and transforms the states φ0 and φ1 (defined in Section 1.4
in the introduction) so that(
1
0
)(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
−→
(
cosα
± sinα
)(
cos θ′
± sin θ′
)
(2.1)
with ‘+’ for φ0, and ‘−’ for φ1. As a result, θ′ is the angle of the states received
by Bob, and α is the angle of the states in Eve’s hand. Using the basis
(
1
0
)(
1
0
)
=


1
0
0
0

 ;
(
1
0
)(
0
1
)
=


0
1
0
0

 ;
(
0
1
)(
1
0
)
=


0
0
1
0

 ;
(
0
1
)(
0
1
)
=


0
0
0
1

 ,
(2.2)
the transformation can be written as

cαcθ′
cθ
0 0 −sαsθ′
cθ
0 cαsθ′
sθ
−sαcθ′
sθ
0
0 sαcθ′
sθ
cαsθ′
sθ
0
sαsθ′
cθ
0 0 cαcθ′
cθ

 , (2.3)
with cθ = cos θ etc.
The error rate is defined as the probability of wrong identification; The
probability that Bob measured φ′0 =
(
sin θ
− cos θ
)
(which is identified as φ1) when
Alice sent φ0 is
pe = Tr
[(
cθ′
2 cθ′sθ′
cθ′sθ′ sθ′
2
)(
sθ
2 −cθsθ
−cθsθ cθ2
)]
= sin2(θ − θ′) . (2.4)
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The connection between this induced error rate and the angle α is calculated
using the unitarity condition [45] (preservation of the overlap)
cos 2θ = cos 2θ′ cos 2α . (2.5)
In order to analyze the effect of privacy amplification, suppose that Eve
performs this translucent attack on all the bits (with identical transformation
for each bit). As result, she gets n probes (for the n bits left from the raw
data after error estimation), each in one of the two states ψ0 =
(
cα
sα
)
or ψ1 =(
cα
−sα
)
. Since she attacks all the bits, she must attack them weakly, so that pe
and α are small. For weak attacks which cause small error rate we use the
approximation 1/ cos 2α ≈ 1 + 2α2 + O(α4) in the unitarity condition, to get
2θ′ ≈ arccos(cos 2θ[1+2α2+O(α4)]) ≈ 2θ−2α2 cot 2θ+O(α4). Thus, the error
rate is pe = sin
2(θ− θ′) ≈ α4 cot2 2θ+O(α6). The angle of Eve’s probe satisfies
α = (pe tan
2 2θ)1/4 , (2.6)
and from this expression we shall obtain the information on the parity bit as
a function of the error rate. It is important to note4 that α = O[(pe)
1/4] since
other attacks usually give α = O[(pe)
1/2].
We have seen in the introduction (Section 1.2) that for these two possible
pure states of each probe, ψ0 and ψ1 (called there, u and v), a standard measure-
ment in an orthogonal basis symmetric to the two states optimizes the mutual
information. The angle between one basis vector and these polarization state is
pi
4
± α. The measurement results in an error with probability
Qe =
1− sin(2α)
2
, (2.7)
and with the same error probability for both inputs, thus, leading to a binary
symmetric channel (BSC). The optimal information of such a channel is I
BSC
=
I2(Qe), but we care only about the fact that the mean error probability is also
optimized (minimized) by this measurement. We denote this error-probability
by r ≡ Qe for convenience. Let us calculate Eve’s information on the parity bit
by calculating the probability that she guesses it correctly. (Another approach
could use the “collision entropy” on each bit [9] to find the optimal mutual
information on the parity bit). The probability of deriving the wrong parity bit
is equal to the probability of having an odd number of errors on the individual
probes
Q(n)e =
n∑
j=odd
(
n
j
)
rj(1− r)n−j .
4 We shall see in Chapter 4 that Alice and Bob can use other states (in addition to the
two states of the protocol) which are much more sensitive to this attack, so that α ≈ pe1/2
for a slightly modified scheme. However, this shall become relevant only when we compare
the quality of different possible attacks.
38
To perform the sum only over odd j’s we use the formulae
(p+ q)n =
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pn−jqj and (p− q)n =
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pn−j(−q)j ,
to derive
n∑
j=odd
(
n
j
)
pn−jqj =
(p+ q)n − (p− q)n
2
. (2.8)
Assigning q = r and p = 1− r we get
Q(n)e =
n∑
j=odd
(
n
j
)
rj(1− r)n−j = 1
n − (1− 2r)n
2
=
1
2
− (1− 2r)
n
2
, (2.9)
and finally
Q(n)e =
1
2
− sin
n(2α)
2
(2.10)
using 1 − 2r = sin 2α. The mutual information IS in this single-particle mea-
surement is thus
IS = I2(Q
(n)
e ) = I2
(
1
2
− sin
n(2α)
2
)
. (2.11)
This is the optimal information obtained by a single particle measurement,
performed on n particles each in either of the states ψ0 and ψ1, and it was
calculated by us in [15].
A lot of useless side-information is obtained by this measurement (e.g., on
the individual bits). This fact indicates that Eve might be able to do much
better by concentrating on deriving only useful information. This will be shown
explicitly in Chapter 3.
In case of small angle α, let us calculate the optimal information obtained
by individual measurements. In that case, equation (2.10) yields
Q(n)e ≈
1
2
− (2α)
n
2
. (2.12)
For small η the logarithmic function is approximated by
log(
1
2
± η) = ln(
1
2
± η)
ln 2
≈ −1 ± 2
ln 2
η − 2
ln 2
η2 , (2.13)
from which the mutual information
I2(
1
2
− η) = 1−H(1
2
− η) = 1 + (1
2
+ η) log(
1
2
+ η) + (
1
2
− η) log(1
2
− η)
≈ 2
ln 2
η2 (2.14)
is obtained. Using this result and assigning η = (2α)n/2, the information (to
first order) obtained by the optimal single-particle measurement is
IS =
2
ln 2
(2α)2n
4
=
(2α)2n
2 ln 2
. (2.15)
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We see that it is exponentially small with the length of the string n. This result
is the maximal information Eve can obtain if she has n particles, each in either
of the states ψ0 and ψ1, and she uses single-particle attack.
Using α = (pe tan
2 2θ)1/4 we finally get the information as a function of the
error rate
IS = O
(
(16pe tan
2 2θ)n/2
)
. (2.16)
2.2 Can a ‘Quantum’ Eavesdropper Learn the
Key?
Eve can do much more than an individual attack if she keeps the probes in
a quantum memory! At a later time, she can attack the final key directly
using both the classical information regarding the error correction and privacy
amplification, and the quantum information contained in the quantum states of
her probes. In such a case, she might be able to gain only useful information
regarding the desired parity bits. Privacy amplification techniques were not
designed to stand against such attacks, hence their efficiency against them is
unknown.
The most general attack allowed by the rules of quantum mechanics is the
following: Eve lets all particles pass through a huge probe (a probe which
lives in a very large Hilbert space) and performs transformations which create
correlations between the state of the particles and the state of the probe. Eve
waits till receiving all classical information (for instance: 1. the relevant bits; 2.
the error-correction data; 3. the privacy amplification technique.) Eve measures
the probe to obtain the optimal information on the final key using all classical
data. Such an attack is called a coherent or a joint attack [5]. (We shall use the
term joint attack in this thesis, and keep the term coherent measurement for
describing measurements which are done in some entangled basis). Joint attacks
are the most general attacks consistent with the rules of quantum mechanics.
Doing several measurements in the middle can always be simulated by that
system as well, by using measurement gates. The analysis of joint attacks is
very complicated, and although security against them is commonly believed,
it is yet unproven 5. For instance, it could well be that Eve would obtain
much more information on parity bits by measuring all bits together. If that
information is not reduced sufficiently fast with the length of the string, the
known quantum key distribution becomes insecure!
2.3 The Collective Attack
In this thesis we suggest a new approach to the security problem. It started
as a practical question: if we cannot prove security against the most general
5 But see Section 2.5.
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attack, what type of restricted security proofs can we achieve? It continued as
a very promising direction for approaching the security problem. The results
we present here strongly suggest that quantum key distribution is secure. We
hope that the steps which still remain open will be soon solved as well.
Consider the following attack which we call [20] the collective attack:
1. Eve attaches a separate, uncorrelated probe to each transmitted particle
using a translucent attack.
2. Eve keeps the probes in a quantum memory till receiving all classical data
including error-correction and privacy amplification data.
3. Eve performs the optimal measurement on her probes in order to learn
the maximal information on the final key.
The case in which Eve attaches one (large-Hilbert-space) probe to all transmit-
ted particles is the joint attack. No specific joint attacks were yet suggested; the
collective attack defined above is the strongest joint attack suggested so far, and
there are good reasons to believe that it is the strongest possible joint attack. If
this is indeed the case, then security against it establishes an ultimate security.
In order to devise a proof of security against collective attacks we shall
provide a solution for an example based on the “translucent attack without en-
tanglement” of [45], which leaves Eve with probes in a pure state, and prove
security against it. As before we assume that this translucent attack is per-
formed on all the bits. After throwing inconclusive results, and after estimating
the error rate, Alice and Bob are left with n bits. As a result, Eve holds an
n-qubit state which corresponds to Alice’s string x. For simplicity, we choose
the final key to consist of one bit, which is the parity of the n bits. Eve wants
to distinguish between two density matrices corresponding to the two possible
values of this parity bit. Our first aim is to calculate the optimal mutual infor-
mation she can extract from them. A priori, all strings are equally probable and
Eve needs to distinguish between the two density matrices describing the pari-
ties. In the next chapter we show that the optimal information is obtained by
a coherent measurement and not by individual measurement. We calculate this
information and we prove that it is exponentially small. Thus, we provide the
first proof of efficiency of privacy amplification against coherent measurements.
In real protocols an error correction must be done. Since Eve is being told what
the error-correction code is, all strings consistent with the given error-correction
code (the given r subparities) are equally probable, while other strings are ex-
cluded. Full analysis of this case is given in Chapter 4, leading to a proof that
privacy amplification is still effective when the error-correction data is avail-
able to Eve. In Chapter 4 we also extend this result to various other collective
attacks, strongly suggesting security against any collective attack.
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2.4 Collective Attacks and the Ultimate Secu-
rity
Our approach solves interesting problems regarding security against collective
attacks, but the more puzzling question regarding our approach is whether it
can also provide a route to the proof of the ultimate security. Unfortunately,
the proof is not available yet, but we have intuitive arguments suggesting that
it exists, based on a randomization argument.
The randomization procedure is a very important step in any protocol for
quantum key distribution. Bob chooses randomly the basis in which he performs
his measurements (in either of the schemes). Alice and Bob choose randomly
the qubits which shall be used and thrown away in the error-estimation step.
Also, they randomize the bits before choosing any error-correction code, and
they choose randomly which parity bits will form the final key. At the time
Eve holds the transmitted particles she has no knowledge of the relevant qubits
for each of these steps. A correct guess would surely help her, putting her in
a position more similar to Bob’s. However, the probability of guessing each
of these random steps (i.e., Bob’s basis, the bits left after error estimation, the
error-correction code for a randomized string and the substrings used for privacy
amplification) is exponentially small with the length of the string. Hence, the
average information which result from such a guess is exponentially small.
Thus, we conjecture that she cannot gain information by searching or by
creating correlations between the transmitted particles; it is better for her to
keep one separate probe for each particle, and to perform the measurements
after obtaining the missing information as is done in the collective attacks. Any
attempt of creating such coherent correlations at the first step of the attack
induces errors, while it cannot lead to a noticeable increase in the resulting
average information; Searching for exponentially many such correlations could
help Eve, but it would also cause an appropriate induced error rate.
Unfortunately, proving this intuitive argument is yet an open problem.
A simplified approach to prove this can be based on providing Eve with most
of the missing details by choosing in advance (and telling her) all relevant data
(the bits used for error estimation, the error correction code, and the privacy
amplification code) except for the basis used by Alice and Bob. Furthermore,
we can also let her have all the particles together. Despite all this, as long as
she does not know the basis used by Alice and Bob, she cannot know which
bits will form the raw data, and the collective attack will probably be her best
attack.
2.5 An Alternative Approach
As we were working on this research, Yao [109] and Mayers [76] suggested an-
other approach to the security problem.
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Yao [109] claims to prove security of OT (assuming secure BC) in case of
error-free channel, and this proof applies to key distribution (even if secure
BC does not exist) based on reduction from OT, suggested by Mayers [75].
This important result is certainly not surprising. It translates the “no clean
imprint” theorem to a calculation, which takes error correction and privacy
amplification into account: if Eve is not permitted to induce errors, she can
gain only exponentially small information. The main achievement of this proof
is that it does not limit Eve in any way, thus it is the first work which considers
a quantum eavesdropper. It considers the quantum state Eve obtains versus the
quantum state she sends further to Bob, and not the density matrices available
to Eve. Since the state obtained by Bob must be very similar to the one sent
by Alice, Eve gain only exponentially small amount of information.
Going to real channels the situation is different, since Eve can certainly gain
information on each transmitted particle. When Eve attacks in a way which
induces constant (but permitted) error rate, the probability that she will be
noticed does not approaches one in the limit of large strings, but remains zero.
In this case, we believe that it does not suffice to consider the difference between
Bob’s state and Alice’s state, since it shall not be negligible anymore. Instead,
one have to investigate Eve’s density matrices as a function of that difference.
Surprisingly, Mayers claims [76] that it is possible to extend Yao’s result to
real channels, without analyzing Eve’s density matrices. We do not understand
Mayers’ proof well enough and at the moment we believe that it cannot be
correct. It is important to state that various security proofs claimed in the past
were later on found to be wrong (e.g., to be based on a hidden assumption).
Mayers’ result is not yet accepted by the general community, and furthermore,
it was not published in a refereed journal. Till this claim is clarified, we must
assume that the problem is still open.
Even if Mayers’ proof will be found correct and complete in the future (or
will lead to a complete proof), our approach might still be crucial: it is possible
that their approach is limited to deal with extremely small error rates only, or
that it requires much longer strings compared to our approach.
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Chapter 3
The Parity Bit
A major question in quantum information theory [65, 34, 54, 86, 69, 49] is “how
well can two quantum states, or more generally, two density matrices ρ0 and
ρ1, be distinguished?” In terms of a communication scheme this question is
translated to an identification task: A sender (Alice) sends a bit b = i (i =
0; 1) to the receiver (Bob) by sending the quantum state ρi, and the receiver
does his best to identify the value of the bit, i.e., the quantum state. The
two-dimensional Hilbert space H2 is usually used to implement such a binary
channel. The transmitted signals can be polarization states of photons, spin-
states of spin-half particles, etc. The transmitted states may be pure states or
density matrices, and need not be orthogonal. Usually, the mutual information
I is used to describe distinguishability, such that I = 0 means indistinguishable,
and I = 1 (for a binary channel) means perfect distinguishability. The ensemble
of signals is agreed on in advance, and the goal of Alice and Bob is to optimize
the average mutual information over the different possible measurements at the
receiving end. For example, two orthogonal pure states transmitted through an
error-free channel are perfectly distinguishable; The optimal mutual information
(I = 1) is obtained if Bob measures in an appropriate basis. Finding the
optimal mutual information is still an open question for most ensembles. Some
cases with known analytic solutions are the case of two pure states, the case of
two density matrices in two dimensions with equal determinants [69, 49] and
the case of commuting density matrices [24]. There are no known analytic
solutions for two non-trivial density matrices in dimensions higher than two. In
this chapter we find a solvable case which has very important implications to
quantum cryptography. This part of the work was done together with Charles
Bennett and John Smolin [15], and with the help of Asher Peres.
Suppose that a source produces binary string x of length n with equal and
independent probabilities for all the digits. Let the string be encoded into a
quantum-mechanical channel, in which the bits ‘0’ and ‘1’ are represented by
quantum states (density matrices) ρ0 and ρ1 of independent two-state quantum
systems. These can be either pure states or density matrices with equal deter-
minants. Suppose Bob wants to learn the parity bit (exclusive-OR) of the n-bit
string and not the specific value of each bit. The parity bit is described by one
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of two density matrices ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 which lie in a 2
n-dimensional Hilbert space
H2n . These parity density matrices ρ(n)p are the average density matrices, where
the average is taken over all strings the source might produce, which have the
same parity p. Since the parity bit of the source string x is encoded by ρ(n)p , in-
formation about which of the two density matrices was prepared is information
about the parity of x.
Let x be any classical string of n such bits, and ρx = ρ(1st bit) . . . ρ(nth bit)
be the density matrix made up of the tensor product of the signaling states
ρ(i) corresponding to the i
th bit of x. Formally, we distinguish between the two
density matrices:
ρ
(n)
0 =
1
2n−1
∑
x | p(x)=0
ρx and ρ
(n)
1 =
1
2n−1
∑
x | p(x)=1
ρx , (3.1)
where the sum is over all possible strings with the same parity [each sent with
equal probability (1/2n)] and p(x) is the parity function of x. We show a simple
way to write the parity density matrices. We find that they are optimally
distinguished by a non-factorizable coherent measurement, performed on the
composite 2n dimensional quantum system, and we calculate the optimal mutual
information which can be obtained on the parity bit.
We concentrate on the special case where the two signaling states have large
overlap, which is important in the analysis of the security of quantum key
distribution against powerful multi-particle eavesdropping attacks. We show
that the optimal obtainable information decreases exponentially with the length
n of the string. This result provides a clue that classical privacy amplification is
effective against coherent measurements, limiting the ability of an eavesdropper
to obtain only negligible information on the final key.
The first sections deal only with the case where each bit is encoded by a pure
state. In Section 3.1 we find a simple way to write the density matrices of the
parity bit for any n when the signaling states are pure; We show that the parity
matrices can be written in a block diagonal form and explain the importance
of this fact. In Section 3.2 we investigate the distinguishability of the parity
matrices; The optimal measurement that distinguishes them is found to be a
standard (von Neumann) measurement in an entangled basis (a generalization
of the Bell basis of two particles); We calculate exactly the optimal mutual in-
formation on the parity bit (derived by performing the optimal measurement).
In Section 3.3 we obtain the main result of this chapter: for two almost fully
overlapping states, the optimal mutual information IM decreases exponentially
with the length of the string. While exponentially small, this optimal informa-
tion is nevertheless considerably greater than the information that would have
been obtained by measuring each bit separately and classically combining the
results of these measurements. We are also able to calculate the maximal deter-
ministic (conclusive) information on the parity matrices obtained in Section 3.1;
This is done in Section 3.4 where we also confirm a result previously obtained
by Huttner and Peres [59] for two bits. In Section 3.5 we repeat the calculation
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of the optimal mutual information for the more general case where the bits are
represented by non-pure states (in H2 and with equal determinants). In Section
3.6 we summarize the conclusions of this chapter. In the next chapter we study
the implications of these results to the security of quantum cryptography.
3.1 Density Matrices for Parity Bits
Let Alice send n bits. The possible values of a single bit (0 or 1) are represented
by
ψ0 =
(
cosα
sinα
)
and ψ1 =
(
cosα
− sinα
)
(3.2)
respectively. In terms of density matrices these are:
ρ
(1)
0 =
(
c2 sc
sc s2
)
and ρ
(1)
1 =
(
c2 −sc
−sc s2
)
, (3.3)
where we use a shorter notation s ≡ sinα; c ≡ cosα, for convenience, and the
superscript [](1) is explained in the following paragraph.
The parity bit of an n-bit string is the exclusive-OR of all the bits in the
string. In other words, the parity is 1 if there are an odd number of 1’s and 0 if
there are an even number. The parity density matrices of n bits will be denoted
as ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 in case the parity is ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively. Using these density
matrices we define also the total density matrix ρ(n) ≡ 1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 + ρ
(n)
1 ) and the
difference density matrix ∆(n) ≡ 1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 − ρ(n)1 ), so that
ρ
(n)
0 = ρ
(n) +∆(n) and ρ
(n)
1 = ρ
(n) −∆(n) . (3.4)
The one-particle density matrices (equation 3.3) also describe the parities of
one particle, and therefore we can calculate
ρ(1) =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 + ρ
(1)
1 ) =
(
c2 0
0 s2
)
, (3.5)
∆(1) =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 − ρ(1)1 ) =
(
0 sc
sc 0
)
. (3.6)
The density matrices of the parity bit of two particles are:
ρ
(2)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 ρ
(1)
0 + ρ
(1)
1 ρ
(1)
1 )
ρ
(2)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 ρ
(1)
1 + ρ
(1)
1 ρ
(1)
0 ) (3.7)
where the multiplication is a tensor product. The total density matrix is
ρ(2) =
1
2
(ρ
(2)
0 + ρ
(2)
1 )
=
1
4
[ρ
(1)
0 (ρ
(1)
0 + ρ
(1)
1 ) + ρ
(1)
1 (ρ
(1)
1 + ρ
(1)
0 )]
= ρ(1)ρ(1) ,
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which, by using the basis
|b0〉 ≡
(
1
0
)
1
(
1
0
)
2
=


1
0
0
0

 ; |b1〉 ≡
(
1
0
)
1
(
0
1
)
2
=


0
1
0
0

 ;
|b2〉 ≡
(
0
1
)
1
(
1
0
)
2
=


0
0
1
0

 and |b3〉 ≡
(
0
1
)
1
(
0
1
)
2
=


0
0
0
1

 (3.8)
in H4, can be written as
ρ(2) = ρ(1)ρ(1) =


c4 0 0 0
0 c2s2 0 0
0 0 c2s2 0
0 0 0 s4

 . (3.9)
The difference density matrix is
∆(2) =
1
2
(ρ
(2)
0 − ρ(2)1 )
=
1
4
[ρ
(1)
0 (ρ
(1)
0 − ρ(1)1 ) + ρ(1)1 (ρ(1)1 − ρ(1)0 )]
= ∆(1)∆(1) =


0 0 0 c2s2
0 0 c2s2 0
0 c2s2 0 0
c2s2 0 0 0

 . (3.10)
The density matrices of the parity bit of n particles can be written recur-
sively:
ρ
(n)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 ρ
(n−1)
0 + ρ
(1)
1 ρ
(n−1)
1 )
ρ
(n)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 ρ
(n−1)
1 + ρ
(1)
1 ρ
(n−1)
0 ) , (3.11)
leading to
ρ(n) =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 + ρ
(n)
1 ) = ρ
(1)ρ(n−1) , (3.12)
and
∆(n) =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 − ρ(n)1 ) = ∆(1)∆(n−1) . (3.13)
Using these expressions recursively we get
ρ(n) = (ρ(1))n (3.14)
which is diagonal, and
∆(n) = (∆(1))n (3.15)
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which has non-zero terms only in the secondary diagonal. The density matrices
ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 are now immediately derived for any n using equation (3.4):
ρ
(n)
0 = (ρ
(1))n + (∆(1))n
and
ρ
(n)
1 = (ρ
(1))n − (∆(1))n . (3.16)
As an illustrative example we write ρ0 and ρ1 for two particles:
ρ
(2)
0 =


c4 0 0 c2s2
0 c2s2 c2s2 0
0 c2s2 c2s2 0
c2s2 0 0 s4

 ; ρ(2)1 =


c4 0 0 −c2s2
0 c2s2 −c2s2 0
0 −c2s2 c2s2 0
−c2s2 0 0 s4

 .(3.17)
The only non-zero terms in the parity density matrices are the terms in the
diagonals for any n, thus the parity density matrices have an X-shape in that
basis.
The basis vectors can be permuted to yield block-diagonal matrices built of
2 × 2 blocks. The original basis vectors [see, for example, equation (3.8)], |bi〉,
are simply 2n-vectors where the ith element of the ith basis vector is 1 and all
other elements are 0 (i ranges from 0 to 2n − 1). The new basis vectors are
related to the old as follows:
|b′i〉 = |bi/2〉 for even i and |b′i〉 = |b2n−(i+1)/2〉 for odd i . (3.18)
The parity density matrices are now, in the new basis (we omit the ′ from now
on as we will never write the matrices in the original basis):
ρ(n)p =


B[j=1]p 0 . . . 0
0 B[j=2]p . . . 0
0 0 . . . B[j=2
(n−1)]
p

 (3.19)
where the subscript p stands for the parity (0 or 1). Each of the 2×2 matrices
has the form
B[j]p =
(
c2(n−k)s2k ±cnsn
±cnsn c2ks2(n−k)
)
, (3.20)
with the plus sign for p = 0 and the minus sign for p = 1, and 0 ≤ k ≤ n, and
all these density matrices satisfy DetB[j]p = 0. The first block (j = 1) has k = 0;
there are
(
n
1
)
blocks which have k = 1 or k = n − 1; there are
(
n
2
)
j’s which
have k = 2 or k = n− 2, etc. This continues until k = (n− 1)/2 for odd n. For
even n the process continues up to k = n/2 with the minor adjustment that
there are only 1
2
(
n
n/2
)
j’s of k = n/2. This enumeration groups blocks which are
identical or identical after interchange of k and n− k and accounts for all 2n/2
blocks. We will see later that blocks identical under interchange of k and n− k
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will contribute the same mutual information about the parity bit, thus we have
grouped them together.
With the density matrices written in such a block-diagonal form of 2 × 2
blocks the problem of finding the optimal mutual information can be analytically
solved. It separates into two parts:
• Determining in which of 2n/2 orthogonal 2d subspaces (each corresponding
to one of the 2× 2 blocks) the system lies.
• Performing the optimal measurement within that subspace.
The subspaces may be thought of as 2n/2 parallel channels, one of which is
probabilistically chosen and used to encode the parity by means of a choice
between two equiprobable pure states within that subspace (these two states
are pure because the B0 and B1 matrices each have zero determinant). We
shall present in the next section the optimal measurement that yields the opti-
mal mutual information transmissible through such a two-pure-state quantum
channel. The channel then corresponds to a classical binary symmetric channel
(BSC), i.e., a classical one-bit-in one-bit-out channel whose output differs from
its input with some error probability pj independent of whether the input was 0
or 1. The optimal mutual information in each subchannel is the optimal mutual
information of a BSC with error probability pj and is I2(pj) = 1−H(pj), with
H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), the Shannon entropy function. The
optimal mutual information IM for distinguishing ρ
(n)
0 from ρ
(n)
1 can thus be ex-
pressed as an average over the optimal mutual information of the subchannels:
IM =
2n/2∑
j=1
qjI2(pj), (3.21)
where qj = TrB
[j]
0 = TrB
[j]
1 is the probability of choosing the j’th subchannel.
The BSC error probability pj for the j’th subchannel depends on the subchan-
nel’s 2× 2 renormalized density matrices Bˆ[j]p = B[j]p /qj, and is easily calculated
once the optimal measurement is found. For each subchannel the qj and renor-
malized 2× 2 matrices look like
qj = c
2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k) (3.22)
and
Bˆ[j]p =


c2(n−k)s2k
c2(n−k)s2k+c2ks2(n−k)
±cnsn
c2(n−k)s2k+c2ks2(n−k))
±cnsn
c2(n−k)s2k+c2ks2(n−k))
c2ks2(n−k)
c2(n−k)s2k+c2ks2(n−k)

 . (3.23)
Since they correspond to pure states we can find an angle γ[j] for each block
such that the density matrices are
(
cos2 γ[j] ± cos[j]γ sin γ[j]
± cos γ[j] sin γ[j] sin2 γ[j]
)
. (3.24)
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In our previous example of n = 2 the matrices are put in a block diagonal
form:
ρ
(2)
0 =


c4 c2s2 0 0
c2s2 s4 0 0
0 0 c2s2 c2s2
0 0 c2s2 c2s2

 ; ρ(2)1 =


c4 −c2s2 0 0
−c2s2 s4 0 0
0 0 c2s2 −c2s2
0 0 −c2s2 c2s2

 ,(3.25)
so that qj=1 = c
4 + s4; qj=2 = 2c
2s2; and
Bˆ[j=1]p =
(
c4
c4+s4
± c2s2
c4+s4
± c2s2
c4+s4
s4
c4+s4
)
; Bˆ[j=2]p =
(
1/2 ±1/2
±1/2 1/2
)
. (3.26)
3.2 Optimal Information in a Parity Bit
Two pure states or two density matrices in H2 with equal determinants can
always be written (in an appropriate basis) in the simple form
ρ0 =
(
a1 a2
a2 a3
)
; ρ1 =
(
a1 −a2
−a2 a3
)
(3.27)
with ai real positive numbers such that Tr ρp = a1+a3 = 1. For two pure states,
say (
cγ
2 ±cγsγ
±cγsγ sγ2
)
, (3.28)
we already said that a standard measurement in an orthogonal basis symmetric
to the two states optimizes the mutual information. The density matrices of
pure states can be written as ρi = (1l + σ · ri)/2 with the σ being the Pauli
matrices and r = (± sin 2γ, 0, cos 2γ) being a three dimensional vector which
describes a spin direction. Using this notation any density matrix is described
by a point in a three dimensional unit ball, called the Poincare´ sphere (also
called the Bloch sphere). The pure states are points on the surface of that
sphere and the above two pure states have x = ±2a2 = ± sin 2γ. With the
density matrix notation the optimal basis for distinguishing the states is the x
basis. Note that all angles are doubled in this spin notation, so that the angle
between the two states is 4γ, and the angle between the basis vector and the
state is pi
2
− 2γ. The measurement of the two projectors
A→ = 1/2
(
1 1
1 1
)
and A← = 1/2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
(3.29)
yields
Pe = Tr ρ1A→ =
1
2
− a2 = 1
2
− sin 2γ
2
, (3.30)
which recovers the result of equation (2.7) in case of pure states obtained in
Chapter 2. However, the treatment of density matrices is more general and this
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is the optimal measurement also in the case of deriving block-diagonal matrices
for the parity of string of non-pure states with equal determinants [69, 49], when
ρi of equation (3.3) are replaced by ρ
dm
i of equation (3.63) and (3.64) of Section
3.5, and this case is also described by a BSC. The only difference between the
matrices is that Det ρp = 0 for pure states and 0 ≤ Det ρp ≤ 14 for density
matrices.
Instead of measuring the density matrices in the x direction we perform the
following unitary transformation on the density matrices
U = 1/
√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(3.31)
to obtain ρ′ = UρU † which is then measured in the z basis. Note that the
transformation transform the original z-basis to x-basis (the motivation for this
approach will be understood when we discuss the 2 × 2 blocks of the parity
matrices). The new density matrices are
ρ0
′ =
(
1
2
+ a2
a1−a3
2
a1−a3
2
1
2
− a2
)
; ρ1
′ =
(
1
2
− a2 a1−a32
a1−a3
2
1
2
+ a2
)
(3.32)
and their measurement yields the probability 1
2
± a2 to derive the correct (plus)
and the wrong (minus) answers (as we obtained before), leading to optimal
mutual information of
I2(
1
2
− a2) , (3.33)
which depends only on a2. Note that the same information is obtained in case
a1 and a3 are interchanged. Now, instead of considering the information as a
function of γ we have it as a function of a2, and we can apply it directly to the
blocks Bˆ[j]p of the previous section.
Let us now consider the information one can obtain on the parity bit. The
naive way to derive information on a parity bit of n particles [each in one of the
states
(
cosα
± sinα
)
] is to derive the optimal information on each particle separately
and calculate the information on the parity bit. This individual (or single-
particlemeasurement) is the best Bob can do in case he has no quantum memory
in which to keep the particles (which, usually arrive one at a time) or he has no
ability to perform more advanced coherent measurements. The optimal error-
probability for each particle is Qe =
1−sin 2α
2
, and the probability of deriving the
wrong parity bit, derived in the previous chapter (eq. 2.10) is Q(n)e =
1
2
− (sin 2α)n
2
,
and the mutual information in this case was found to be
IS = I2
(
1
2
− (sin 2α)
n
2
)
. (3.34)
As we previously said, the derivation of useless side-information on the indi-
vidual bits indicates that Bob might be able to do much better by concentrating
on deriving only useful information. The optimal measurement for finding mu-
tual information on the parity bit is not a single-particle measurement, but is
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instead a measurement on the full 2n-dimensional Hilbert space of the system.
In general, optimizing over all possible measurement is a very difficult task un-
less the two density matrices in H2n are pure states. However, in the preceding
section we have shown how to reduce the problem to that of distinguishing the
2× 2 blocks of our block-diagonal parity matrices. We now have only to apply
the optimal single-particle measurement to the 2x2 Bˆ[j]’s of equation (3.23) and
use the result in equation (3.21).
The error probability (equation 3.30) for distinguishing the Bˆ[j]’s of equa-
tion (3.23) is seen to be:
pj =
1
2
− c
nsn
c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)
, (3.35)
from which the information I2(pj) in each channel is obtained. Plugging the
error probability pj (equation 3.35) and the probability of choosing the j’th
subchannel qj (equation 3.22) into (3.21), the optimal information on the parity
bit is now:
IM =
2n/2∑
j=1
(c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)) I2
(
1
2
− c
nsn
c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)
)
. (3.36)
For various simple cases we can see the implications of this result, and further-
more, we can compare it to the best result obtained by individual measurements.
In the simple case of orthogonal states (α = pi
4
) all these density matrices are
the same and we get qj =
(
1
2
)n−1
, pj = 0 and IM = 1 as expected.
• A brief remark is in order at this stage. The transformation to the x
basis for each 2 by 2 matrix, Bˆ(n,k)p is actually a transformation from a
product basis to a fully entangled basis of the n particles. That basis is a
generalization of the Bell basis of [26].
(
1
0
)
1
(
1
0
)
2
. . .
(
1
0
)
n−1
(
1
0
)
n
±
(
0
1
)
1
(
0
1
)
2
. . .
(
0
1
)
n−1
(
0
1
)
n
; (3.37)
(
1
0
)
1
(
1
0
)
2
. . .
(
1
0
)
n−1
(
0
1
)
n
±
(
0
1
)
1
(
0
1
)
2
. . .
(
0
1
)
n−1
(
1
0
)
n
(3.38)
etc. The Bell basis for two particles is frequently used and its basis con-
tains the EPR singlet state and the other three orthogonal fully entangled
states.
For large n, the number of blocks is exponentially large and performing
the summation required in equation (3.36) is impractical, since all the 2n−1
matrices must be taken into account. However, that problem can be simplified
by realizing that all blocks with a given k, as well as all blocks with k and n−k
interchanged, contribute the same information to the total. This is easily seen
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in equation (3.36) where both the weight and the argument of I2 are symmetric
in k and n− k. The optimal mutual information for even n is then
IevenM =
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qkI2(pk) +
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
qn
2
I2(pn
2
) , (3.39)
and for odd n
IoddM =
n−1
2∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qkI2(pk) . (3.40)
As an example we calculate IM for n = 2 (of course, the counting argument
is not needed in that case). This particular result complements the result in
[59] where the deterministic information of such a system is considered (see also
Section 3.4). In the new basis (3.32) the density matrices of (equation 3.26)
become
Bˆ
′(k=0)
0 =
(
1/2 + c
2s2
c4+s4
1
2
c4−s4
c4+s4
1
2
c4−s4
c4+s4
1/2− c2s2
c4+s4
)
; Bˆ
′(k=0)
1 =
(
1/2− c2s2
c4+s4
1
2
c4−s4
c4+s4
1
2
c4−s4
c4+s4
1/2 + c
2s2
c4+s4
)
and
Bˆ
′(k=1)
0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
; Bˆ
′(k=1)
1 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
. (3.41)
We use the notation S = 2sc = sin 2α; C = c2−s2 = cos 2α (hence, c4−s4 = C
and c4 + s4 = 1+C
2
2
) to obtain q1 = 2c
2s2 = S
2
, p1 = 0, q0 =
1
2
(1 + C2)
and p0 =
C2
1+C2
(the qj ’s were obtained in the previous section). The mutual
information of the parity of two bits is obtained using equation (3.21)
IM = q0I2(p0) + q1I2(p1)
=
1
2
(1 + C2)I2
(
C2
1 + C2
)
+
S2
2
. (3.42)
3.3 Information on the Parity Bit of Almost
Fully Overlapping States
The case of almost fully overlapping states is extremely important to the analysis
of eavesdropping attacks on any quantum key distribution scheme. In this case
the angle α is small so s ≡ sinα ≃ α and c ≡ cosα ≃ 1 − α2
2
. To observe
the advantage of the coherent measurement, let us first recall that the optimal
information obtained by individual measurements [with Q(n)e ≈ 12 − (2α)
n
2
],
calculated to first order for small α, is (see 2.15)
IS ≈ (2α)
2n
2 ln 2
. (3.43)
We use the same approximations used in Chapter 2, and equations (3.35)
and (3.22) to calculate the leading terms in the optimal mutual information
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(3.39) and (3.40). For k = n
2
(n even) we get pk = 0 (regardless of the small
angle) and
I2(pn
2
) = 1 . (3.44)
For k < n
2
we get pk ≈ 12 − s
n
s2k
≈ 1
2
− αn−2k which yields [using equation (2.14)
with η = αn−2k]
I2(pk) ≈ 2
ln 2
α2n−4k . (3.45)
The coefficient qk = α
2k for k < n
2
and qk = 2α
2k for k = n
2
, so that
qkI2(pk) ≈ 2
ln 2
α2(n−k) (3.46)
for k < n
2
, and
qkI2(pk) ≈ 2αn (3.47)
for k = n
2
. The dominant terms are those with the largest k, that is, k closest
to n
2
. The next terms are smaller by two orders in α. The number of density
matrices with these k’s are also the largest (up to a factor of 2 in case of even n).
Therefore, the terms k = n
2
for even n and k = n−1
2
for odd n are the dominant
terms in the final expression. Thus, for almost fully overlapping states, the
mutual information is
IevenM ≈
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
2αn =
(
n
n
2
)
αn
for even n, and
IoddM ≈
(
n
n−1
2
)
2
ln 2
αn+1 (3.48)
for odd n.
These expressions can be further simplified. The number of density matrices
of any type is bounded (for large n) using Stirling formula (see [73] in the chapter
on Reed-Solomon codes)(
n
k
)
<
2nH(k/n)√
2π(k/n)(1− k/n)n
. (3.49)
For k near n
2
, η ≡ 1
2
− k
n
is small, and the standard approximation (2.14):
H ≈ 1−O(η2) = 1−O
(
(1
2
− k/n)2
)
< 1 is used to derive
(
n
k
)
< 2
n√
2pi(k/n)(1−k/n)n .
Using also k/n(1− k/n) ≈ 1
4
− η2, we derive(
n
k
)
<
2n√
pi
2
n
(1 +O(η2)) . (3.50)
Thus the leading term in IM is
IM <
2n√
pi
2
n
αn = (2α)n/
√
π
2
n (3.51)
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for even n and
IM <
2n√
pi
2
n
2
ln 2
αn+1 =
2
ln 2
α(2α)n/
√
π
2
n < (2α)n/
√
π
2
n (3.52)
for odd n (using α < ln 2/2). We see that we could keep a better bound for odd
n but for simplicity we consider the same bound for both even and odd n’s.
We can now compare the optimal information IM from a coherent measure-
ment on all n particles to the optimal information IS from separate measure-
ments (cf. eq. 3.43):
IM = O(1)× (2α)n/
√
n
IS = O(1)× (2α)2n. (3.53)
Since α is a small number (corresponding to highly overlapping signal states),
the coherent measurement is superior to the individual measurement by an
approximate factor of (2α)−n. However, it is only superior by a polynomial
factor, since
IM ≈
√
IS . (3.54)
3.4 Deterministic Information on the Parity Bit
For a single particle Bob can perform a different kind of individual measurement
which is not optimal in terms of average mutual information but is sometimes
very useful [4, 86]. It yields either a conclusive result about the value of that bit
or an inconclusive one, and Bob will know which of the types of information he
has succeeded in obtaining. Such a measurement corresponds to a binary erasure
channel [86, 59, 45]. With probability p? of an inconclusive result, the mutual
information is Ip? = 1 − p?. The minimal probability for an inconclusive result
is cos 2α leading to Ip? = 1− cos 2α [86]. This result is obtained by performing
a generalized measurement (Positive Operator Value Measure [86, 54, 61]) on
the system or a standard measurement performed on a larger system which
contains the system and an auxiliary particle [86, 60]. Note that this results in
less mutual information than the optimal measurement for one-particle mutual
information. If Bob uses this type of measurement on each particle separately
his deterministic single-particle information about the parity bit is (1−cos 2α)n.
We now use the block-diagonal density matrices derived in Section 3.1 to
derive also the optimal deterministic information on the parity bit. We note
that each of the 2 × 2 blocks in the block-diagonal density matrices is the
density matrix of a pure state, so we may replace the optimal measurement
in each subchannel with the optimal deterministic measurement and proceed
as before. The total optimal deterministic information is easily calculated by
replacing I2(pk) in (3.39) and (3.40) by I(p?k) = 1 − p?k . To find the minimal
P?k we recall that each of the normalized density matrices Bˆ
(n,k)
p corresponds to
pure states (3.24) with some angle γ. Comparing with equation (3.23) we can
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write the overlap as the difference between the diagonal terms of the density
matrices
p? = cos(2γ) = cos
2 γ − sin2 γ = c
2(n−k)s2k − c2ks2(n−k)
c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)
, (3.55)
hence
I(p?k) = 1−
c2(n−k)s2k − c2ks2(n−k)
c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)
. (3.56)
The total information is
IevenD =
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qkI(p?k) +
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
qn
2
I(p?n/2) , (3.57)
for even n, and
IoddD =
n−1
2∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qkI(p?k) (3.58)
for odd n.
For n = 2 we recover a result previously obtained by Huttner and Peres
[59] by performing the optimal POVM on the first pair of density matrices of
equation (3.26), and a measurement in the entangled basis (as before) on the
second. The probability of an inconclusive result is cos2 γ − sin2 γ = c4−s4
c4+s4
=
2C
1+C2
, hence the optimal deterministic information is 1 − 2C
1+C2
, leading to the
total deterministic information
ID = q1ID(p?) + q2I2(p2) =
1
2
(1 + C2)(1− 2 C
1 + C2
) +
S2
2
= 1− C , (3.59)
which is exactly the result obtained by Huttner and Peres (note, however, that
they used an angle which is pi
4
− α hence derived 1 − S for the deterministic
information).
For almost overlapping states (small α) the dominant terms are still the
same as in the case of optimal information. The term qk is as before and the
information in each port is
I(p?k) = 1 (3.60)
for k = n
2
and
I(p?k) = 1−
c2n−4k − s2n−4k
c2n−4k + s2n−4k
= 1− (1− α2n−4k)2 = 2α2n−4k (3.61)
for k < n
2
. Taking into consideration only the dominant term we get
IevenD ≈
(
n
n
2
)
αn
for even n which is the same as the optimal information, and
IoddD ≈
(
n
n−1
2
)
2αn+1 (3.62)
for odd n which is smaller than the optimal mutual information by a factor of
1
ln 2
.
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3.5 Parity Bit for Density Matrices of Mixed
States
The previous discussion assumed that ρ(1)p are pure states. The generalization
to the case of density matrices with equal determinants is straightforward. Let
the bit ‘0’ and the bit ‘1’ be represented by
ρdm0 =
(
c2 sc− r
sc− r s2
)
, (3.63)
and
ρdm1 =
(
c2 −(sc− r)
−(sc− r) s2
)
, (3.64)
(with s = sinα etc., and r < sc) which contains the most general density ma-
trices of the desired type. On the Poincare´ sphere these density matrices have
the same z components as the previously written pure states but smaller x com-
ponents (hence smaller angle α′). We could choose other ways of representing
these density matrices, e.g., with identical x components and smaller z com-
ponents. Such representations are appropriate for comparison with pure states
(since they yield the same mutual information for a single particle) but are less
convenient for showing that the previous result is easily generalized.
Clearly
ρ(1)dm =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 + ρ
(1)
1 ) =
(
c2 0
0 s2
)
, (3.65)
∆(1)dm =
1
2
(ρ
(1)
0 − ρ(1)1 ) =
(
0 sc− r
sc− r 0
)
, (3.66)
The total density matrix doesn’t change and the difference density matrix has
terms (sc − r)n instead of (sc)n. Reorganizing the basis vectors we again get
the block diagonal matrices where each of the 2 by 2 matrices has the form
B(n,k)p =
(
c2(n−k)s2k ±(cs− r)n
±(cs− r)n c2ks2(n−k)
)
. (3.67)
When normalized, these density matrices have the form of equation (3.27) and
are optimally distinguished by measuring them in the x direction. Transforming
to the x basis as before we get the same
qk = c
2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k) (3.68)
as before, and
pk =
1
2
− (cs− r)
n
c2(n−k)s2k + c2ks2(n−k)
. (3.69)
The total information can now be calculated as before by assigning these pk
and qk into equations (3.40) and (3.39). Thus, the case of mixed states is also
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analytically solved for any number of bits, and the influence of mixing on the
optimal mutual information is through the pk’s.
Calculating the optimal information for small α and any r is possible but
complicated. A much simpler alternative is to find a bound on the optimal
information using pure states with the same angle, α′, on the Poincare´ sphere,
using
tan 2α′ =
sin 2α− 2r
cos 2α
, (3.70)
or using an alternative form for the mixed states (3.63) and (3.64).
3.6 The Connection to Quantum Cryptogra-
phy
In this chapter we solved a problem in quantum information: suppose Bob is
given n particles, each in one of two possible states (either pure or mixed in
2-d with equal determinants). How much mutual information can he extract
on the parity bit and what is the optimal measurement? The density matrices
describing the parity bit are very complicated and have 2n dimensions. Thus, it
is very surprising that the optimal information can be calculated, since previous
results consider much simpler case (e.g. density matrices in 2-d).
This result is important to the analysis of privacy amplification, and has
crucial impact on quantum cryptography. Previously, it was known that pri-
vacy amplification is effective when particles are not measured together, but
its effectiveness against coherent measurements was in question. Our result
provides the optimal measurement which can be done to find a parity bit. In
particular cases, when almost fully overlapping states are used, we proved two
complementary results regarding that optimal measurement:
• The optimal information IM obtained by allowing all possible measure-
ments is much larger than the one (IS) obtained by measuring each bit
separately.
• The optimal information IM is still exponentially small with the length of
the string. This is an effectiveness result: classical privacy amplification
techniques are effective against any quantum measurement.
Our “effectiveness result” leads to the derivation of strong security results
against sophisticated attacks directed against the final key. However, such anal-
ysis is much more complicated since it involves the key distribution protocol in
real channels, and because Eve is exposed to classical information in addition
to the quantum information. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Security Against Collective
Attacks
The discussion of the previous chapter treats an imaginary scenario which is
very general but is not general enough to deal with the common situation in
quantum cryptographic protocols. Still, it provides some basic tools required
for such an analysis.
The basic differences from the situation previously described are:
• Eve probes states transmitted from Alice to Bob rather than fed by Alice;
Thus, she has some freedom in choosing the states she obtains.
• In addition to the quantum information (the possible states of the probes)
Eve obtains classical data; The state of Eve’s probes is information-
dependent, and this fact must be taken into account in calculating the
optimal information, and also in the optimization process.
These differences create a more complicated situation where the final measure-
ment must be optimized, not by itself, but together with the probing process.
As far as quantum cryptography is concerned, this chapter provides strong
evidences that quantum key distribution is secure. As far as physics is con-
cerned, this chapter contains interesting examples for information-dependent
quantum states. Another achievement is the development of new type of bounds
on the information which can be extracted from quantum states.
To emphasize the importance of the “effectiveness result” obtained in the
previous chapter let us consider the scenario which is common in quantum key
distribution schemes: Alice and Bob (the legitimate users) try to establish a
secret key. They use any binary scheme and Alice sends L′ particles (see Sec-
tion 1.4) through a noisy channel to Bob. An adversary, Eve, is trying to learn
information on their key. She gets the particles one at a time, interacts with
each one of them weakly (on average), and sends it forward to Bob. She must
interact weakly with each particle if she wants to induce only small error rate
(or alternatively, she could attack strongly only a few of the particles, but pri-
vacy amplification is already proven effective against such type of attack [9]).
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Although the specification of the privacy amplification technique is announced
after the transmission is over, Eve can keep a quantum state of a system which
has interacted with all the transmitted particles, and use it after all the speci-
fication is announced. Security against such joint attacks in error-free channels
is shown in [109]. Our main goal is to obtain a concrete bound on Eve’s infor-
mation for a given error rate, and show that it reduces to zero, if large strings
are used. Typically, one would like to consider the case where Alice and Bob
use existing technologies, while Eve is restricted only by the laws of physics.
In the first sections we concentrate on symmetric collective attacks in which
the same translucent attack is applied to each transmitted particle, and the
attack is symmetric to any of the possible quantum states of each particle.
Such an attack induces the same probability of error to each transmitted bit.
It must be weak, or else it would induce a non acceptable error rate. Thus, the
possible states of Eve’s probe cannot differ much.
In Section 4.1 we design a specific case in quantum key distribution where
each of Eve’s probes is in one of two pure states (with small angle between
them), so the efficiency result of the previous chapter can be applied. We
also incorporate error correction as is done in any realistic protocol and thus
the analysis becomes more complicated. This part was done together with Eli
Biham and Dominic Mayers and with the help of Gilles Brassard and John
Smolin. It was published with Eli Biham in [20]. Sections 4.2, 4.3 were done
with Eli Biham [21]. In Section 4.2 we present new bounds on the information
which can be extracted from mixed states in case the result regarding pure states
is known. In Section 4.3 we combine the results of the previous sections and
the fact that density matrices in Eve’s hands are information-dependent and
we calculate Eve’s optimal information for various symmetric collective attacks.
We show how to prove security against any symmetric collective attack which
uses 2-dimensional probes. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 we discuss the relevance
of the previous result to non-symmetric collective attacks and to the optimal
collective attack.
4.1 The Simplest Case – Eve’s Probes are in
One Out Of Two Possible Pure States
In this section we consider the two-state scheme and devise a specific attack
against it. In the two-state [4] scheme the classical bits ‘0’ or ‘1’ are represented
by two non-orthogonal pure states, which can be written as
ψ0 =
(
cos θ
sin θ
)
and ψ1 =
(
cos θ
− sin θ
)
(4.1)
respectively. Alice sends L′ such qubits. Bob performs a test which provides
him with a conclusive or inconclusive result. For instance, he can test whether
a specific particle is in a state ψ0 or a state orthogonal to it ψ0
′ =
(
sin θ
− cos θ
)
; A
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result ψ0 is treated as inconclusive (since it could also be ψ1 sent by Alice),
and a result ψ0
′ is identified as ψ1. Alternatively, he could test if a particle is
in a state ψ1 or a state orthogonal to it ψ1
′ =
(
sin θ
cos θ
)
, and identify a result ψ′1
conclusively as ψ0. Bob informs Alice which bits were identified conclusively,
using the unjammable classical channel, and these bits are the raw data. Later
on, they check the error rate on the raw data, and if it is reasonable, they use
the remaining n bits to obtain a (hopefully secure) final key. The errors are
corrected using any error-correction protocol. Finally, the parity of the full n-
bit string is used as their final one-bit key (Of course, for practical purposes our
approach must be generalized to yield a longer final string).
Our first example of a collective attack is based on the “translucent attack
without entanglement” of [45], which leaves Eve with probes in a pure state.
The translucent attack without entanglement uses the unitary transformation
(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
−→
(
cos θ′
± sin θ′
)(
cosα
± sinα
)
(4.2)
where θ′ is the angle of the states received by Bob, and α is the angle of the
states in Eve’s hand. The error rate is the probability of wrong identification
and it is pe = sin
2(θ − θ′). Using the unitarity condition cos 2θ = cos 2θ′ cos 2α
we get for weak attacks that
α = (pe tan
2 2θ)1/4 . (4.3)
This translucent attack is performed on all the bits, and it leaves Eve with n
relevant probes, each in one of the two states
(
c
±s
)
, with c = cosα and s = sinα.
As a result, Eve holds an n-bit string x which is concatenated from its bits
(x)1 (x)2 . . . (x)n. For simplicity, we choose the final key to consist of one bit,
which is the parity of the n bits. Eve wants to distinguish between two density
matrices corresponding to the two possible values of this parity bit. Our goal is
to calculate the optimal mutual information she can extract from them.
For our analysis we need some more notations. Let nˆ(x) be the number of
1’s in x, and p(x) be the parity of x. For two strings of equal length x ⊙ y is
the bitwise “AND”, so that the bit (x⊙ y)i is one if both (x)i and (y)i are one,
and zero otherwise. Also x ⊕ y is the bitwise “XOR”, so that (x ⊕ y)i is zero
if (x)i and (y)i are the same, and one otherwise. For k (independent) strings,
v1, . . . , vk, of equal length let the set {v}k contain all the 2k linear combina-
tions of v1, . . . , vk (including the string v0 = 00 . . . 0): (v0), (v1), . . . , (vk), (v1 ⊕
v2), (v1⊕v3), . . . , (vk−1⊕vk), (v1⊕v2⊕v3), . . . (v1⊕v2 . . .⊕vk). Since the (orig-
inal) k strings are linearly independent these 2k strings are all different. The
quantum state of a string is the tensor product
ψx =
(
c
±s
)(
c
±s
)
. . .
(
c
±s
)
=


ccc . . . ccc
±ccc . . . ccs
. . .
±sss . . . sss

 , (4.4)
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living in a 2n dimensional Hilbert space. The sign of the i’th bit (in the middle
expression) is plus for (x)i = 0 and minus for (x)i = 1. The sign of the j’th
term (j = 0 . . . 2n−1) in the expression at the right depends on the parity of the
string x⊙ j and is equal to (−1)p(x⊙j). The density matrix ρx = ψxψTx also has
for any x, the same terms up to the signs. We denote the absolute values by
ρjk ≡ |(ρx)jk|. The sign of each term (ρx)jk is given by
(−1)p(x⊙j)(−1)p(x⊙k) = (−1)p[x⊙(j⊕k)] . (4.5)
A priori, all strings are equally probable and Eve needs to distinguish be-
tween the two density matrices describing the parities. These matrices were
calculated and analyzed in Chapter 3 (henceforth, the BMS work [15]). If Eve
cannot obtain the error-correction code her optimal information on the parity
bit is given by (3.39) and (3.40). To leading order in α it is given by (3.48) and
it is
IevenM =
(
2k
k
)
α2k (4.6)
for n = 2k, and
IoddM =
(
2k − 1
k − 1
)
2
ln 2
α2k =
(
2k
k
)
1
ln 2
α2k (4.7)
for n = 2k − 1. Thus,
I(n) = c
(
2k
k
)
α2k (4.8)
with c = 1 for n = 2k and c = 1/ ln 2 for n = 2k − 1.
In case Eve is being told what the error-correction code is, all strings consis-
tent with the given error-correction code (the r sub-parities) are equally prob-
able, and Eve need to distinguish between the two density matrices:
ρ
(n,r)
0 =
1
2n−r−1
∑
x | ( p(x)=0x OECC)
ρx ; ρ
(n,r)
1 =
1
2n−r−1
∑
x | ( p(x)=1x OECC)
ρx (4.9)
where OECC is a shortcut for Obeys Error-Correction Code.
Let us look at two simple examples where n = 5: one with r = 1 and the
other with r = 2. Suppose that the parity of the first two bits, (x)1 and (x)2, is
p1 = 0. Formally, this substring is described by the n-bit string v1 = 24 which
is 11000 binary; The number of 1’s in the first two bits of a string x is given
by nˆ(x ⊙ v1), and x obeys the error-correction code if p(x ⊙ v1) = p1. Let vd
be the binary string (11111 in this case) which describes the substring of the
desired parity. Eve could perform the optimal attack on the three bits which
are left, or in general, on v1⊕ vd. For any such case, the optimal attack is given
by the BMS work and the optimal information depends only on nˆ(v1 ⊕ vd), the
Hamming distance between the two words. This information [using eq. (4.8)] is
I(nˆ) = c
(
2k
k
)
α2k (4.10)
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with c = 1 for even nˆ (which equals to 2k) and c = 1/ ln 2 for odd nˆ (which
equals nˆ = 2k − 1).
Suppose that Eve gets another parity bit p2 = 1 of the binary string 01100
(v2 = 12). Now, a string x obeys the error-correction code if it also obeys
p(x⊙ v2) = p2. Clearly, it also satisfies p[x⊙ (v1⊕ v2)] = p1⊕ p2. In the general
case there are r independent parity strings, and 2r parity strings in the set {v}r.
The BMS result cannot be directly used, but it still provides some intuition:
For each word (i.e., each parity string) vl ∈ {v}r, let I(nˆ(vl⊕vd)) be the optimal
information Eve could obtain using (4.10). Also let Isum be the sum of these
contributions from all such words. In reality Eve cannot obtain Isum since each
measurement changes the state of the measured bits, hence we expect that Isum
bounds her optimal information Itotal:
Conjecture
Itotal < Isum . (4.11)
On the other hand, Eve knows all these words at once, and could take advantage
of it, thus we leave this as an unproven conjecture.
In the following we find an explicit way to calculate the optimal information
exactly. However, this exact result requires cumbersome calculations, thus it is
used only to verify the conjecture for short strings.
The parity of the full string is also known since the density matrix ρ(n,r+1)
corresponds to either ρ
(n,r)
0 or ρ
(n,r)
1 depending on the desired parity pr+1, thus
we add the string vr+1 = vd. There are r+1 independent sub-parities altogether,
hence 2r+1 parity strings in the set {v}r+1. A string x is included in ρ(n,r+1) if
p[x⊙ vl] = pl (4.12)
for all given substring in {v}r+1 In the BMS work (where r = 0) the parity
density matrices were put in a block diagonal form of 2n−1 blocks of size 2× 2.
This result can be generalized to the case where r parities of substrings are
given. There will be 2n−r−1 blocks of size 2r+1 × 2r+1. We shall show that the
(jk)’th term in a density matrix ρ(n,r+1) of r+1 sub-parities is either zero, ρjk or
−ρjk, that is, either all the relevant strings contribute exactly the same term, or
half of them cancels the other half. The proof can be skipped in a first reading.
Theorem
The element (ρ(n,r+1))jk is zero if j ⊕ k 6∈ {v}r+1, and it is ±ρjk if j ⊕ k ∈
{v}r+1.
Proof
In case
j ⊕ k 6∈ {v}r+1 (4.13)
choose C such that
p[C ⊙ vl] = 0 (4.14)
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with all (vl)’s in {v}r+1 and
p[C ⊙ (j ⊕ k)] = 1 (4.15)
(many such C’s exists since C has n independent bits and it needs to
fulfill only r+2 constraints). For such a C and for any x which obeys the
error-correction code there exist one (and only one) y, y = x ⊕ C, which
also obeys the code (due to the first demand) but has the opposite sign in
the jk’th element (due to the second demand), so (ρy)jk = −(ρx)jk (due
to eq. 4.5). Since this is true for any relevant x, we obtain
(ρ(n,r+1))jk = 0 . (4.16)
In case
j ⊕ k ∈ {v}r+1 (4.17)
such C cannot exists, and all terms must have the same sign: Suppose
that there are two terms, x and y with opposite signs. Then C = x ⊕ y
satisfies the two demands, leading to a contradiction.
QED
This theorem tells us the place of all non-vanishing terms in the original order-
ing. The matrices can be reordered to a block-diagonal form by exchanges of
the basis vectors. We group the vectors s, s⊕ v1, etc., for all (vl)’s in {v}r+1 to
be one after the other, so each such group is separated from the other groups.
Now the theorem implies that all non-vanishing terms are grouped in blocks,
and all vanishing terms are outside these blocks. As a result, the matrix is
block-diagonal. This forms 2n−r−1 blocks of size 2r+1 × 2r+1. All terms inside
the blocks and their signs are given by eq. (4.4) and (4.5) respectively up to
reordering. The organization of the blocks depends only on the parity strings
vl and not on the parities pl, thus, ρ
(n,r)
0 and ρ
(n,r)
1 are block diagonalized in the
same basis. The rank of a density matrix is the number of (independent) pure
states which form it, and it is 2n−r−1 in case of the parity matrices [eq. (4.9)].
When these matrices are put in a block diagonal form, there are 2n−r−1 (all
non-zero) blocks. Thus, the rank of each block is one and the corresponding
state is pure. When a block is fully diagonalized to yield
B[j] =


aj 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 . . . 0
. . .
0 0 0 . . . 0


, (4.18)
the non-vanishing term aj in the j’th block is the probability that a measurement
will result in this block.
In the BMS work (r = 0), the information, in case of small angle, was found
to be exponentially small with the length of the string. When each probe is in
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a pure state, this result can be generalized to r > 0 as follows: The optimal
mutual information carried by two pure states (in any dimension) is well known.
The two possible pure states in the j’th block of ρ
(n,r)
0 and ρ
(n,r)
1 can be written
as
(
cos β
± sinβ
)
. The optimal mutual information which can be obtained from the
j’th block is given by the overlap (the angle βj)
Ij = 1 + pj log pj + (1− pj)log(1− pj) , (4.19)
where
pj =
1− sin 2βj
2
; (4.20)
The overlap is calculated using eq. (4.4) and (4.5). Thus, for any given error-
correction code, we can find the two pure states in each block, the optimal
information Ij , and finally, the total information
Itotal =
∑
j
ajIj . (4.21)
We did not use the value of vd in the proof, and thus, the final key could be
the parity of any substring. Moreover, we intend to develop similar methods
to analyze keys of several bits which can be formed from parities of several
substrings.
We wrote a computer program which receives any (short) error-correction
code and calculates the total information as a function of the angle α between
the pure states of the individual probes. We checked many short codes (up to
n = 8) to verify whether Itotal < Isum as we conjectured. Indeed, all our checks
showed that the conjecture holds. The information for small angle α is bounded
by
Isum = Cα
2k (4.22)
as previously explained, where C is given by summing the terms which con-
tribute to the highest order of eq. (4.10), and the Hamming distance nˆ (which
is 2k or 2k−1), can be increased by choosing longer codes to provide any desired
level of security.
In addition to a desirable security level, the error-correction code must pro-
vide also a desirable reliability; A complete analysis must include also estimation
of the probability pf that Alice and Bob still has wrong (i.e. different) final key.
For enabling such analysis, one must use known error-correction codes. Random
Linear Codes allow such analysis but cannot be used efficiently by Alice and
Bob. Hamming codes [73], Hr which use r given parities for correcting one error
in strings of length n = 2r − 1, have an efficient decoding/encoding procedure
and a simple way to calculate pf . A Hamming code has 2
r words in {v}r, all of
them, except 00 . . . 0, are at the same distance nˆ = 2r−1− 1 from vd. Using our
conjecture and eq. (4.10) (with k = nˆ+1
2
= 2r−2) we obtain
Itotal < (2
r − 1) 1
ln 2
(
2r−1
2r−2
)
α(2
r−1) +O
(
α(2
r−1)) . (4.23)
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For r = 3 (n = 7) the conjecture yields Itotal < 60.6α
4, where the 23−1 words
(0111001; 1101010; 1110100 and their linear combinations 1010011; 1001101;
0011110; 0100111) are at a distance nˆ = 3 from vd = 1111111, and 0000000 at
a distance nˆ = 7. This Hamming code was presented in Section 1.4. For the
exact calculation we use vd so there are 4 independent parity strings: 0111001;
1101010; 1110100; 1111111. As a result, there are 24 resulting strings where
0001011; 0010101; 0101100; 0110010; 1000110; 1011000; 1100001; 1111111 are
added to the above. Averaging over all the density matrices which are consistent
with such given parity strings, and organizing the matrices in a block diagonal
form, we calculated (using the computer program) the pure states in each block
and the resulting information obtained by the optimal measurement. The exact
calculation also gives the same result as above, showing that the conjecture
provides an extremely tight bound in this case.
Using (
2r−1
2r−2
)
<
2(2
r−1)√
(pi
2
2r−1)
(4.24)
and some calculation we finally obtain
Itotal <

 2
ln 2
√
pi
2

√2r−1(2α)(2r−1) , (4.25)
bounding Itotal to be exponentially small with n [which follows from 2
r−1 =
(n+ 1)/2]:
Itotal < C(n)(2α)
(n+1)/2 , (4.26)
with C(n) =
√
n + 1 2
ln 2
√
pi
. As a function of the error rate the information is
Itotal < C(n)(16pe tan
2 2θ)(n+1)/8 . (4.27)
The rate of errors in the string shared by Alice and Bob (after throwing
inconclusive results) is the normalized error rate, p
(N)
e = pe/(pc + pe), where
pc = sin(θ + θ
′) is the probability of obtaining a correct and conclusive result.
For small α it is p
(N)
e =
2pe
sin2 2θ
= 2 cos
2 2θ
sin4 2θ
α4. The final error probability pf is
bounded by the probability to have more than one error in the initial string,
since the code corrects one error. It is pf =
n(n−1)
2
(p
(N)
e )
2+O[(np
(N)
e )
3], showing
that we can use the Hamming codes as long as np
(N)
e << 1. In case it is not,
better codes such as the BCH codes [73] (which correct more than one error) are
required, but their analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Extracting more
than one final bit is also possible, but is also beyond the scope of this work.
4.2 Bounds on Information
In terms of quantum information theory the result of eq. (4.26) (henceforth, the
BM result) extends the BMS result to the case where parities of substrings are
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given (error-correction code). For purposes of quantum key distribution, the BM
result provides the first security proof (assuming the verified conjecture 4.11)
against a strong attack. However, it is restricted to attacks in which Eve’s
probes are in a pure state. Unfortunately, most possible translucent attacks on
the two-state scheme [4], which can be used in the first step of the collective
attack, leave each of Eve’s probes in a mixed state. Also, any translucent attack
on the four-state scheme [6] leaves each probe in a mixed state (at least for two
out of the four possible states).
The goal of this section is to apply the BM result to the case of mixed states.
We demonstrate that any type of information which can be extracted from
certain two-dimensional mixed states can be bounded, if the solution for pure
states is known. In the next sections we use this bound and conjecture 4.11 to
explicitly demonstrate, via examples, how to bound Eve’s optimal information
(for a given induced error rate).
Any state (density matrix) in 2-dimensional Hilbert space can be written as
ρ =
Iˆ + r · σˆ
2
(4.28)
so that
ρ =
1
2
(
1 + z x− iy
x+ iy 1− z
)
, (4.29)
with r = (x, y, z) being a vector in R3, σˆ = (σˆx, σˆy, σˆz) the Pauli matrices,
and Iˆ the unit matrix. In this spin notation, each state is represented by
the corresponding vector r. For pure states |r| = 1, and for mixed states
|r| < 1. Suppose that χ and ζ are two density matrices, represented by rχ and
rζ respectively. It is possible to construct the density matrix
ρ = mζ + (1−m)χ (4.30)
from the two matrices (where 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 since m and 1−m are probabilities),
and the geometric representation of such a density matrix ρ = Iˆ+rρ·σˆ
2
is
rρ = mrζ + (1−m)rχ . (4.31)
Two pure states can always be expressed as |Φ0〉 =
(
c
s
)
and |Φ1〉 =
(
c
−s
)
, with
c = cosα and s = sinα. Using the notations of density matrices
Φ0 ≡ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| (4.32)
etc. the two pure states are
Φp =
1
2
(
1 + z x
x 1− z
)
, (4.33)
with z = cos 2α and x = sin 2α for p = 0 and x = − sin 2α for p = 1. If Φp is
used to describe bit p, the receiver can identify the bit by distinguishing the two
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pure states. Two (not necessarily pure) density matrices ρp in two-dimensional
Hilbert space, with equal determinants (which are equal to |r|) can also be
expressed using similar form with z = |r| cos 2α and x = ±|r| sin 2α. For two
such mixed states let us choose a state χn, and two pure states Φ0, Φ1 such that
ρ0 = mΦ0 + (1−m)χn
ρ1 = mΦ1 + (1−m)χn . (4.34)
Let I be some (positive) measure for the optimal distinguishability of two states,
so that any operation done on them cannot lead to a distinguishability better
than I. From the construction of (4.34), it is clear that any such measure, I, for
optimal distinguishability must find that the two mixed states ρp are not more
distinguishable than the two pure states Φp. That is
Theorem
I(Φ0; Φ1) ≥ I(ρ0; ρ1) . (4.35)
Proof
Suppose the contrary I(Φ0; Φ1) < I(ρ0; ρ1). Then, when one receives
Φp he can mix them with χn and derive a better distinguishability than
I(Φ0; Φ1), in contradiction to the definition of I(Φ0; Φ1).
QED
We can choose any measure of an optimal information carried by these sys-
tems to describe the distinguishability. Very complicated types of information
can be extracted from such systems, as for example, the optimal information
on the parity of an n-bit string of such quantum bits [15, 20]. In the case [20],
where parities of substrings are given, a solution exists only for pure states with
small angles (the BM result). We can use this known solution to bound the
optimal information on mixed states which are close to each other.
Let ρcms be the completely mixed state ρcms =
1
2
Iˆ. Also let ρ↓ be the pure
state of spin down in the z direction. Two cases of (4.34) are useful for our
purpose:
a) ρp = mΦp+(1−m)ρcms, where the pure states Φp have the same angle as
ρp (see Fig. 4.1a);
b) ρp = mΦp + (1 − m)ρ↓, where Φp (which are uniquely determined) are
shown in Fig. 4.1b.
The first type of bound is useful if ρp have a small angle α (which satisfies
tan 2α = x/z), so that the angle between the pure states β = α is also small.
The second type of bound is useful when the ‘distance’ 2x between the two
possible mixed states is small (while α might be large). In this case x is small
and z positive hence the resulting angle β between the two pure states is small
(following tanβ = tan 2δ = x
z+1
≤ x). Thus, in both cases the angle between
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Figure 4.1: Two ways of finding two pure states Φp from which the two density
matrices ρp can be constructed using a third state χn common to both density
matrices. In a), χn = ρcms, the completely mixed state. In b), χn =↓z, the
“down z” pure spin state.
the two pure states is small so that I(n, β) < C(n)(2β)(n+1)/2 (with C(n) =√
n+ 1 2
ln 2
√
pi
) provides an upper bound on Eve’s information on the final key.
Note that our final goal is to get I(n, pe), thus we need also to find the relation
between pe and β (through the known relation with α).
4.3 Security Against Symmetric Collective At-
tacks
An explicit calculation of Eve’s density matrix as a function of pe must be done
separately for any suggested attack to obtain I(n, pe). However, the fact that
Eve is permitted to induce only small error rate restricts her possible trans-
formations at the first stage of the collective attack, hence, the two possible
states of each of her probes must be largely overlapping (for a symmetric at-
tack). Concentrating on two-dimensional probes, this implies that the second
of the two cases above can always be used to bound Eve’s information to be
exponentially small. For certain examples – the first case is sufficient, hence
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the angle between the two possible pure states can be calculated from Eve’s
density matrix directly using β = α. Let us show two examples in details, to
conclude that Eve’s information is exponentially small with the length of the
string. Both examples use the same unitary transformation but are applied
onto different quantum cryptographic schemes, the two-state scheme [4] and
the four-state scheme [6].
In our examples Eve uses a 2-dimensional probe in an initial state
(
1
0
)
. She
performs a unitary transformation
U
(
1
0
)
|φ〉 (4.36)
(with |φ〉 Alice’s state), where
U =


1 0 0 0
0 cγ −sγ 0
0 sγ cγ 0
0 0 0 1

 , (4.37)
with cγ = cos γ, etc. With γ =
pi
2
this gate swaps the particles
(
1
0
)
|φ〉 → |φ〉
(
1
0
)
. (4.38)
Eve chooses a small angle γ so that the attack is a weak swap. Let Alice’s possi-
ble initial states be |φp〉 =
(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
in the two-state scheme, and |φm〉 = 1√2
(
1
im
)
(with i =
√−1 and m = 0 · · · 3) in the four-state scheme. The corresponding
final states are
|Ψp〉 =


cos θ
± sin θ cγ
± sin θ sγ
0

 ; |Ψm〉 = 1√2


1
im cγ
im sγ
0

 , (4.39)
respectively.
Bob’s reduced density matrices (RDMs) are calculated from |Ψ〉〈Ψ| by trac-
ing out Eve’s particle. This operation is usually denoted by
ρB = TrE [|Ψ〉〈Ψ|] , (4.40)
where the full formula is given by eq. (5.19) in [86] (ρnm =
∑
µν ρnν,mµδµν =∑
µ ρnµ,mµ). We denote this operation by
ρB = TrE
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Iˆ
]
, (4.41)
where the two-dimensional δµν is written as Iˆ. From Bob’s matrices we find
the error rate, that is, the probability pe that he recognizes a wrong bit value.
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Calculating Eve’s density matrix is more tricky; we need to take into account
the additional information she obtains from the classical data, in order to obtain
an information-dependent RDMs. This is a trivial task for the four-state scheme
but a rather confusing task in case of the two-state scheme.
In case of the four-state scheme Bob measures his particle in one of the basis
x (corresponding to m = 0, 2) or y (m = 1, 3). Suppose that Alice and Bob use
the x basis; Bob’s RDMs are
ρB =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(sγ)
2 ±1
2
cγ
±1
2
cγ
1
2
− 1
2
(sγ)
2
)
, (4.42)
leading to an error rate pe = sin
2(γ/2) which is the probability that he identifies
|φ2〉 when |φ0〉 is sent. Eve has the same knowledge of the basis, hence her
information-dependent RDMs are
ρE =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(cγ)
2 ±1
2
sγ
±1
2
sγ
1
2
− 1
2
(cγ)
2
)
, (4.43)
so that x = sγ, z = (cγ)
2, and the relevant angles are 2β = 2α = (tan)−1(sγ/cγ2)
(using the first type of bounds). For a small angle γ we get pe ≈ γ2/4 +O(γ4),
β ≈ γ/2 + O(γ3), and thus pe ≈ β2 +O(β4). The information is thus bounded
by
I(n, pe) < C(n)(4pe)
(n+1)/4 (4.44)
to be exponentially small [using (4.26)].
It is interesting to note that this spin-exchange attack against the four-state
scheme provides the optimal information vs. disturbance for individual attacks.
This can be easily seen by calculating I2(γ) from ρE and then by comparing
I2(pe) to the optimal result calculated recently in [50]. As a result, this attack
also provides the maximal possible ‘distance’ between Eve’s possible density
matrices (on the Poincare´ sphere) for a given error rate. Thus, with some more
work, it is possible to obtain a bound on Eve’s optimal information on the final
key using any symmetric collective attack (on the four-state scheme) which uses
probes in 2 dimensions. This interesting result was obtained only while adding
final corrections to this thesis, and thus, it shall be explicitly shown in a future
review paper on the security issue, but not in this thesis.
In case of the two-state scheme Bob’s RDMs are
ρB =
(
(cθ)
2 + (sθ)
2(sγ)
2 ±cθsθcγ
±cθsθcγ (sθ)2(cγ)2
)
. (4.45)
Bob chooses one of two possible measurements, M0→1 or M1→0, with equal
probability p0→1 = p1→0 = 1/2; In case of M0→1, Bob measures the received
state to distinguish φ0 from its orthogonal state φ0
′ and finds a conclusive result
‘1’ whenever he gets φ0
′. (The conclusive result ‘0’ is obtained by interchanging
0 and 1 in the above). The error rate is the probability of identifying φp
′ when
φp is sent, and it is
pe = (sθ)
2(cθ)
2[1− cγ ]2 + (sθ)4(sγ)2 . (4.46)
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To obtain Eve’s density matrices one must take into account all the infor-
mation she possibly has. If one ignores the classical information and calculates
the standard RDMs (as in [51]), then the result is of significant importance to
quantum information, while it is less relevant to quantum cryptography. Re-
call that Bob keeps only particles identified conclusively (as either φ0
′ or φ1
′);
Bob informs Alice — and thus Eve — which they are, and, as a result, Eve
knows that Bob received either φ0
′ or φ1
′ in his measurement, and not φ0 or
φ1. This fact influences her density matrices, and these are not given anymore
by the simple tracing formula ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Iˆ
]
. In general, information
dependent RDMs are obtained by replacing Iˆ by any other positive operator Aˆ:
ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Aˆ
]
(4.47)
(This is a rather obvious conclusion from the discussions prior to eq. (5.19) and
also from page 289 in Section 9 in [86]); The correctness of this technique can
easily be verified. In our case
ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)(1
2
|φ0′〉〈φ0′|+ 1
2
|φ1′〉〈φ1′|)
]
, (4.48)
where the halves result from p0→1 and p1→0. This tracing technique leads to
ρE =
(
(sθ)
2(cθ)
2 + (sθ)
2(cθ)
2(cγ)
2 ±cθ(sθ)3sγ
±cθ(sθ)3sγ (sθ)4(sγ)2
)
. (4.49)
After normalization we get
x = 2sγcθ(sθ)
3/TrρE (4.50)
and
z =
1 + z
2
− 1− z
2
= [(cθ)
2(sθ)
2[1 + (cγ)
2]− (sθ)4(sγ)2]/TrρE . (4.51)
The relevant angles are again 2β = 2α = tan−1(x/z). For small angle γ we get
pe ≈ sθ4γ2 +O(γ4), 2β ≈ (sθ/cθ)γ +O(γ3). Finally we get
pe ≈ (sθ)2(cθ)2(2β)2 +O(β4) (4.52)
from which we find
I(pe, n) < C(n)
(
pe
sθcθ
)(n+1)/4
, (4.53)
with C(n) as before.
From the dependence on p(n+1)/4e (that is, from pe ≈ β2) one might get
the wrong impression that this attack is much worse to Eve than the EHPP
attack [see (4.27) where pe ≈ α4]. This is indeed the case since the EHPP
attack is especially designed to attack the two-state scheme. However, Alice
and Bob can easily overcome this problem if they use other (additional) states
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in the protocol. Such additional states are used only for error estimation and
are much more sensitive to the EHPP attack. For instance, if Alice sends the
additional state
(
1
0
)
to Bob, then Bob’s RDM is

 cα2cθ′2cθ2 0
0 sα
2sθ′
2
cθ2

 , (4.54)
as a result of the EHPP transformation (2.3). The induced error rate is
pe =
sα
2sθ′
2
cθ2
≈ tan2 θ α2 (4.55)
proving that pe ≈ α2 as in the attacks presented in this section (actually, Alice
and Bob could even identify that Eve is performing an attack specially designed
against the two-state scheme if pe is so much different for different states). Thus,
if Alice and Bob use such verification states, Eve must take this into account
and decrease α in an appropriate way. As a result of the existence of such
unique attacks against the two states of the two-state scheme, and the recent
proof that the optimal attack on the four-state scheme also yields pe ≈ β2 [50]
it is quite clear that it is better to abandon the two-state scheme as it is today
and to modify it as we just suggested. Whether the modified two-state scheme
still deserves being called a two-state scheme is a matter of taste, but clearly it
loses one of its main advantages over the four-state scheme, namely using two
states instead of four for secure transmission.
4.4 Security Against Non-Symmetric Collective
Attacks
While writing this thesis we extended the previous result a bit further, analyzing
also a typical example of a non-symmetric collective attack. These results are
yet partial, but due to their importance, we prefer to add them in an incomplete
form rather than to ignore them.
In this section we present the gate of weak measurement and use it to per-
form a non-symmetric attack on the four-state scheme. This attack generalized
the simple attack presented in Section 1.4, where Eve performed standard mea-
surements in one of the two basis. In the original attack Eve can only attack
a small potion of the particles, η, or else she induces too much noise. Using
the weak measurement gate presented here, she can attack all particles (for any
permitted error rate).
A gate for standard measurement performs the transformation
(
1
0
)
E
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
A
−→
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
E
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
B
. (4.56)
73
We generalize this gate to
(
1
0
)
E
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
A
−→
(
cos γ
± sin γ
)
E
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
B
, (4.57)
which yields the previous gate for γ = π/4 and yields a weak measurement gate
for small γ. This unitary transformation stands for a weak measurement in the
x basis.
Let us apply the unitary transformation to
(
1
0
)
A
and
(
0
1
)
A
:


1
0
0
0

→


cγ
0
0
sγ

 ;


0
1
0
0

→


0
cγ
sγ
0

 . (4.58)
This unitary transformation can be chosen as:


cγ 0 0 −sγ
0 cγ −sγ 0
0 sγ cγ 0
sγ 0 0 cγ

 (4.59)
Applying this (x basis) weak measurement transformation to |φp〉 and |φm〉 we
get 

cθ
±sθ
0
0

→


cγcθ
±cγsθ
±sγsθ
sγcθ

 ; 1√2


1
im
0
0

→


cγ
imcγ
imsγ
sγ

 . (4.60)
One can verify that for γ = π/4 and m = 0, 2 this is the standard measurement
gate (in the x basis) we started with.
When Eve applies this transformation onto the two-state scheme as above,
she actually applies another symmetric collective attack. However, when Eve
applies this gate to attack the four-state scheme by choosing randomly in which
basis (x or y, in our case) to measure1, she applies a very enlightening example
of a non-symmetric collective attack.
We consider the case where Eve performs a weak measurement in the x
direction. If Alice and Bob also use the x basis Eve induces no errors and the
angle for her probe is α = γ. If they use the y basis the reduced density matrices
in Bob’s hands are
ρB =
(
1
2
∓ i
2
c2γ
± i
2
c2γ
1
2
)
, (4.61)
leading to an error rate pe = sin
2 γ. The average error rate is thus, pe =
(sin2 γ)/2, and this bounds γ to be small. For small angles γ =
√
2pe.
1 The gate presented above can be easily generalized to give a weak measurement in any
other direction.
74
Eve has the same knowledge of the basis, hence her information-dependent
RDMs are
ρE =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(c2γ) 0
0 1
2
− 1
2
(c2γ)
)
. (4.62)
These RDM’s are independent of the state sent by Alice. Thus, Eve’s density
matrix provides no information at all.
Although Eve’s average information on each bit does not differ much from
the previous example (using the spin-exchange gate), her average information
on the parity bit is much reduced. In most cases it is exactly zero since the
probability that Eve guesses the basis of all the bits in an n-bit string correctly is
2−n. Even when she does guess it correctly, her information is still exponentially
small
I < C(n)(8pe)
(n+1)/4 , (4.63)
but larger than the information Eve obtains using the spin-exchange gate by
a factor of 2(n+1)/4. On average, her information is reduced by a factor of
2[(n+1)/4]−n ≈ 2−3n/4 compared to that symmetric attack.
To gain a better comparison, one should calculate Eve’s information in a
symmetric collective attack using a weak measurement in the Breidbart basis
(the basis symmetric to the x and the y bases), or even better — to calculate
Eve’s information in a non-symmetric attacks where Eve measures in some
chosen angle from the Breidbart basis.
4.5 Security Against Any Collective Attack
We have seen simple symmetric collective attacks in Section 4.3. The informa-
tion available to Eve when she performs any other symmetric collective attack
with two-dimensional probes can also be calculated using our method. In par-
ticular, when the optimal attack of that type will be found, our method can be
used to prove security against it; For small enough error rate Eve’s probes must
have small angles between them, and thus, our proof can be applied using the
first type of bounds (Fig. 4.1a).
The second type of bounds (Fig. 4.1b) is usually irrelevant when the attack
is given (since Eve’s initial state is usually in a pure state), but it can be
very useful for finding the optimal attack, requiring only to find the maximal
‘distance’, 2x, between the two possible states of the probe. For the attacks on
the two-state scheme the optimal distance can be found as in [51]. Note that
it will not provide the optimal attack, but it shall provide a bound on Eve’s
optimal information. For the attacks on the four-states scheme we can already
perform the calculation as previously explained, and shall do it very soon.
More general collective attacks can use non-symmetric translucent attacks
and/or can use probes in higher dimensions in the first step of the collective
attack. Methods similar to ours can be used for proving security against various
non-symmetric collective attacks (in 2 dimensions), as is done in Section 4.4.
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But the calculation becomes more complicated, and we are not sure if all cases
can be solved. However, the case solved in the previous section provides some
intuition why non-symmetric attacks are not good for Eve.
Our bounds cannot be used when Eve uses higher dimensional probes. On
one hand, the two possible states of each probe in this case are still highly
overlapping, and the same intuition which holds in our work shall still hold.
However, extending the information bounds we found to three or four dimen-
sions might be a difficult task since there no simple geometrical representations
as for two dimensions. Note that analysis of dimensions higher than four is not
required since they cannot help the attacker due to reasons shown in [51].
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Chapter 5
Quantum Networks for
Quantum Cryptography
Quantum correlations between two particles show non-classical properties which
can be used for providing secure transmission of information. In this chapter
we present a quantum cryptographic system, in which users store particles in a
transmission center, where their quantum states are preserved using quantum
memories. Correlations between the particles stored by two users are created
upon request by projecting their product state onto a fully entangled state. Our
system secures communication between any pair of users who have particles
in the same center. Unlike other quantum cryptographic systems, it can work
without quantum channels and is suitable for building a quantum cryptographic
network. We also present a modified system with many centers. This part was
done together with Eli Biham and Bruno Huttner [19].
The new developments in quantum computation started a wide surge of in-
terest in the field of quantum computing gates and devices. However, building
such computing devices is a difficult task, and quantum computing is only doing
its first experimental steps. The building blocks of future quantum computers
are one-bit and two-bit quantum logical gates [36, 41, 2, 31], which are currently
under intensive development [33, 103, 82]. Building quantum computing devices
to factor large numbers does not seem to be practical in the foreseeable future
since it requires combining many one-bit and two-bit gates. However, a single
two-bit gate also have intriguing uses in information processing and quantum
communication such as teleporting a quantum state [8], and dense coding in
quantum cryptography [16]. We shall show in this chapter that the use of quan-
tum gates together with quantum memory opens new directions in quantum
cryptography. Our system may be practical long before quantum computers
are, hence it provides a short-term application for quantum gates.
One of the main disadvantages of quantum cryptography is its restriction
to relatively short channels. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to clas-
sical channels, a quantum channel cannot use repeaters1 to amplify the signal
1In parallel, we investigated this problem as well and find a surprising way of defining
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without loss of coherence. Currently, working prototypes enable transmission
to distances of many kilometers (see the general introduction in Chapter 1).
Commercial systems may become available in the near future [55], so that two
users will be able to communicate securely (if they are not too far). However,
building quantum cryptographic networks based on the existing schemes2 seems
to cause severe difficulties (which may even make it impractical):
1. Quantum communication requires any pair of users to have a common
quantum channel, or alternatively a center (or a telephone-like switching
network) connected by quantum channels to all the users, which should
match any pair of channels upon request; enhancing the security of the cur-
rent world-wide telephone network (which contains about N ≈ 109 users
(telephones) ) using quantum cryptography requires huge investments in
quantum channels and devices.
2. Any user must have the financial and technological abilities to operate
complicated quantum devices.
3. The keys must be transmitted online, or else one would need to transmit
O(N2) keys in advance to enable any pairs of users to communicate in
secrecy.
4. The network must assure authenticity of the users.
It is important to have quantum cryptographic networks not suffering from these
problems.
In this chapter we suggest a new cryptographic scheme in which users store
quantum states in quantum memories, kept in a transmission center. Upon
request from two users, the center uses two-bit gates to project the product
state of two non correlated particles (one from each user) onto a fully entangled
state. As a result, the two users can share a secret bit, which is unknown even to
the center. Our scheme can operate without quantum channels, if the quantum
states are “programmed” at the center. In that case, the scheme does not suffer
from the four problems just mentioned, and can operate at any distance. Hence,
it is especially appropriate for building a quantum cryptographic network of
many users. Such a system actually shows some of the useful properties of the
public key cryptosystems, but yet, it doesn’t require computation assumptions.
In Section 5.1, we present a new two-party quantum cryptographic scheme
which is a time-reversed EPR-scheme. In Section 5.2, we present a quantum
network based on this scheme with the addition of quantum memories. In Sec-
tion 5.3, we discuss the possibilities of implementing our scheme in practice. In
Section 5.4, we present a more advanced network, based on quantum telepor-
tation, where users can store their states in different centers and the centers
quantum repeaters. See Section 6.1.3 and Section 6.3.
2For a suggestion of a quantum cryptographic networks based on the existing schemes
see [101].
78
teleport states upon request. This network uses quantum channels; however,
it requires quantum channels only between the centers, so that the 4 problems
stated above do not arise. In Section 5.5 we summarize this chapter.
5.1 A Time-Reversed EPR-Scheme for Quan-
tum Cryptography
The first goal of this chapter is to suggest another scheme for quantum cryptog-
raphy, which we shall call the time-reversed EPR-scheme: in the EPR scheme,
presented in Section 1.4, a singlet state is prepared and, later on, it is projected
on the states of the four-state scheme; in our time-reversed EPR-scheme, each
user prepares one of the four states of the four-state scheme, and, later on, the
product state is projected upon a basis which includes the singlet state. Let
both Alice and Bob send one of the four states, | ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ←〉 or | →〉 to a
third party whom we refer to as the center (the purpose of using this name
shall be clarified in Section 5.2). The center measures their qubits together
to find whether the two particles are in a singlet state. This can be done by
measuring the total-spin operator (Sˆtotal)
2. If the result of the measurement is
s = 0, then the two particles are projected onto the singlet state. In that case
Eq. (1.25) ensures that, if the two spins were prepared along the same axis, then
they necessarily had opposite values (the projection of the states with identical
spins on the singlet state is zero). As a result, Bob knows Alice’s bit and vice
versa. However, from Eq. (1.25), an honest center, who follows the protocol and
projects onto the singlet state, has absolutely no knowledge on these bits. For
example, when Alice and Bob both used the vertical axis, the center does not
know whether Alice had the up state and Bob the down state, or vice versa. If
the measurement result is s = 1, Alice and Bob cannot infer anything about the
value of each other’s bit, and they discard the transmission. The probability of
obtaining the singlet state is zero when Alice and Bob sent the same state (e.g.,
↑↑), and is half in case they sent opposite states. Taking into account the case
where Alice and Bob use different axes (which will also be discarded), we find
that the overall probability to obtain a usable state is only one eighth.
To create a key with many bits, Alice and Bob send strings of quantum
states (L′ > 8(L + l) qubits) to the center. The center must be able to keep
them for a while (in case the states do not arrive at the same time from Alice
and Bob), and then to measure the first pair, the second pair etc. The center
tells Alice and Bob all cases in which the result of the measurement is a singlet,
which happens in one fourth of the cases. Alice and Bob then compare their
axes. When they used the same axis (which happens about half of the time),
they know that their spins are necessarily opposite, and thus Bob can calculate
Alice’s bits to share a key with her. As in the BB84 scheme and the EPR
schemes Alice and Bob use the classical discussion channel to estimate the error
rate. If it is tolerable they perform error correction and privacy amplification,
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Figure 5.1: Two processes, which we use to prove the security of the protocol.
In both figures, one particle of each EPR correlated pair (denoted by dashed
lines) is sent to the center, who performs a Bell measurement. We consider only
the case where the result of the measurement is a singlet state. The second
particles are sent to Alice and to Bob respectively, who project them onto the
BB84 states. In a), the first measurement is done by the center. The particles
arriving to Alice and Bob are therefore in the singlet state like in the EPR based
protocol. In b), the first measurement is performed by Alice and Bob. Each
particle sent to the center is therefore in one of the BB84 states. This is similar
to our protocol.
to derive a final L-bit key.
The security of our protocol derives from the security of the EPR protocol,
and relies on the fact that the singlet state is the only state for which the
two spins are anticorrelated both in the Sˆz and in the Sˆx bases. However, as
explained previously, if the center projects on the singlet state, he does not
get any information on Alice’s and Bob’s bits. Therefore, a cheating center
needs to project onto a different state (possibly entangled with his own system),
which cannot give perfect anticorrelations along both Sˆz and Sˆx axes. Since the
center cannot know in advance which basis was used by Alice and by Bob (the
two density matrices corresponding to using Sˆz or Sˆx are identical), he will
unavoidably introduce errors, which Alice and Bob shall identify during the
discussion.
In fact, in terms of eavesdropping possibilities, our protocol and the EPR
protocol are equivalent, as we show using the scheme presented in Fig. 5.1. In
this scheme, two EPR pairs are created, one particle of each pair is sent to the
center, and the second one to Alice and to Bob. In Fig. 5.1a, the center performs
a measurement on his two particles first. An honest center, who follows the
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agreed protocol, projects the particles onto the singlet state. The two particles
sent to Alice and to Bob are now in the singlet state as well. This is therefore
equivalent to the EPR scheme. The only difference is that the projection onto
the singlet state performed by the center succeeds with probability 1/4 only.
This means that the center will ask to discard 3/4 of the transmission, but
this does not affect the eavesdropping issue. A cheating center can send to
Alice and Bob any state he wants, including any desired entanglement with his
own system, by choosing an appropriate unitary transformation and the correct
state on which to project his own particles. To show that, we start with the two
singlet pairs and let the center introduce an ancilla in a state Ainit. The state
of the whole system is:
ΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉)⊗ (|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉
)
⊗ Ainit . (5.1)
The first particle of each singlet pair is sent to Alice and to Bob respectively,
while the center keeps the second, together with his ancilla. The state ΦABC
can thus be rearranged as:
ΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↑〉AB⊗|↓↓〉C+|↓↓〉AB⊗|↑↑〉C−|↑↓〉AB⊗|↓↑〉C−|↓↑〉AB⊗|↑↓〉C
)
⊗Ainit ,
(5.2)
where the index AB refers to the particles sent to Alice and Bob, and the index
C refers to the particles kept by the center. The center now applies a unitary
transformation U to entangle his particles with the ancilla in the following way:
UΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↑〉AB ⊗ |↓↓〉C ⊗A1 + |↓↓〉AB ⊗ |↑↑〉C ⊗A2
−|↑↓〉AB ⊗ |↓↑〉C ⊗A3 − |↓↑〉AB ⊗ |↑↓〉C ⊗A4
)
, (5.3)
withAi any normalized states of the ancilla which are (in general) not orthogonal
to one another.
By projecting his state onto ψ = α| ↓↓〉C + β| ↑↑〉C − γ| ↓↑〉C − δ| ↑↓〉C
(this projection succeeds with probability 1/4 on average), the center creates
the state
ΨABC =
1
2
(
α∗|↑↑〉AB⊗A1+β∗|↓↓〉AB⊗A2+ γ∗|↑↓〉AB⊗A3+ δ∗|↓↑〉AB⊗A4
)
,
(5.4)
which is the most general state the center could create when cheating the EPR
scheme [11]. This demonstrate the equivalence between Fig. 5.1a and the EPR
scheme.
In Fig. 5.1b, the first measurement is performed by Alice and Bob, who
project the particles onto the BB84 states. Therefore, the particles arriving
at the center are also in the BB84 states, and this scheme is identical to ours.
Since the relative time of the measurements cannot influence the outcome, all
these schemes are equivalent. Following the same reasoning, but in two steps
(first letting only Alice measure before the center) it is also possible to show
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that the security of the BB84 scheme implies the security of our scheme. Since
the security of the EPR scheme implies the security of the BB84 scheme [11],
our proof actually shows that the security of the three schemes is equivalent.
Using only the total spin measurement, less than one eighth of the qubits
could be used. A better choice, although possibly more difficult to implement
in practice, is to measure the Bell operator (defined in [26]) whose eigenstates
(the Bell states) are the singlet state, Ψ(−) [equation (1.25)], and the three other
states:
Φ(+) =
√
1
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉) =
√
1
2
(|←←〉+ |→→〉) , (5.5)
Ψ(+) =
√
1
2
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉) = −
√
1
2
(|←←〉 − |→→〉) (5.6)
and
Φ(−) =
√
1
2
(|↑↑〉− ↓↓〉) =
√
1
2
(|←→〉+ |→←〉) , (5.7)
where the second expression for each of the Bell states is derived by expanding
them (as was done for the singlet state) into the (|←〉 , |→〉) basis. Consider a
case where Alice and Bob used the same basis. According to the result of the
measurement, and to the choice of axes by Alice and Bob, their prepared states
are known to be either correlated (e.g. if the result is Φ(−) and they both used
the z axis), or anticorrelated (e.g. if the result is still Φ(−) but they both used
the x axis).
The protocol is:
• The center retrieves the particles from Alice and Bob and measures the
Bell operator on each pair. He gets one of the four above states, and tells
his result to Alice and Bob.
• Alice and Bob tell each other the axis they used (but not the bit value).
When they used different axes, they discard the transmission. Whenever
they used the same axis, they know if their bits are correlated or anti-
correlated. In this case half of the quantum states are used to derive the
desired key, and L′ > 2(L+ l) qubits are required.
The proof of security for this case is similar to the proof in the singlet
case. An honest center, who projects the states onto the allowed states, cannot
get any information on the bits. For example, if the center obtains the state
Φ(+), and Alice and Bob announce later that they used the horizontal axis,
the center only knows that either both Alice and Bob have the left state, or
both have the right state. But he cannot know which of these two possibilities
occurred, hence has no information on the bit values. Moreover, similarly to
the singlet case, Φ(+) is the only state for which Alice’s and Bob’s states have
such correlations along both x and z axes. Therefore, for each bit on which a
cheating center attempts to eavesdrop, he needs to create a different state in
order to gain information, which shall be detected with finite probability. By
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checking a large number of bits, Alice and Bob will therefore detect the cheating
with probability exponentially close to one.
5.2 A Quantum Cryptographic Network
In this section we combine the reversed EPR scheme and the use of quantum
memories into a classical network to present a quantum cryptographic network.
The classical protocol for a network uses a hidden file managed by a communi-
cation center. Any user is permitted to put data (secret keys) in the file, under
his name, but only the center has access to the data. Let there be N users,
and let each of them store many L-bits strings. Upon request from two users,
the center uses their data and creates a secret key for them, which is shared by
both of them: the center calculates the XOR of one string of the first user (say,
a1 . . . aL of Alice), and one string of the second user (say, b1 . . . bL of Bob); the
XOR of a string is calculated bit by bit using cj = aj ⊕ bj (the parity of the
two bits), and the resulting string, C = c1 . . . cL, is transmitted (via a classical
unprotected channel) to Alice; Alice rederives Bob’s string by calculating the
XOR of her string with the received string, and can use Bob’s string as their
common key. Secure transmissions from each user to the center can be done ei-
ther by personal delivery, trusted couriers or quantum key distribution. Such a
classical key distribution scheme is perfectly secure if we assume that the center
holding them is perfectly safe and trusted. No other person (except the center)
can have any information on their key. Even a powerful eavesdropper who can
impersonate the center and all the users cannot eavesdrop, since the center and
each of the legitimate users can use some of the secret bits for authenticating
each other. Alice and Bob need to trust the center for two different purposes:
1. To “forget” their secret key (and not trying to listen to the messages
transmitted using the key);
2. To authenticate one to the other in case they have no other way of au-
thentication. This is a new possibility of authentication, added to the
two options, previously mentioned in Section 5.1. Thus the assumption
of having classical channels which cannot be modified can be completely
removed, even if the users have no other way to authenticate each other.
The main reason why this simple scheme is not satisfactory in practice is that it
concentrates too much power in the distribution center. Indeed the center can
understand all the secret communications going through its distribution web,
or connect Alice to an adversary instead of to Bob. Even if we assume that
the center is trusted, any eavesdropper who manages to get access to it could
decipher all the communications.
Using a quantum memory instead of a classical memory is the key-point in
deriving the quantum network. We now present a quantum key distribution
network which uses a quantum file instead of the classical hidden file, and re-
moves the requirement of a trusted center. Alternatively, we can release the
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usual assumption of quantum cryptography [5] – that classical channels cannot
be modified by Eve – if we are willing to trust the center for authentication
(without trusting him for “forgetting” their qubits). Instead of storing L classi-
cal bits to make a future key, each user shall store L′ quantum states (qubits) in
specially devised quantum memories kept in a center. Upon request from two
users, the center performs the time reversed EPR scheme described in the pre-
vious Section and creates correlations between the bits. The resulting string C,
which holds the correlation data is sent to Alice and Bob via a classical channel.
As in the classical case, using string C, Alice can calculate Bob’s string to derive
a final common key of L bits. If Alice and Bob compare bases after deriving
the data from the center, then, as explained in Section 5.1, any attempt by the
center to obtain the value of these bits will create errors and be discovered by
Alice and Bob. The center therefore does not need to be trusted anymore. Un-
like other quantum schemes, the actual (online) distribution of the secret keys
is performed on classical channels. First, the center let Alice and Bob know
the state he got. Then, Alice and Bob continue as in the other two schemes
previously described to obtain the final key. All the quantum communication is
done in advance, when the users “deposit” their quantum strings in the center
(preferably in a personal meeting).
When L-bit strings are stored in a classical hidden file, two users derive L-bit
strings of correlated bits. Using quantum states for representing the bits, longer
strings of length L′ > L+ l are required, since some bits will be used for error
estimation, error correction and privacy amplification. The exact ratio depends
on the expected error rate in the channel. Only the bits which are encoded
in the same basis by both users can be used, therefore L′ > 2(L + l) bits are
actually required (we assume that the more efficient scheme of measuring the
Bell basis is used).
Let us summarize the protocol as follows:
• In the preparation step the user sends (gives) L′-qubit strings to the center,
each qubit is one of the four states of the BB84 protocol. The center
keeps these quantum states in a quantum file without measuring them.
It is important that the system used for keeping the quantum states will
preserve them for a long time (as long as required until the actual key
distribution is performed).
• When Alice and Bob wish to obtain a common secret key, they ask the
center to create correlations between two strings, one of Alice and one of
Bob. The center performs the Bell operator measurement on each pair of
qubits, which projects them onto one of the Bell states, and tells Alice and
Bob the result he obtained. After Alice gets the results from the center
(and not before that), Alice and Bob compare the basis they used and
keep only the bits for which they used the same basis. In this case, and
according to the state obtained, the states of Alice and Bob are either
correlated or anticorrelated. So, Alice for example inverts all her bits
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which should be anticorrelated with Bob’s. The remaining string should
be identical with Bob’s, apart from possible errors.
• An honest center, who performed the correct projections on the Bell states
does not get any information on the string.
• A cheating center (or any other eavesdropper who might have had ac-
cess to the quantum files), who modifies the allowed states, unavoidably
introduces errors between the two strings.
• Alice and Bob perform error estimation, error correction and privacy am-
plification to derive a final key.
The quantum channel is used only as a preparation step between each user
and the center, and all the online communication is done via a classical channel.
Yet, only O(N) keys are required to enable secret communication between any
pair of the N users. The conventional quantum key distribution schemes require
O(N2) keys, or else require online quantum communication. In fact, our scheme
does not require quantum channels at all. As in old implementations of quantum
cryptography [7], the four quantum states can be chosen in any 2-dimensional
Hilbert space. Instead of sending them, each user could arrive once in a while
to the center, and “program” his states into the quantum file. If the memory
can keep the states unperturbed long enough then each user can put as many
strings as he needs till his next visit to the center. By using personal delivery
of the quantum states we replace the distance limitation of all other schemes
by a time limit, and solve the problems of a quantum cryptographic network
which were described in the introduction to this chapter. All the technologically
difficult steps, such as storing qubits and performing Bell measurements occur
only at the center.
5.3 Implementations
Our scheme requires the possibility to program, store and manipulate quantum
bits rather than to transmit them. Therefore, the discussion in Section 1.5
perfectly applies to our demands. In our case the quantum bits are subjected
only once to a unitary operation of calculating the Bell state.
We estimate3 that it may be possible to implement a working prototype of
our scheme within a few years, with small modifications of existing technology
of ion traps. Such a prototype shall be able to keep quantum states of several
users for a few minutes and to allow to perform two-bit operations on qubits
of two users. To do so, the center should hold L′ ion traps, and each of the
two (or more) users puts one qubit in each ion trap. Upon request of two users
the center shall be able to measure the i’th qubit of Alice and the i’th qubit of
Bob together in the i’th ion trap. It may well be that such a prototype will not
3The following suggestions were investigated with the help of D. DiVincenzo [42].
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enable an operation on the qubits of other users, since the state of the other
qubits in the ion trap might be destroyed.
The way to establish a real working scheme with a center and with many
users is still long. The main obstacle is that it is currently infeasible to transfer
a quantum state from one ion trap to another. A real network should enable
each user to program his string of quantum states in a register (say, at least
one separated ion trap for each user). Then, upon request of two users, the
center should be able to move one qubit of each of the two users to another
ion trap where he can perform the Bell measurement without disturbing the
other quantum states. As discussed in Section 1.5, this might be possible using
‘cavitraps’ but it is difficult to estimate now whether it will become practical in
a few years. It may well be that other candidates based on nuclear spins will
become more favorable.
5.4 World-Wide Network of Many Centers
The network of Section 5.2 is well suited for communication among users who
are not far away and can arrive to the center. For two users who are far away
from each other and cannot come to the same center our network may not be
appropriate. We now show that it can be modified to be useful also in this case.
Let there be many centers, and many users registered in each center. Every two
centers should share many EPR singlet pairs. Upon request of users of the two
centers, one center would teleport [8] the qubits of his user to the other center.
This operation can be done with 100% efficiency (but it may, however, increase
the error rate). The singlet pairs can be transmitted using any quantum cryp-
tography scheme or even using a teleportation scheme and a supercenter who
shares EPR pairs with all centers. However, the transmission and distribution
of singlet pairs require quantum channels even if done in advance4.
Do we lose all the benefits we gained before? Certainly not. Still, only the
centers need to have ability of performing quantum operations. All quantum
transmission is done in advance, and yet, there is no need for O(N2) strings,
since the number of centers is much smaller than the number of users. Authen-
tication is still simple. One problem of any quantum channel is the limit on its
length. Our first scheme (with one center) replaced it by a limit on time. It
would be bad to have both problems in a network of many centers. However,
the suggestion of purifying singlets [12] enables transmitting signals to longer
distances. Our scheme can make an excellent use of it, since only the centers
need to have the technological ability of purifying singlets. Moreover, several
transmission stations can be put in between to improve transmission (this idea
was suggested by DiVincenzo [42]) by performing purification of singlets be-
tween any two neighboring stations and then use teleportation from one station
to the next to derive purified singlets shared by the centers.
4And transporting quantum states to deliver them by a personal meeting is similar to
transmitting them through channels.
86
5.5 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter we introduced a new scheme for quantum cryptography based
on a time-reversed EPR scheme. We suggested two new types of networks: a
classical one based on hidden files, and one based on quantum files. The security
of key distribution protocols in these networks does not rely on computational
complexity assumptions. Both networks can be used to distribute keys in a
secure way among any two users using simple online communication via classical
channels. In the case of hidden files it is done with the help of a trusted center
who can have access to all the information exchanged through its lines. Using
quantum files, the center need not be trusted. Users have the means to check
whether the center, or any other eavesdropper, tried to obtain information on
the transmitted messages.
The one-center quantum network we suggested does not require any quantum
channel at all, and can be implemented in a center where each user “programs”
his states into a quantum memory. We estimate that a working prototype
may be built in the near future using ion-trap technology. A real network
can be built when the problem of transmitting a quantum state from one trap
to another is solved (perhaps using cavitrap with polarization states). The
machinery required for our scheme is also required for much more complicated
tasks such as purification and quantum computing. In this respect, our scheme
may represent a first practical application for these new devices, which are now
being planned in various laboratories. We hope that our work will motivate
more research for systems which can both keep a quantum state for a long time,
and enable the desired programming and measurements. We didn’t pay much
attention to the delicate problem of programming the states. The programming
requires a simple equipment to make sure that the center does not eavesdrop
on the preparation step. While cavitraps are very complicated, programming
the polarization state of each of the photons may be quite simple in the future.
A future system of secure communication based on the protocol of Section 5.4
would involve a number of large transmission centers, which can exchange EPR
correlated particles and store them, together with the qubits deposited at the
centers by various users. Secure communication between any pair of users would
then requires teleportation of the states to the same center, followed by the
creation of correlations between the two strings.
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Chapter 6
Quantum Error Correction and
Quantum Privacy Amplification
While doing this research, the feasibility of quantum memory was much in-
creased (at least conceptually) due to the suggestions for quantum error correc-
tion [95]. Furthermore, additional fascinating applications of quantum memories
were suggested by other people:
1. breaking quantum bit commitment [78]
2. entanglement purification [12]
3. quantum privacy amplification [38]
The first issue was mentioned in Chapter 1, and we will not discuss it further.
Let us explain the second issue in brief: Alice and Bob exchange many singlet
pairs through a noisy channel. Because of the natural noise (or any other
reason), the resulting entangled states are imperfect. Using an entanglement
purification process [12], they can distill (if the initial error rate is not too large)
nearly perfect singlet states. This is impressive since the purification is done by
local operations performed at Alice’s site and Bob’s site, and using only classical
discussion.
In this chapter we present our research on quantum error correction and
quantum privacy amplification. Quantum error correction and quantum privacy
amplification generalize the analogous classical concepts to the quantum case.
In the classical case, error correction is useful for improving communication,
computation and memory, and privacy amplification is useful for cryptography.
We use the term quantum privacy amplification literally.
Quantum computation, communication, and memory are very sensitive to
noise. Unlike the classical cases, errors cannot be removed using simple re-
dundancy if non-orthogonal quantum states are used, due to the no-cloning
theorem. Quantum error correction (QEC) was suggested [95] as a way to solve
these problems by using new type of redundancy. Several schemes have been
recently suggested to reduce these problems, mainly focusing on quantum com-
putation, trying to minimize the redundancy. In Section 6.1 we investigate the
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role of QEC in quantum communication and memory. We focus on the fidelity
of the the recovered state, an issue ignored by most of the works on this sub-
ject. To improve the fidelity, we suggest to replace the error-correction codes by
error-reduction codes, and we analyze the ways to calculate the fidelity. For n,
a large integer, we suggest a code which uses N = n2 quantum bits to encode
one quantum bit, and reduces the error exponentially with n [81]. Our result
suggests the possibility of sending quantum states over very long distances, and
maintaining quantum states for very long times. This part was done with the
help of Eli Biham, Gilles Brassard, Lior Goldenberg and Lev Vaidman.
Privacy amplification is an important step in any quantum key distribution
protocol. While we (and also Yao [109] and Mayers [76]) investigated the ef-
ficiency of classical privacy amplification against a quantum eavesdropper, the
possibility of using quantum privacy amplification (QPA) instead of classical
privacy amplification was suggested [38]. Ignoring the problem of practice, this
idea is very interesting. They suggested to perform a QPA which is based
upon the entanglement purification (EP) developed in [12]. We call this process
EP-based QPA, for convenience. In this process Alice and Bob use purified sin-
glets to execute the EPR scheme or the four-state scheme (via teleportation).
They can even choose a fixed basis and use orthogonal states, if they previ-
ously verified that the quantum privacy amplification works to yield the desired
entanglement purification. The EP-based QPA provides a proof of security of
quantum key distribution under the assumption that Alice and Bob have per-
fect devices1 [38]. In Section 6.2 we criticize the possibility that EP-based QPA
provides secure quantum key distribution.
One of the main surprises of the idea of [38] is that, unlike the classical
case (where error correction and privacy amplification are usually considered
separately), the suggested QPA process already contains the error correction as
well! This was a hint that QEC itself could be used for suggesting another QPA
process. In Section 6.3 we show that QEC codes can also serve for QPA (e.g.,
by encoding the qubits of the four-state scheme), if a simple randomization step
is applied.
In the previous chapter and in the literature [11] it is usually claimed that
the EPR scheme provides no significant benefit over the four-state scheme. The
EP-based QPA suggests a genuinely different quantum key distribution protocol,
where the use of shared entangled states yields a protocol that has no analogue
along the lines of the four-state scheme. Our QEC-based QPA shows similar
features to the EP-based QPA, and it can work with any scheme. Due to the use
of randomization of the code qubits, Alice could even start with only two known
orthogonal states, encoded using the QEC code, to execute the key distribution.
This aspect also presents a similarity to the use of the EP-based QEC. Finally,
we explain that QPA might still be crucial to the security of quantum key
distribution over large scale distances or times. This is due to quite different
reasons from those suggested in [38].
1 The assumption appears on page 2819, col. 1, line 18.
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6.1 Quantum Error-Correction
6.1.1 Error-Correction and Error-Reduction
The ability to correct errors in a quantum bit (qubit) is crucial to the success of
quantum computing, and it is very important to the implementations of quan-
tum communication systems and quantum memories. Motivated by quantum
computing, Shor [95] shows that quantum errors can be corrected (in some anal-
ogy to classical error correction [73]). The many works which follow Shor’s idea
focus on improving his result [14, 67, 98, 27] to better fit the requirements of
quantum computing, or to provide a better understanding of the properties of
the error-correction codes (the previous works and also [99, 46, 96]). In this
section we apply this idea to quantum memories and quantum communication,
where improving the fidelity of the recovered state is the main goal. The error-
reduction scheme we suggest here enables, in principle, to reduce the noise in
a transmission channel or in a quantum memory to any desirable level, while
using much less qubits than the analogous error-correction schemes.
Classical error correction is based on redundant encoding which uses more
than one bit (on average) to encode one bit. The simplest scheme is the 1→ 3
repetition code in which each bit is repeated three times in the encoding, and
a majority vote is chosen for decoding. This code corrects one error, thus if the
3-bit string suffers from up to one error, the original bit is recovered with perfect
fidelity. In a realistic analysis one must also take into account the possibility
of more than one error. For instance, if a single bit contains an error with
probability p (where we assume that p is small), then pl =
(
3
l
)
pl(1− p)3−l is the
probability of having exactly l errors. Thus, the probability of having an error
in the recovered bit is P = p2 + p3 = 3(1 − p)p2 + p3 = 3p2 − 2p3. We call the
probability P of having an error in the recovered bit the remainder error, and
the fidelity is 1− P .
The analogous quantum error correction [95] uses 9 qubits2 to encode a single
qubit (to perfectly correct a single error) using the following procedure: a 1→ 3
repetition code in the z basis |0〉 → |000〉 and |1〉 → |111〉 (where |000〉 stands
for the tensor product |0〉|0〉|0〉 of three qubits); a transformation to the x basis
|0〉 → (1/√2)(|0〉+ |1〉) and |1〉 → (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉) for each qubit; and finally,
again a 1 → 3 repetition code in the (new) z basis. All together, the encoding
is:
|0〉 → 1√
8
(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉) ,
|1〉 → 1√
8
(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉) . (6.1)
We denote it as R3UR3 where Rn stands for 1 → n repetition code, and U
for transformation from the z basis to the x basis. From now on, N denotes
the total number of code qubits which encode one original qubit. In an RnURn
2 Other codes were found later on which use less qubits.
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code (which is the obvious generalization of the code suggested by Shor) N = n2
qubits are used.
A qubit is described by a two-dimensional Hilbert space (e.g., spin of a spin-
half particle) and it generalizes the classical bit to the quantum state |ψ〉 =
α|0〉+ β|1〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. When it is encoded using RnURn we get the
entangled state
|ψ〉 → |Ψ
RUR
〉 = α|0
RUR
〉+ β|1
RUR
〉 . (6.2)
This state is made of N = n2 qubits, and lives in a 2(n
2) dimensional Hilbert
space, with
|0
RUR
〉 =
(
1
(
√
2)n
)
(|01 · · · 0n〉+ |11 · · · 1n〉) · · · (|01 · · ·0n〉+ |11 · · ·1n〉)
|1
RUR
〉 =
(
1
(
√
2)n
)
(|01 · · · 0n〉 − |11 · · · 1n〉) · · · (|01 · · · 0n〉 − |11 · · ·1n〉)(6.3)
where there are n multiplets of n bits each. In the decoding process, the dis-
turbed state is projected on the desirable 2-dimensional subspace spanned by
the two states |0
RUR
〉 and |1
RUR
〉.
An error-correction code is not supposed to correct arbitrary types of errors.
In all the discussions on quantum error correction transformations of many
particles together are dismissed since in reality such errors are much smaller
than errors in individual bits. As a result, the interaction of the qubits can
be written as a tensor product of the interactions of the individual bits (each
with an independent environment). We adopt this assumption and refer to it
as independent disturbance.
To simplify the analysis even further, usually an additional assumption is
made, that most of the bits are completely unaffected by the transformations,
while few bits are strongly affected (and suffer from a bit-flip, a phase-flip or
both3). In such a case, a code provides a perfect fidelity if it can correct at least
as many bits as were affected. Unfortunately, this assumption is not natural,
and it contradicts the assumption of independent disturbance which says that
errors occur independently in any of the qubits. We shall not assume that only
some qubits are affected. All bits are affected hence a code cannot provide
perfect fidelity; there is always a remainder error P in the recovered qubit.
We can estimate the average error rate p for a qubit transmitted through
the channel, and calculate the remainder error P which results from it. For a
small p, an error-correction code usually yields a much smaller P . However,
such an approach is somewhat classical and it is not clear that it provides a
correct calculation for P . To the best of our knowledge, it is not completely
proven that the calculation of P can be based upon p, since the qubits are not
measured separately in the QEC process.
In the next subsection we shall try to remove this assumption (for a very
simple case) and follow an alternative approach which is fully quantum. Instead
3 The analysis in [14, 46] might have shown that resistance against such errors promises
resistance against any quantum error. We are not fully convinced that this is indeed true.
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of choosing p as a parameter, we shall choose the “average” transformation4
which acts on each qubit. It may even be more realistic to assume that some of
the transformations are not weak, but we shall be satisfied with analyzing an
average transformation. Usually it is assumed that it suffices to consider the
classical probability p instead of the average transformation.
In this subsection we focus on analyzing the connection between p and P
for Rn codes, assuming that such calculation is relevant to the quantum case of
RnURn as well.
For communication purposes, we are mainly interested in the remainder er-
ror. It can be reduced if we use longer codes (or more efficient codes) which
correct more errors. Alternatively, for a given code, it is possible to reduce the
remainder error if we perform error reduction instead of error correction! Let
us explain the difference between them (in the classical case). We previously
presented the classical error-correction scheme R3. This code improves the re-
mainder error (to 3p2−2p3) only on average: it improves it much when no errors
are found, but it does not improve it when one error is found; in case we know
that one error was identified and corrected [which happens with probability
p2+ p1 = 3p
2(1− p) + 3p(1− p)2] the probability of having a remainder error is
exactly p2/(p1+p2) = p, and we gain no error reduction at all! In case we throw
away cases were an error is found, instead of correcting it, the remainder error
is p3/(p0+p3) = p
3/(p3+(1−p)3). For a small p the remainder error is reduced
from 3p2−2p3 to p3+3p4+O(p5). The probability of success (the probability of
not throwing the bit) is Q = p0 + p3 = 1− 3p+O(p2). The possibility of using
error reduction was already considered in [104], who suggested the n = 2 error
reduction as an alternative to the n = 3 error correction. The n = 2 (classical)
error-reduction code provides a remainder error P ≈ p2 + 3p3 which is better
than 3p2 − 2p3 for a small p.
In any error-correction code, the remainder error increases with the number
of corrected errors. If we throw away cases where the scheme suffers from large
number of errors the average remainder error can be much improved. There-
fore, in our error-reduction code the majority vote is replaced by a unanimous
decision; in case of a disagreement the bit is thrown away. The classical (1→ n)
repetition code Rn with n = 2t+1 provides successful unanimous decision with
probability Q = (1−p)n+pn, and the remainder error in this case is P = pn/Q.
For a small p
P ≈
(
p
1− p
)n
, (6.4)
and (for a large n) Q is given by
Q ≈ (1− p)n ≈ 1− np + (np)
2
2!
− (np)
3
3!
. . . . (6.5)
For a large n but small np we obtain Q ≈ 1− np.
4 In order to yield a small p the transformation must be close to unity.
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The same code can also be used to correct up to t errors (since n = 2t+ 1),
but with a much higher (average) remainder error, which can be calculated
from the binomial expansion of [p + (1 − p)]n. As in the previous example,
if exactly t errors are identified and corrected, the probability that there were
actually t+ 1 errors (hence, there is a remainder error) is p. If np > 1 (or even
np ≈ 1) and Q becomes too small, error correction and error reduction can be
combined together for the price of increasing the remainder error P . This is
done by using a code which can correct up to t errors and use it to correct t′
errors where 0 < t′ < t. The case of t′ = 0 reduces to an error-reduction code,
and the case of t = t′ reduces to an error-correction code. For simplicity we
shall consider only “pure” error-reduction schemes, but our calculations can be
generalized to combine the correction of few bits as well.
The quantum error-reduction scheme R2UR2 (suggested in [104]) improves
the remainder error compared to Shor’s scheme, while using only 4 qubits in-
stead of 9 for the encoding. The error-reduction process is done by projecting
the state of the code’s qubits on a desirable subspace; for instance, in case of the
RnURn quantum error-reduction code, it is projected on the subspace spanned
by the two states of eq. (6.3). If the projection fails, the qubit is not corrected
but is thrown away. Clearly, this does not complicate the implementation, and
would probably even simplify it. Unless Q is very small, throwing away the bits
has only small influence on a quantum key distribution protocol since the legiti-
mate users throw away most of the bits anyhow due to other reasons. However,
in quantum computing throwing one bit destroys the computation.
In a scheme which combines error reduction and t′-errors error correction,
one has to check into which subspace the state is projected, and if this subspace
corresponds to t′ errors (or less) the state is corrected by simple transformations
(see [95]).
Suppose that the average error rate in a quantum error-reduction scheme is
p. Following [95, 104] and other works on this subject we calculate the classical
remainder error P (from the analogous classical code) given that errors occur
with probability p. Let us use the error-reduction code RnURn with large n.
This code encodes one qubit into N = n2 qubits. It reduces the remainder error
to
P =
pn
pn + (1− p)n , (6.6)
that is, to be exponentially with n. More efficient codes could be used as well,
based, for instance, on [98, 99, 27].
6.1.2 A Realistic Calculation of the Remainder Error in
a Simple Case
To the best of our knowledge, a calculation of the remainder error which takes
into account the fact that each bit is subjected to a transformation was done
only in [66]. It was done using interaction operators and recovery operators,
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but only the case where one of the operators is proportional to the identity was
considered, and it is not clear if it covers all possible transformations.
For the simple special case of the code R2UR2 we wish to calculate explicitly
the remainder error P , and the probability of success Q, to verify that they are
of the same order as P and Q of the classical error reduction code R2. We cal-
culate the remainder error without using the classical analogous code. Let each
qubit in the code be transformed arbitrarily (but independently). In general,
the transformation is not unitary since an ancilla (e.g., environment) might be
involved. However, for any given initial state we can still consider unitary trans-
formations and add the effect of decoherence (non-unitary transformations) by
averaging over several different unitary transformations with appropriate prob-
abilities. (We believe that a similar argument is provided in [46]).
For instance, when the weak-measurement gate (eq. 4.59) acts on a code
qubit and an environment qubit in a state
(
1
0
)(
1
0
)
, it yields the same RDM (for
the code qubit) as the average of the two transformations
(
cγ sγ
sγ cγ
)
(6.7)
and (
cγ −sγ
−sγ cγ
)
. (6.8)
The use of unitary transformation provides the order of magnitude of the
resulting P and Q, for verifying that the frequently used classical analog is not
strictly wrong.
Let each qubit j in the code be exposed to the most general one-particle
transformation
Uj =
(
cos θj sin θje
iφj
− sin θjeiηj cos θei(φj+ηj)
)
(6.9)
(up to an irrelevant overall phase), where all angles are smaller than some small
angle χ, so that p ≈ χ2 if a single qubit is measured.
In the quantum error-reduction process R2UR2 the original qubit is encoded
into |Ψ
RUR
〉 = α|0
RUR
〉+β|1
RUR
〉 with |0
RUR
〉 = (1/2)(|0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉+
|1111〉) and |1
RUR
〉 = (1/2)(|0000〉−|0011〉−|1100〉+ |1111〉). The original state
is in a 2(2
2) = 16 dimensional Hilbert space, and can be written as
|Ψ
RUR
〉 = 1
2
[(α+β)|0000〉+(α−β)|0011〉+(α−β)|1100〉+(α+β)|1111〉] . (6.10)
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This state is transformed (due to 〈U1U2U3U4|0011〉, etc.) into:

α + β
0
0
α− β
0
·
α− β
0
0
α + β


→


x0000
x0001
x0010
x0011
x0101
·
x1100
x1101
x1110
x1111


. (6.11)
Using cθ = cos θ and sθ = sin θ, the terms are x0000 = (α+ β)cθ1cθ2cθ3cθ4 + (α−
β)cθ1cθ2sθ3sθ4e
iφ3eiφ4+(α−β)sθ1sθ2cθ3cθ4eiφ1eiφ2+(α+β)sθ1sθ2sθ3sθ4eiφ1eiφ2eiφ3eiφ4 ,
etc. In the quantum error-reduction process the state is projected onto the sub-
space spanned by |0
RUR
〉 and |1
RUR
〉.
Let C = (cos θ1 · · · cos θ4 cosφ1 · · · cos φ4 cos η1 · · · cos η4), thus, C ≈ 1−O(χ2).
After a lengthy calculation we obtain the (unnormalized) final state |Φ
RUR
〉 =
C
[(
α
β
)
+O(χ2)
]
. This final state, when normalized, is almost identical to the
initial state |Ψ
RUR
〉, and the corrections are of the type sin θ1 sin θ2; sin η3 sin η4,
etc., all of order O(χ2) or smaller. Thus, the remainder error probability is
indeed O(χ4) ≈ O(p2), with probability of success Q ≈ C2 ≈ 1 − O(χ2) ≈
1−O(p).
This simple example (which is already quite complicated) shows us that the
classical use of p could be correct. Yet, a more general proof is certainly needed.
6.1.3 Application to Quantum Communication and Memory
The main problem of a scheme which performs only error reduction is that, when
n is increased, the probability of successful projection diminishes as (1−p)n. We
could combine it with some (small-t′) error correction as previously explained,
but there is also a different solution, which should be preferable in case the
noise changes in time as θ ≈ wt. In this case, the probability of success can be
much improved using the Zeno effect (see discussion in [104, 30]) by performing
M projections in between, at equal time steps, reducing p to p/(M2), and Q to
(1 − P
M2
)nM ≈ 1 − np/M . The remainder error is also much improved by this
process. Performing M projections is rather simple when enhancing a quantum
memory is considered (meaning that it does not add any further complication).
When transmission to long distances is considered, Alice and Bob need to have
projection stations between them. We shall explain later in Section 6.3 that
(contrary to the common belief) the usage of such repeater stations is possible
even when used for secure transmission of quantum information (as in quantum
key distribution).
Analysis of the effectiveness of this scheme when real devices are used is
much more complicated and (to our knowledge) is still missing. It might be
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partially or completely solved if fault-tolerant quantum error correction [96] is
used.
6.2 Quantum Privacy Amplification
Quantum privacy amplification (QPA) is a scheme for privacy amplification
which uses quantum gates and memory.
Purification [12] uses quantum gates and classical communication to distill
purified singlet states from non-pure singlet states. Suppose that the two non-
pure singlets are in a tensor product and that Alice and Bob have perfect devices.
Then, if the purification succeeds, the obtained singlet state have a better fidelity
than the average fidelity of the two original state. When a supply of such non-
pure singlets is given, and this process is repeated many times it converges5 to
provide singlets that are arbitrarily close to being perfect. Thus, purification
can be used to provide Alice and Bob perfect singlets under these assumptions.
Recently, a wonderful idea was raised in [38] to use purification as a QPA for
the EPR scheme (but it can be useful to any other scheme due to teleportation).
This paper provides an (almost complete) proof of security of quantum key
distribution under the assumption that Alice and Bob have perfect devices. It
also creates the impression that purification based QPA can provide a proof for
the ultimate security of quantum key distribution. In this section we criticizes
this possibility. It is based on discussions with Charles Bennett, Eli Biham,
Gilles Brassard and John Smolin.
When Eve performs a collective attack, the original pairs are in a tensor
product with each other, even if entangled with Eve’s probes. In this case, and
with the additional demand that Alice and Bob have perfect devices, this QPA
provides an easy proof of security. [Yet, it does not provides a calculation of
Eve’s information as a function of the original average fidelity and the number
of singlets required (which might be exponentially large with some parameter
if not proven otherwise). Only an incomplete numerical analysis is provided].
Altogether, there are three assumptions which make the proof correct and
complete: (1) Alice and Bob have exponentially large number of particles. (2)
Alice and Bob have perfect devices. (3) Eve performs a collective attack (this
results from eq. (9) in [38]). Here, we ignore the efficiency problem, although
this problem must be solved if one wishes to use the scheme.
Let us try to remove assumptions (2) and (3) to see whether the purification
based QPA can provide a proof of security in principle. We conclude that it
might provide it, but the task might be much more difficult than proving security
using classical privacy amplification.
If Alice and Bob have perfect devices but Eve performs a (non-collective)
joint attack their proof is almost complete: Suppose that Eve knows which pairs
shall be used at each step (including the pairs which shall be used for verification,
but not the basis used for each verification) Eve could prepare a state which
5 If the original singlets are not too far from being pure.
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yields an error only in certain qubits, since all the transformations are unitary
(this observation is due to Charles Bennett and John Smolin). Indeed, in this
case, it is quite clear that randomizing the pairs solves the problem. However,
an analysis of this attack and a proof of security against it are missing from [38],
and it is not clear if changing the intuition into a proof is trivial. Note that
we use a similar randomization argument in Chapter 2, where we provide an
intuition that randomization makes a collective attack the strongest joint attack.
The proof in [38] considers noisy channels, but assumes non-realistic perfect
devices. The case of perfect devices is not of much interest unless the proof can
be extended to real devices. We analyze both the security against collective
attacks and against joint attacks.
If Eve performs a collective attack and Alice and Bob have real devices it is
still possible to generalize the proof of [38]. On one hand, Alice and Bob cannot
check whether the purification converges. Perfect devices are required to enable
Alice and Bob to derive any level of confidence that the remaining pairs are in
the desired pure state, and quit the protocol if this level is not reached. On the
other hand, repeating the purification many times and randomizing the pairs
probably reduces the entanglement with Eve to zero even if the states are not
purified. It is not clear how to prove security and how to find Eve’s information
as a function of the number of iterations in this case.
While assuming either perfect devices or collective attacks seems to cause
problems which are solvable in principle, removing both assumptions might
leave an unsolvable problem.
Let the RDM of one such pair be ρ, and the RDM of all the pairs together
be χ. Also let the state of the entire system (pairs and Eve’s probes) be ψ.
With ρ close enough to the desired singlet state |φ−〉〈φ−|, Alice and Bob cannot
distinguish ρ from the desired state due to their non-perfect devices. Let us
present various attacks Eve could perform in such a case:
1. Eve can prepare a joint state χ for the pairs such that the purification
does not converge due to her special choice of the entanglement of the
pairs.
2. Eve can prepare a different state χ for the pairs which is not changed by
randomization.
3. Eve could prepare a state ψ for the system and her probes, such that she
obtains information from it.
Furthermore, consider the following attack:
• Eve might be able to combine the above three techniques to create a
situation where purification does not converge, randomization does not
work, and yet she gets some information on some final bit, or collective
property of some bits.
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We were not able to prove that such an attack is impossible. Furthermore, it is
not even clear how to find an intuitive argument for security in this case.
Thus the EP-based QPA only provides the possibility for a very restricted
security proof, assuming either perfect devices or the collective attack. Note that
improving their proof is an extremely difficult task when we recall that Eve has
access to all information regarding the purification process, thus can follow the
changes in the state of her probes throughout the process. Therefore, we believe
that proving security using the much simpler classical privacy amplification is
an easier task.
6.3 Quantum Error Correction as Quantum Pri-
vacy Amplification
In this section we suggest another QPA which is based on QEC. After read-
ing the previous section, one may wonder whether QPA (of any type) is still
interesting. We believe it is, for reasons which are shown at the end of this
section.
One of the effects of QPA is error correction. This raises the question of
whether QEC can serve as QPA. Assuming Alice and Bob have perfect devices
we suggest the following (simple) QEC-based QPA: Alice prepares M qubits
that she wishes to send to Bob. She chooses the qubits according to the four-
state (or the two-state) scheme of quantum cryptography. She encodes each
qubit using N qubits following any QEC scheme and sends the MN qubits
to Bob. Bob receives the particles and keeps them in a quantum memory till
receiving all qubits which encode an original qubit. Since perfect devices are
used, QEC can reduce a small error rate in a quantum memory or in a quantum
channel to any desired level due to analysis of the remainder error (apart for
accumulating many-bits error).
We can use projection stations to improve this QEC-based QPA much fur-
ther, due to the Zeno effect. We call them quantum repeaters. When such quan-
tum repeaters are placed in appropriate predetermined distances, they keep the
error rate at low levels without reducing security. Note that, when real devices
are used, the use of fault-tolerant QEC [96] might still enable reducing the er-
rors to any desired level (although the use of projection stations becomes more
subtle).
Let us now analyze the case where an eavesdropper attempts to eavesdrop
on the code qubits. Eve can either get the qubits at some intermediate stage, or
even control the projection stations used to improve the probability of successful
projection Q. Indeed, since each such station is only required to perform the
desired projection, it can even be controlled by the eavesdropper; if Eve tries
to do anything other than the required projections — she increases the error
rate and will be detected. Eve could even control the encoding and decoding
process of the original qubit.
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The only assumption required for the success of any error-correction or error-
reduction scheme is that each code bit is disturbed independently of the others.
If real noise causes many-particle transformations the scheme will fail, but for
bits stored or transmitted separately, such effects are expected to be negligible.
Thus, the legitimate users can use error-reduction schemes to decrease the noise,
and expect much less errors when comparing a portion of the data. Eve is still
permitted to do whatever she likes, including creating many-particle coherence.
She could clearly benefit from performing a coherent attack in this case, but
she is restricted to induce a much smaller error rate on the original qubit.
If perfect devices are used, Alice and Bob can reduce the permitted error
rate exponentially to zero. In case of real devices a proof is still missing. As
previously said, analyzing this aspect of QPA is rather complicated and we
believe that a security proof based on classical privacy amplification is simpler.
If Eve deviates from the protocols and the error rate is larger than expected,
Alice and Bob quit the transmission. If she deviates from the protocol but
provides the final state with the permitted error rate, Alice and Bob do not care
which operations she has done. Then, the permitted small error rate (which is
verified), promises them that her information is limited as desired.
The errors due to the frequent projections in a “many-stations” system were
not considered here. As in the case of a fault-tolerant calculation [96], it may
well be that there is some optimal number of stations M such that a larger
number of stations causes an increase of the remainder error. Note also that
some errors are due to the creation and measurement of the code state in the
labs of Alice and Bob, and for the time being these limit our ability to reduce P .
We believe that error correction by symmetrization is the right way to handle
these problems, but we are not aware of works which are showing this. However,
the main limitations on quantum cryptography are maintaining coherence over
long distances and long times and these limitations are solved efficiently using
the scheme we suggest.
Suppose now that Alice sends the MN qubits in a random order (so that
Eve will not know which N qubits encode each original qubit). In this case, our
QPA scheme probably becomes more secure: Without having the knowledge
regarding the random permutation we conjecture that she could benefit from a
coherent eavesdropping. Thus, the randomization of the code qubits probably
improves the QPA. However, as for all other uses of the randomization argument
there is no proof for this intuition.
The EP-based and the QEC-based QPA processes do not assure security.
They only allow Alice and Bob to work with a much lower permitted error
rate. Even though we do not believe that QPA improves our ability to prove
security in a direct way, it might still help it in other ways. a) It can be used
to reduce the error rate very much. Such a reduction might be crucial for
other security proofs such as the one we presented in Chapters 2 and 4, which
relies on various approximations of small angles. b) It enables implementing
quantum cryptography over large scale distances and times since the final error
rate depends only on the devices’ errors and not on the channel/memory’s error.
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When we combine both arguments we see that QPA might be crucial for proving
security using classical privacy amplification when large scale cryptography is
performed, by reducing the errors to levels which can be dealt with by the BM
approach.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Quantum memory shall sooner or later become a common tool. In this thesis we
provided the first thorough analysis of the impacts of using quantum memories
for both improving quantum cryptography and for attacking it. In the hands
of an eavesdropper a quantum memory is a crucial tool: without it classical
privacy amplification provides a proven security of quantum key distribution
(although an explicit bound is still missing). In this work we provided strong
evidences that classical privacy amplification still works when Eve holds a quan-
tum memory, and we suggested a way to establish a full proof. In the hands
of the legitimate users, a quantum memory provides new ways of establishing
a network for many users. It also provides the ability to improve large scale
quantum key distribution.
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